



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
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THE STUDY

OF COMPARATIVE CIVILIZATIONS

Scientific thought today is dominated by the spirit of synthesis, in contrast with eighteenth and nineteenth century works which were characterized by their analytical impulse. However, this movement is still lurking in the collective unconscious, and not having achieved as yet its complete flowering, it remains ignored by most of the intellectual élite. Not only because it is impossible to see the forest for the trees, but especially because, influenced by an academic tradition inherited from the great masters of past centuries, the élite today is loathe to open its eyes to the reality of our own times. Official science, most universities and specialists have been trained to feel a horror for general ideas. It would, therefore, seem that this intellectual tendency is not likely to favor the creation of vast conceptions, were it not for the fact, as we shall see later, that despite themselves, scholars and researchers are carried along by the same movement of ideas. For,

Translated by S. Alexander.

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in order to advance into the most varied domains of scientific thought in our time, it is sometimes necessary to establish such intimate relationships among special fields, widely separated from each other in terms of their subject matter, that actually the sketching out of veritable syntheses is taking place to some degree everywhere. It is really very simple; in the absence of such generalizations, one would be pawing the ground.

Reaction against general ideas in the course of the past two centuries have had a legitimate cause: to disengage scientific method from the interference of certain anthropocentric conceptions which had often been put, by propaganda, at the disposal of a religious idea.

Galileo's trial, the hue and cry unleashed by clerical militants against the theory of evolution, could not easily be forgotten. The consequences of this reaction were all the more important insofar as the physical and biological sciences which were the direct targets of such attacks, lay, by reason of their discoveries and practical applications, at the very forefront of events and gave them their tone. Unconsciously, their methods were taken as the model. And thus, a more or less unanimous animosity against general ideas crystallized. In a sense, this discipline was very prudent, for at that time the physical and biological sciences were merely in their adolescence. It was much more important to gather facts, whether by observation or by experience. The interpretation of these facts would come later.

However, the abuses which were committed must not be exaggerated to the point of prejudicially judging the work-methods of the most developed sciences. Wide-flung hypotheses were necessary for the progress of knowledge and the evolution of thought in general. Together with the accident of discoveries or the appearance of new techniques, there came the resuscitation of themes and theories long rejected or forgotten. But in their newest metamorphosis they re-emerged purified as more precise instrumentalities. Thus, it would appear that alongside of the evolution of scientific thought the critical spirit had to separate bit by bit correct ideas from those which seemed furthest from reality, distinguishing useful from encumbering concepts. Henri Poincaré had already observed this torturous march of scientific thought; thus he was enabled to write those clairvoyant pages

which were confirmed by the history of science, together with the new perspectives which had just been opened up.¹ But the ideas of the great scholar could not change the atmosphere which prevailed at the end of the last century; and, on the other hand, recent lessons in the history of science could not be assimilated by the reading public at large for the simple reason that of all the sciences, the history of science was the youngest and had not yet succeeded in establishing a recognizable body of doctrine.

Setting aside some stuttering efforts in the course of the nineteenth century, the history of science was established on a solid base only forty years ago. However, despite this short existence, it is possible to derive two lessons from these attempts which help us to understand the present situation. These are the relationships which obtain in any given epoch between already-acquired knowledge, and the sometimes uncertain principles which may be deduced from recent research, as well as from the comprehension of the discontinuous movement of scientific thought in its historic development.

From the historical point of view, that is to say, in terms of the evolution of scientific thought, there has always existed a misunderstanding, a more or less emphasized lack of harmony, between the level of knowledge already acquired by previous generations and the mental attitude which is our contemporary patrimony; in a word, between learning and inquiry.

For the purpose of this article we are now concerned only with a certain confusion growing out of this difficulty which must take more or less time to be resolved. In our time, as has happened in the past, together with the parsimony inherent in any effort of too long duration, or with the fever which produces sensational discoveries—especially if they serve to modify customs of contemporary life—there exist sciences which are very much in fashion because they seem to plunge suddenly ahead in an extraordinary way. And their bursting luminosity tends to dazzle minds to the point where other sciences are left rejected in the shadow, a situation especially marked if their labors are obscure, or if they are not succeeding in issuing forth from the impasse in which they find themselves wedged.

¹ See especially the introduction to his book: *La science et l'hypothèse*.

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Thus, from the fifteenth to the eighteenth century, navigational science enjoyed an enormous publicity; the same as nuclear or astronautic science today. The former made possible in those days the discovery of America and the dispersion of the white peoples all over the earth; the latter make possible the exploration of space. As a result of the fuss produced by technological exploits, a state of mind spreads among intellectuals who tend to believe that the striving of thought toward new horizons is limited exclusively to those sciences which, at a given moment, are rich with creative ebullience, whether real or apparent. For there is a tendency to confound the benefits which certain practical applications may produce with real contributions toward human knowledge.

Furthermore, it is possible to fall into the error of appreciating values of our own time while one lacks perspectives with regard to the past. Let us give an example. From a historical point of view, Galileo's work has generally been presented to the public at large in a tendentious manner. If one were to believe most of the texts and commentaries it would seem as if Galileo's work had enjoyed great popularity in its time and exercised an important influence on creative thinkers. But this is really a distortion due to faulty perspective, resulting from applying to the past a prestige subsequently acquired as a result of the extraordinary exuberance of nineteenth century physical science. In Galileo's day no one had acclaimed a miracle. The great laws, then set forth, had been more or less known in outline since antiquity, and the master's contemporaries did not suspect the importance which the newly introduced mathematical subtleties represented.² Archimedes had not been able to establish these laws in a precise manner for the simple reason that neither multiplication nor division was available to him, nor the possibility of employing the zero or decimals.

² Even Descartes manifests this state of mind, which seems surprising since he, more than any other, contributed by his mathematics and philosophy to the development of the physical sciences. His testimony, therefore, assumes an authority difficult to find among other seventeenth century authors: "As for classical mathematics and modern algebra, aside from the fact that they deal only with the most abstract, seemingly useless, materials... they have been made into an obscure art, encumbering the mind, rather than into a science cultivating it." Descartes, *Discours de la méthode*. Second Part.

He possessed only the abacus to assist him in operational calculation. But Galileo took up again the same studies making use of the new means of calculation which represented a continuous effort of fifteen hundred years.

That is why Galileo's work in his time interested only a limited minority of learned men. The real efforts of the seventeenth century were yoked to another need—the problem of discovering a method by which it would be possible to compute longitudes. Such was the problem which preoccupied governments, official science, the academy, stirring up the curiosity of the newspapers and the public, as today research for discovering the causes of cancer or the secrets of the atom. The solution of this problem which cost enormous sums of money and work lasting three hundred years dates from the eighteenth century. Sea voyages were made possible by it and modern time computing applied to it.

In the selection of this field of work Galileo, therefore, offers us no proof of originality. His genius consisted in applying new mathematical methods where they had previously not been applied. In other words, he realized a synthesis between modern mathematics and the beginnings of physics; just as in the thirteenth century the astrologers of Alfonso X, the Wise, had achieved at Toledo a synthesis among trigonometry, algebra, and the new decimal forms of arithmetic in order to study the curves of the movements of the planets.

We, therefore, find ourselves with two opposing points of view which have been the cause of serious misconceptions, resulting from a fault of perspective. In Galileo's time the great preoccupation and obsession of most thinkers was concerned with navigational science because it brought an immediate yield to the collectivity. The first conceptions of the new physics interested only a very small minority; but if the wide public of letters had understood the importance of Galileo's work his trial would not have taken place, or, at any rate, not in the manner which later provoked such scandal. On the other hand, from the point of view of modern thought, the fact is ignored that Galileo's work was the fruit of a synthesis. But presenting his work, as we do today, as if it were the scientific thought of his epoch, we overlook

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the fact that it was navigational science which made the development of the contemporary world possible.

This faulty perspective has exercised such an influence on thought that the history of science has been derailed by it up to our own day. Thus was formed that naive conception (put forward in innumerable texts) according to which science had not really begun until the end of the eighteenth century. Everything that had been achieved before were only sketches, stammering efforts. We were informed, black on white, that atomic science counted only fifty years of existence when the fundamental hypothesis dates from Democritus and the methods of work which made possible the current measurements without which nuclear science would not exist, that is to say, mathematics, had demanded of humanity a continuous effort of five thousand years!

Furthermore, we had to face the fact that in human knowledge there existed sciences which were no longer engaging in research because they had exhausted their objectives. Others found themselves in an impasse. But the one as much as the other might serve for future syntheses. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries numismatics were considered a leading field of research. But once all the coins had been collected and described, there was almost nothing more to discover. However, numismatics could serve as a precious source for the historian; it could help him out of difficulty. Taxinomy, which had aroused the enthusiasm of nineteenth century biologists, is at the point of completing its inventories and classifications. But the fact that it no longer occupies the place today that it had previously does not mean that it has ceased to exist. Thanks to it other scaffoldings could be constructed. The description of invertebrates or insects and the study of their biology made experimentation possible in genetics. Without the application of zero in mathematics and the discovery of the decimal (notions which were investigated in Spain in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries) the microns and angstroms employed by biochemists and physicists would not exist. Nor are these exclusively contemporary. Apollonius of Perga who lived in the third century B.C. had discovered the unusual curves which might be obtained by sectioning a cone. It was only one thousand six hundred years later that it was ob-

served that these geometric figures existed in nature and were traced in the sky by the rotation of the stars.

In other words, sciences which had been at the very forefront of research, those which pawed the ground without going ahead, those which had achieved their goals a long time ago—all these play their part in the heaping up of human knowledge transmitted from generation to generation. Nuclear or biochemical sciences might enjoy the publicity and illusions which their discoveries and practical applications create, but science is the knowledge of all branches of learning. These observations now permit us to understand the discontinuous development of scientific thought. And furthermore, the history of science teaches us today that this discontinuity exists not only in time but also in space; a fact which has been overlooked until recently. Let us give an example which has now become classic.

"Humanity," wrote Schopenhauer, "lost (because of Aristotle's geocentric theory) a truth (the heliocentric system) and it took two thousand years to rediscover it." Now, this phrase which has become a cliché cooked in all kinds of sauces during the past century was simply the result of an ignorance of extra-occidental civilizations. According to a nationalistic assumption one would have believed that the West after a long tunnel called the Iron Age had finally succeeded in continuing the scientific work of the Greeks. But this was not so. The heritor of the School of Alexandria which synthesized the knowledge of antiquity, was Arab civilization and scientific development continued within its radius of action, where nations of high intellectual standard existed: Persia, Mesopotamia, Andalusia. During these two thousand years in which it was believed that nothing had happened, human knowledge had actually made a gigantic leap ahead. Scholars had brought to bear an extraordinary instrument, mathematics. Humanity had learned to calculate with numbers rather than letters. And in this impressive effervescence, Aristotle's geocentric theories had very little attraction. Indeed, those of Aristarchus of Samos had had at least as many partisans, and the astrologers of the Wise King of Toledo were more or less heliocentrists in the thirteenth century long before Copernicus and Kepler.

It is now easy to deduce from these historical perspectives the principles which interest scientific thought. In order for a science

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to achieve a broad structure of ideas, a long period of analysis is needed, sometimes lasting millenia. In order to arrive at geographic syntheses which are today taught in school, a continuous effort was necessary beginning with Hecataeus of Miletus in the sixth century B.C. and ending only toward the end of the last century. How much more time will geologists need in order to classify the ancient folds in the strata existing all over the surface of the globe? This would make it possible to understand techtonic phenomena, their genesis, and why and how mountains came into being. How many centuries will yet be needed for the nuclear sciences to pass from the state of equations—which are relations between different measurements—to that of definitions?

But at *any* given moment a particular science finds itself sufficiently mature to undertake the task of synthesizing its data. It may happen that this propitious moment coincides with parallel developments in other fields. The synthesis, therefore, will be concerned not only with a single branch of knowledge but a large complex of them. Society will be shaken by a burst of genius. New horizons will leap to view. The epoch will be stamped by this coin.

These new perspectives, therefore, reveal to us the discontinuous evolution of scientific thought. In the history of science there exist long periods of analysis and rapid movements of synthesis in which human genius achieves the highest degree of its power. Thus we have the epoch of the School of Alexandria, of that of Andalusia in the Middle Ages, of the seventeenth century in the West. And thus also the twentieth century offers itself more sharply to our comprehension by reason of this new light. After the long period of analysis which dominated a great number of sciences from the eighteenth century on, a wide movement of synthesis reveals itself today with such force of acceleration that our epoch can already be characterized by this tendency.

It was possible to perceive the beginnings of this process toward the end of the century. Biology, represented by paleontology, the natural sciences by geology, and physics by crystallography,—all these sciences, although very remote from each other in terms of fields of study—had begun to establish such intimate relationships as to permit a gigantic synthesis: the history of the earth and living things. Chemophysics and biology were joined

in order to explain the functioning of the human machine; as a result of which, new perspectives in physiology have been opened up, and in our day even new horizons in the field of psychology. At the present time, molecular chemistry, the nuclear sciences, genetics and others are intermingling to create another extraordinary synthesis: biochemistry which, perhaps, in the very near future, will succeed in explaining the mysteries of life and its evolution. What was the direction of Einstein's life-work if it was not an effort to achieve an equation that might synthesize all known laws of physics? This trend is obvious today. The ultra-specialization in all branches of knowledge today, resulting from the activity of scientific thought over the course of preceding millennia, must not influence us to underestimate the significance of this counter-trend.

History could not avoid this grandiose trend toward synthesis which characterizes our epoch. From the sixteenth century until today, history had carried on a long work of analysis. For, beginning in the sixteenth century, the critical spirit, thanks to the humanists, intervened in order to separate fact from fiction, from inaccuracies and lies, to verify or reconstitute facts on the basis of primary evidence. Previously, history had been the patrimony of personal interpretation necessarily circumscribed within the chronicler's vision. The narration of events could not possess any authority other than that resulting from the honesty, intellectual formation and idiosyncrasy of the chronicler. Although he might have talent, even genius, he was subject to errors of interpretation resulting from a limited knowledge of the contemporary facts which he was relating. Too often he was inscribing his parchment only to satisfy the vanity of a prince or his own family; sometimes he was even subsidized to present "the official truth" in his writing. If he enjoyed independence, he made no effort to describe events objectively. Not possessing any perspective on the past, hardly knowing about the generations which had immediately preceded him, he made no attempt to raise himself above the struggle. Such an idea never even entered his head. Consciously or unconsciously, he allowed himself to be borne along by his own religion or political convictions. History was simply a literary genre, an art.

From the sixteenth century on, a gigantic work of scrutiny

was effectuated. Little by little, the chronology of the most important events experienced by humanity, have been set down in an orderly manner. The origin of humanity's past has been pushed further back into the night of time. It took three centuries of critical studies to free the historian from the tyranny of Genesis. The antiquity of man seems ever more remote, going back to epochs so distant as to startle the mind. In the seventeenth century, it was still believed that Adam dated from four thousand years ago. In our time, fragments of primitive beings are found in strata belonging to the most remote quaternary periods. Sinanthropes and Australothropes are dated from between six hundred thousand and eight hundred thousand years ago. But in that case, an enormous perspective—at first startling us, and then filling us with a sense of wonder—emerges out of the dawn mist and imposes itself on modern thought. Since the paleolithic age, numerous civilizations had succeeded each other, concealed or forgotten in the inexorable course of centuries. More and more evidence heaped up in museum collections and it was possible to begin to understand humanity's slow march ahead. And again a grandiose conception struck the spirit. Entire cycles of civilizations had developed in complete isolation of each other. Formerly, natural obstacles had been so imposing that civilizations had emerged, grown and attained their complete flowering independently within determined geographic limits. Regions privileged by nature were distinguished from the sterility of other parts of the globe in which great cultures had not been able to perfect themselves; the Mediterranean *oikouméne*, the high plateaus of Asia, the valleys of the great Chinese rivers, of the Indus and the Ganges, certain sections of America... After four centuries of analysis history eventually had become a science. It had accumulated an enormous amount of material. It was time to put it all in order and establish relationships. The hour of synthesis had arrived.

History, therefore, was following the same rhythm of evolution as that of contemporary thought. Lacking new forms it could only remain motionless. Of course, it was always possible to continue the inventory undertaken since the sixteenth century. Indeed, this is the task which most researchers are engaged in even today. Archives and centers containing archaeological riches

possess enormous reserves still to be catalogued and analysed. New discoveries occur which make it necessary to restudy themes which had been considered exhausted, such as the manuscripts of Upper Egypt which present under a new light—and I need not say how much more exact—the problem of Gnosticism. But also it seemed ever more evident that as soon as one departed from the early years of the sixteenth century in order to go back to more remote times, one entered a slippery terrain in which cunning ambushes lay in wait at every step.

It was very simple. The documents which had come down to us were less numerous—and how much less!—than those which had been preserved in modern times. And then there was a more serious problem: periods for which no documentation remained. At the same time, the critical spirit was being applied to those epochs which had left richer source materials. Yet, even in those cases, it was difficult to resuscitate the authentic atmosphere. For example, the great century of the Roman Empire. Suspicion crept into the mind. Agreed, one possessed an accurate chronology; various data which had seemed sufficient. But did that lend a believable interpretation to events? Today it is possible to doubt it. At the end of the nineteenth century the historians had gathered together their findings on modern times. The sixteenth century had particularly interested them. In the course of these years, the West had finally split up into separate restless nationalities; and there was no doubt that the wars of religion constituted a turntable on which the West of the Middle Ages had become transformed into Europe such as it subsequently existed. Because of its inherently great interest, this epoch was conscientiously studied. However, one need merely read the works written then by the great scholars to realize that they were more or less unintelligible. Like every old scientific text, it will be said, superseded by more recent work. Agreed, and in this sense it was easy to point out the lacunae concerning Latin countries, Italy and especially Spain. But it was not the lack of information which disheartened the reader. Rather, what irritated one beyond measure was a question of fundamental error with regard to the interpretation of events. The facts were exact, the episodes recounted were seriously documented, but one knew that the spirit of the epoch was altogether different than that which was being described.

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In our days the greatest works of history have gone beyond the analytical method. Short syntheses have been outlined. Twentieth century historians have made a very great effort to understand the extraordinary sense of life which was bubbling in the West in the sixteenth century. But they realized that an accurate chronology of battles, of peace treaties, of tournaments and other anecdotes, together with descriptions and commentaries were not sufficient. They understood that the society of that time had been agitated by profound currents of ideas whose sources went back to previous centuries, but whose explosion had been favored by a complex of economic, social and intellectual phenomena which had set people and things topsyturvy. The reappearance and knowledge of texts from antiquity, unknown until that time, the diffusion of printed books, the discovery of America and contact with civilizations whose existence had not even been suspected, the new Humanist conceptions put forward by Erasmus, the arrival of precious metals from the East Indies causing a rise in prices composed an entity important in an altogether different sense than the squabbles between Charles V and Francis I. A vast synthesis had thus been sketched out. Undoubtedly, it will be perfected by new findings. Nevertheless, it is permissible today to believe that the main lines for the understanding of that epoch were solidly drawn. That is why the reader felt that nineteenth century works, although so close to our own time, seemed to have aged so terribly.

And so the suspicion grew in the mind of the student of universal history. If this new synthesis concerning a period so short and a geographical frame so limited as that of the West during the sixteenth century had resulted in such a transformation of knowledge during the last few years, what was one to think of previous epochs about which only a meager documentation was available and sometimes only a simple chronological scaffolding! As one went back toward the past, led astray by chronicles possessing literary value but no objectivity, had not only the history of victories been set down? That is to say, the history of those ideas which had succeeded in dominating the minds of an epoch and eliminating all rivals: those soldiers clinging to the ground? In a word, as one went back beyond the sixteenth century, had

not a history of myths been conceived of rather than a history of facts?

The problem was clearer when it became a question of understanding events which unexpectedly happened in epochs about which no documentation remained. Then myth shamelessly imposed itself. For example, all the text books assure us that the Arabs invaded Spain. Now, there does not exist any evidence from the eighth century concerning this extraordinary action. The earliest Latin chronicles which have come down to us, dating only from the ninth century, do not explain this invasion. They ignore Mohammed and the expansion of Islam. The enemies of the Christians are the heretics. One must refer to the earliest Arab chronicles known, belonging to the end of the tenth and beginning of the eleventh century, in order to find an account of this startling conquest. That is to say, this history agreed upon by everyone is based on documents drawn up several centuries after the events! The myth was so anchored in the mind of historians that it had never crossed their imaginations to find out how armies from the Nile were able to reach Tunisia after having crossed some three thousand kilometers of desert, nor to explain how North Africa could have been conquered in less time than one says an Ave Maria, that is in ten years! For, in order to invade Andalusia it was necessary to control Morocco...and to cross the Strait of Gibraltar. How had this formidable stretch of sea been cleared? Very easily. According to the evidence of the oldest Arab chronicles, with four boats...!

But since that seemed insufficient, even if those barques were as big as Noah's ark, the basis of the account was approved of, while the mechanism which might explain the action was rejected—the fleet (?) of Count Julian, Governor of Ceuta, who, seeking to avenge his daughter's honor, soiled by the king of Toledo, had lent the four barques to the troops of Taris the invader.

Certain historians, especially among contemporaries, clearly recognized the weakness of the documents on which classical history rests. But what was there to do? Except realize with Georges Marçais the impotence of current science in explaining the Islamisation of Ifriqiyah, the land of Saint Augustine, Origen,

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Tertullian!³ A Spanish author of the past century who studied the Arab invasion of Spain in great detail exclaims in an outburst of frankness: "If for such reasons (fables, contradictions, exaggerations and anachronisms in the chronicles) one were to reject what the ancients tell us, many of the most important pages of universal history would remain blank."⁴

Thus one found oneself faced with an unsurmountable obstacle which, upon further consideration, proved to be only the result of analytic methods followed up to our own day. In simple terms, it is only a question of growth. To go ahead, to issue from the impasse, and advance toward the future it is necessary to change methods and take a bird's eye view. Just as in the torturous march of scientific thought, at a certain stage there was an imperative need for syntheses. It became absolutely necessary to establish the lines of force which at a given time and in a given geographical framework had structured the society. The historian found himself in possession of certain precise and accurate data like those points which the mathematician fixes upon his coordinates, but he had not dared establish their curve, that is to say, the evolution of this human grouping.

A similar difficulty had presented itself to the biologists who were studying those creatures who had formerly peopled the earth. Two bits of evidence were discovered, two fossils representing the growth of a *phylum*, that of the hooved mammals, for example. Now, the paleontologist enjoyed an advantage over the historian. He possessed a general idea, a working hypothesis, permitting him to establish relations between the two fossils which he would compare in his laboratory. This was the theory of evolution. He did not know how this evolution had come about, but, as a hypothesis existing over a long term, it served him as a connecting feature, whereby he could recognize the relationship existing between two species which at first seemed markedly different in terms of their

³ "The Islamization of the Berbers raises an historical problem which we have no hope of resolving." Georges Marçais, *La Berbérie musulmane et L'Orient au Moyen Age*, Paris, Aubier, 1946, p. 35.

⁴ Eduardo Saavedra, *Estudio sobre la invasión de los Árabes en España*, Madrid 1892, p. 2.

anatomy and yet belonged to the same family. It was impossible for him to reconstruct the missing link but all the same, he could deduce the development of the living creature. Thus, on a very fine thread, paleontologists succeeded in describing the evolution of the hooved mammals. The method employed proved most adequate since subsequent discoveries confirmed their generalization.

The historian found himself in a position of flagrant inferiority. It was difficult for him, employing analytical methods, to reconstitute the sense of events which, besides, he knew about only in a sporadic manner. That is why myths have maintained themselves up until our day. The understanding of universal history was only a snare.

And so we have the problem of the Arab invasion of Spain or that of the Islamization of Ifriqiyah. Lacking contemporary documents and considering the poverty of those belonging to later epochs, the historian did not dare set himself above the mediocre and contradictory texts to confront the insurmountable problems posed by geography. How explain the conquest of regions so far from bases in Arabia, which at that time, given the then existing means of communication, were situated at the end of the world? Did one not have the right to wonder how and by what miracle, those gigantic armies needed to reach the Clain or the Indus and conquer the terrain, had been able to rise out of a desert, an uninhabited place by definition? Historians had not compared these obscure events with subsequent events better known; for Islam consequently was well propagated in regions where no one in the memory of man had spoken about the Moslem invasion, since that episode had taken place in periods when the political power of the Arab nations was already well on the decline: Black Africa, the high Asian plateaus, certain Chinese provinces, Indonesia which had been Islamized in the fourteenth and fifteenth century and has now become the most important Moslem state in the world.

If one applied simple but vast syntheses to these questions, it was then easy to understand that Islam had been propagated among the masses by virtue of a leading idea which possessed an extraordinary dynamism: monotheism. As a result of this principle one could demonstrate that the Mediterranean world since the second century A.D., and perhaps even before, up to the six-

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teenth century, the battle of Lepanto, had been the theatre of a gigantic competition between two religious ideas: monotheism and a trinitarian conception of the divinity. The events of the seventh and eighth century to which we have made reference signalized a grave and determining crisis in the evolution of this rivalry. For these regions had been the seat of elements which were precursors of this crystalization; that which had permitted the rapidity of the phenomenon. These were Christian heresies of the monotheistic type: Gnosticism in its Priscillian version in Spain, Aryanism which had so great an importance in the peninsula and in Tunisia, etc.

But then one could deduce a concrete idea from this synthesis. These regions had not been subjected to the invasions of the eighth century; they had been overturned by veritable wars of religion.

Now, if one compares Visigothic civilization in Spain, a section of life which animated Hispanic society with its own manifestations from the fourth to the eighth centuries and about which sufficient archeological and literary information is known, with the subsequent period which lasts until the eleventh century, when the Moslem counterreformation was fixed into a characteristic dogmatism, one would perceive that the great culture of the caliphate of Cordoba (tenth century) is in harmony with the earlier civilization on an analogous line of evolution. In both civilizations, scientific, philosophical, literary thought, as well as the art of which abundant documentation remains, are located on the same curve.

The crisis of the eighth century must not, therefore, be interpreted as a violent hiatus as a result of which Hispanic society, like the changing of the set in the theatre, had been transformed from Christian to Moslem, from Latin to Arab, from monogamous to polygamous. It was rather a question of a process of acceleration of a sharp crisis in a long evolution over several centuries. As a result of a vast religious competition it so happened that during those obscure times society had undergone not an invasion but a revolution; just as today the Chinese were not invaded by the Russians in order to become communists. In other words, perhaps we will never know what happened in the Iberian peninsula during

the first fifty years of the eighth century, but we can now know the sense of these events.

To achieve a better conception allowing us to interpret more exactly than in the past this obscure period of history, the question must be determined whether we are not dealing with a comparative study between two civilizations, the Visigothic and the Andalusian-Moslem? This example, taken from studies which we have undertaken for a long time and are still pursuing⁵ as well as other instances which one might select out of the pages of universal history, makes clear to us how much importance the study of comparative civilizations has in our time.

So as to put some order in the enormous classification of facts being gathered and analysed today by research it was necessary to achieve syntheses. But, in the state of current knowledge, a comprehension of universal history could only be acquired by syntheses obtained from the comparison of different civilizations. Not only in order to pierce the mystery of obscure epochs, understand the meaning of certain events which we view with false perspective (generally due to our present conceptions about man and about society which otherwise would have been inconceivable), but also to attain to superior precepts concerning the evolution of thought and the sciences of man.

In our opinion this effort must rest on three points:

I. *On the lines of forces which structure each civilization.* Before proceeding to a synthesis it would be necessary to make sure that the data to be integrated were exact. Otherwise, one would be engaging in useless work which could only multiply confusion. Given the enormous mass of registered facts, an inventory increasing from day to day in accordance with new discoveries and work undertaken everywhere to some degree, it is urgent to establish clear and precise schemes concerning the geographical frames, the limits and evolution of each civilization. Therefore, the basic task is posed: to isolate in a positive manner the lines of force which have structured these civilizations.

⁵ Readers desiring more complete details may read in French the chapters concerning this epoch in our *Histoire d'Espagne*, Paris 1958, or, in Spanish, Chap. XIV, entitled "La révolution islamique," in the second volume of our work *La decadencia española*, Madrid, Mayfe, 1950.

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Now, to establish these bases it is sometimes necessary to have recourse to the study of civilizations which have followed a parallel development. For example, writers have affirmed that the spirit of demonstration was an attribute of Greek civilization. Is this entirely true? Although perhaps insufficiently realized in our day, had not mathematics at Babylon, and in Egypt, achieved such a form of expression long before? In order to construct the pyramids with the calculations that such an enterprise involved, was it not necessary to make use of simple but demonstrable theories? When Mohammed Ibn-Kothair who lived under the seventh Abasside Caliph, Al-Mamun, (786-833) measured with two teams of astrologers the terrestrial degree in the plain of Sindjar in Mesopotamia, was he not accomplishing this collective task for the purpose of a demonstration? Was he, therefore, following foreign teaching or did this rationalism of his grow out of his own cultural conceptions? The Hellenistic style underwent an analogous evolution in Byzantium and in Andalusia. A comparative study of the monuments of these two civilizations would permit us to separate out the autochthonous elements of Ibero-Andalusian art in its Visigothic and Moslem expressions. Since the third century after Christ vast regions, the high plateaus of Asia, have been the theatre of an important competition of religious ideas which penetrated up to China, first of all Nestorianism, then Islam. The history of these regions could be known only if one has recourse to a study of these comparative movements.

II. *On zones of metamorphosis.* Civilizations have not always evolved within geographic frames completely isolated from each other, like the Chinese, the Mayans or the Incas. Families of civilizations have existed, which, over the millenia, succeeded each other in regions sufficiently near, so that reciprocal contacts permitted exchanges of every kind. Thus, civilizations belonging to Indo-European and Semitic types confronted each other, first in Asia and later on the shores of the Mediterranean. In this way, a sort of zone of friction between these two poles of attraction was formed, and the societies of these regions possessed, as a result of these mutual influences, greater sensibility. Spengler, although utterly ignoring the geographic problems which enframe

and determine history, was nevertheless aware of certain facts resulting from this state of things. He had discovered the phenomenon which he called: Pseudo-morphosis.

To express his thought, he had recourse to the technique and terminology employed by geologists. Mineralogists denote by the word pseudo-morphosis, the following phenomenon: A substance crystallizes within the strata. Crystals in the form of polyhedrons, proper to their molecular constitution, will appear. Let us suppose that as a result of subsequent chemical action, this substance is dissolved, it will produce in the rock a cavity which will possess the form, quadratic, octagonal or any other shape of the crystals which have disappeared.

Then it might happen that another substance is introduced into this cavity. It apparently takes the form of the primitive crystal but in its internal constitution it will crystallize according to its own nature. The inexpert student may be mistaken if he considers only its external form; but it will be sufficient for him to break it to recognize another crystallographic disposition.

Spengler had observed that there existed within civilizations similar phenomena of a cultural type. Greek civilization, for example, possessed a particular genius proper to it. This was a conception of life which, following Nietzsche, he called "Apollonian." The Semitic peoples on their part possessed a genius which he called "Magian." Now, it so happened that as a result of historic events certain literary monuments had taken the apparent form of the Hellenic genius, while conserving, at the same time, in their inwardness the Magian spirit of the Semitic author. St. Paul wrote his Epistles in the Greek tongue, but these texts could not be ranked among Greek literature, insofar as the spirit which had set them down was altogether different. A veritable pseudo-morphosis had taken place.

Averroes wrote his philosophical works in the Arabic language but they were not essentially part of the "Magian" spirit. Rather, they should be situated on the trajectory of Greek philosophy, and this Cordovan has always been considered as one of the great Aristotelian commentators. From this fact alone one could deduce a much broader conception. By reason of its geographic position, Spain at the heart of history, was located in a middle ground between Semitic and Indo-European civilizations. The woman of

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Elche, a symbiosis of Greek and Carthaginian art and indigenous workmanship was a remarkable bit of evidence in this regard. Now, this region and this nation were not alone in carrying out this function of mediation. The same thing happened in Ifriqiyah, in Syria, and in the other Byzantine provinces of Asia. These regions, therefore, constituted zones of metamorphosis. A term by which geologists refer to terrain generally sedementary which have been metamorphosed, by reason of their primitive formation, by subsequent developments. A study of comparative civilizations, therefore, would permit us to uncover these interractions produced in zones of metamorphosis. And perhaps we shall discover there, other than pseudo-morphosis, phenomena which we know nothing about today. New horizons would appear which would shed more brilliant light on events of which we possess only the vaguest ideas as a result of the lack of sufficient documentation.

III. *On the evolution of thought and society.* When it concerned itself with political events or episodes, the knowledge of humanity's past had very little influence on the evolution of scientific thought. For it was only a question of a superficial description of life. But this situation changed when history began to study societies not only in terms of their striving toward material and intellectual advancement but also in their evolution toward the biological type of contemporary man. The study of comparative civilizations will facilitate not only a more exact focusing on the history of science, for example, but would also furnish interesting precepts of research which, at first, do not seem to have any direct relationship with history.

If one establishes in a positive manner the evolution of the human being in relation with the geographical settings in which he lived and with the civilizations which shaped him, these lessons would make possible a deeper understanding of phenomena which interest today the laboratory and biological researcher: for example, the average lifespan over the course of time. According to the epoch, this varied as a function of the geographical and social milieu. If we possessed a precise understanding of such questions which only a study of comparative civilizations can deepen, could one not deduce therefrom knowledge concerning future physical and mental preventative measures for the health

of society? Would not the history of disease be of infinite assistance to the biologists? The equilibrium and disequilibrium produced by the individual's adaptation or lack of adaptation to his environment, studied from a historical point of view, would constitute, needless to say, useful data to aid the psychologist and alienist in their research.

Economic problems are discussed today within the complex of the modern world. Nevertheless, social and economic phenomena were much simpler in the past than in our day. It is possible to study them. It is indeed probable that analysing them in terms of comparative civilizations would permit the understanding of contemporary problems by locating them in a perspective which would explain the trajectory of their evolution. The history of economics and sociology, still at the sketching-out stage, deserves sustained attention if society wishes to issue from the morass in which it now finds itself buried. Under the Roman Empire and in the sixteenth century did the precious metals of the West drain away toward India?

Especially in the social sciences does the study of comparative civilizations play its most important role. Some day perhaps it will be possible to learn about the genesis and evolution of thought. At what epoch of history, for example, did abstraction appear in man and society? What are the conditions which permitted its development? Why are most men still incapable today of forming abstractions and following chains of reasoning?

The study of comparative civilizations could isolate the laws which have governed human destiny in the past; it would enable us to understand the causes of growth, flowering and decline of society. For a civilization is not an abstract entity. It is the living and characteristic image of a society.

Spengler, Toynbee, and others have been the pioneers of these grandiose new conceptions. For this reason they have upset many fixed ideas and stirred up a lively effervescence among thinkers. Since in their speculation they could not make use of a scientific method established by generations of preceding experience, they were forced to commit errors, to ignore certain panoramas, to fall into some exaggerations. All of this, of course, sometimes arouses unjust criticism. These authors, like all in advance of their contemporaries in the perception of new horizons,

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paid the price which must be paid by all those who make discoveries. It is unreasonable to reject these great schema under the pretext that some conclusions have been put forward on the basis of insufficient evidence. Flaws in the marble do not make ugly a statue which has been sculpted by the hands of a great master. Discussions about subordinate motifs cannot break the thrust of their thought.

Specifically, the history of science teaches us the importance of those swift moments in the existence of humanity when new ideas surge forth and launch toward a fecund and prodigious future. We find ourselves today in an epoch analogous to other moments in the past when great syntheses were put forward. Current generations must put to order in this crowded world all the knowledge acquired during two centuries of analysis. The alert has already been sounded for a long time and by the most distinguished individuals.

Modern man needs clarification to understand his existence. He must have an ideal in life in order to forge his destiny. Without a program to be achieved, without a guiding ray amidst the incoherence of the modern world, there is a danger that our societies are sliding towards a fruitless nihilism.

If the study of comparative civilizations is carried out with method, then some clear and precise conceptions may surely be established.

Would it not then be possible to deduce the exact situation of humanity today in terms of its immense evolution in the past? Norms for present action and future objectives can someday be fixed. At last! Will not man be in a position to guide his destiny? A precise instrument will be at his command. He will possess the archives, scientifically classified and studied, of the story of man.

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This study does not claim to be an exhaustive critique of the contemporary cinema, whose abundance and diversity defies any attempt to unify it. It has no other purpose than to clarify the underlying meanings of certain productions which are typical of the medium (as for example, *L'Avventura* by Antonioni and *A bout de souffle* by Jean-Luc Godard), and to show that the "learned" cinema, that is, the cinema conscious of the ends pursued and the means employed, cannot but fail when it undertakes to introduce new connexions between the sign and the sense.

In a certain way, the aesthetic problem raised by the cinema resembles that raised by poetry. Poetry is language, and as such, the sensible sign makes us forget that it is sensible, that is, that it is sound, to refer us to the thing it signifies, which is not a thing but a sense. But on the other hand, poetic language is and must remain sensible if it is not to miss its aesthetic aim. The sound cannot altogether become sense. If it was purely sensible, the sign in poetry would become music. Reduced to its meaning,

Translated by H. Kaal.

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it would cease to be poetic and become prosaic, prose being the expressive language proper. The cinema finds itself confronted with the same dilemma: If the image were a simple sign, it should vanish at the very moment of its appearance to refer us to its linguistic meaning. But it cannot do this, first, because it is not sound but image, and then, because (and in this it differs from the novel) it cannot cease to be one of the fine arts; for it depends, as a matter of fact, on technical progress, which calls for stylistic transformations of cinematographic imagery.

But inasmuch as poetry is language, that is, inasmuch as it employs linguistic signs, it does not leave the universe of discourse, even if the sensible sound refers us to the sense. The sensible aspect of the linguistic sign does not refer us to what is foreign to it, or at least not foreign in a different way from that in which there is a foreign element in prose, which resides in the radical difference in nature between a sign which is only a sign (and not a symbol), and the sense by which the mind immediately replaces the sign. When, on the contrary, a sensible image refers us to a discursive sense, it refers to something that is foreign and external to it, since as a representative visual object it carries a sense within the sensible that it is in itself, but refers nonetheless to another meaning in the universe of discursive meanings. In fact, the sound as a purely sensible thing is not in itself expressive; it is only "impressive." If it refers us to one or more discursive meanings, these meanings could only be evoked or equivocated, and could not come from the outside to join the internal meaning of the sound. Whereas the image, since it is an image, doubles its representative sense, that is, its proper expressiveness by a second meaning—a second expressiveness which is that of language proper.

We do not mean by this to allude to the "talking" of the pictures, which presents no special problem. In fact, this language which is language proper (and can without difficulty if not without disagreement be replaced by subtitles, or even, in silent films, by gestures) and presents the proper problem of language as such, does not have to be examined for its own sake. But above all, this discourse which, in the traditional cinema, could play an explicative role (since it can communicate to the spectator all the subjective and intersubjective feelings and the like of the

characters) and a technical role (since it cuts out or down the role that falls to gestures as mute expressions of sentiment) is assuming in the contemporary cinema a role which will be seen to be quite different.

That poetry and prose are made of the same stuff does not imply that the end of poetry is the communication of conceptual meanings. It claims, on the contrary, to be *suggesting* sensible meanings (in the double sense of sensations or impressions and of sentiments). Now it is the sound that is sensible; the sentiment depends on the sense. Thus if poetry suggest sensations or impressions, it can do so only through the sensible sound in which the sensuousness of poetry resides. But it can suggest sentiments only through the sense which is not sensible and to which the sound refers us. If poetry remains what it is, that is, if it suggests instead of communicating, it is precisely by this ceaseless give-and-take of the sensuous and the affective, as a result of which the affect becomes sensation in and through the sound while the sensuous becomes meaningful in and through the sense. Which saves poetry from the double peril of vanishing by losing itself in the pure sensuousness of the sensible, or in pure but discursive meaning. This mixture is the essence of poetry. When it is successful, it avoids the double hazard of expressiveness and impressiveness.

But the cinema cannot find a place in this happy, though rare, mixture. For it is impossible to mix without confusion two heterogeneous things: the image and the discourse. The movement which has been deliberately neglected up to now seems to solve the problem of the connection between cinema and language, not by an alliance between word and image which does not, as we have seen, essentially alter the connection, and which, as we shall see, assumes a new role in the contemporary cinema, but by the possibilities it opens to the image of transforming itself into narrative and hence of superseding language in its narrative and descriptive function. More can be said: In this role, the cinema succeeds better than language; it merely takes back what is its own, since narrative and descriptive language has only been an imperfect translation of the universe of sights and movements given to visual perception. It is clear that the cinematographic

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image can represent the visually perceived more adequately than descriptive language. One can hardly deny that literary descriptions and even narrations are often boring. And not only does the image make us *see*, by appealing to the same sense (sight) which had originally taken in the perceptual show (which, even though it is not *only* a show, since perception is and remains assuredly a common act of sentient and sensed, is nevertheless *also* a show), but the image also, when set in motion in the film, allows us to convert the pure show into true perception, by the possibility of introducing a point of view, with its partiality, which the narrative disguises. Before the narrative could become relative, it would in fact have to appear against the background of an objective narrative. Now when a narrative thus seeks to become objective to make its own relativity appear, it falls back very neatly into the visual universe, where it can only move with difficulty. That certain exceptional objective novels have succeeded, only proves this point in the most striking way: Their objectivity amounts to finding in the perceived universe the meanings that have been refused to the perceiving and speaking subject. The latter is reduced to his vision and to sorting out the various visual appearances imposed on him by the objects by checking some appearances against the others. Thus the universe of meanings is reduced to percepts. And as it is clear that it is only in changing his place by the voluntary motion of his body that he can change the aspect of the object, the subject who is the source of "objective" appearances is also the source of the relativity of his points of view. But this subject who is reduced to his body becomes himself a point of view, since as a material object he is capable of presenting diverse aspects to another corporeal subject endowed with the same power of motion. In order to become relative, the discursive narrative can certainly use another method beside having recourse to an impossible objective narrative. It could (and this is done) interfere with other narratives bearing on the same subject. But to begin with, this is impossible *in an instant*: The "synthesis" of perceptions is only possible in time. Besides, either it would not be the same things that were said (the words themselves would have to change), and it would not be the same narrative from a different point of view, but a different narrative, or else it would be the same narrative in

different words. But since semantic articulations have a sense, this would amount to saying other things in other words. In short, it is always the lack of an absolute objective reference which will keep the narrative from becoming relative, and the narrative can save its relativity only by appealing to the presupposition of the objectivity of the object. As if the subject, distrustful of himself and hopeful of attaining a relative point of view, stepped down from his privileged position for the benefit of the object which he supposed to be permanent.

The cinema spontaneously resolves this difficulty. Duration and the reciprocal relations of speed, which are impossible in the narrative, form part of the very movement of the image. The image in motion allows the spatial and the temporal to intertwine. In and through the image in motion, the object is effectively displaced and produces, without words, its perceptual appearances. There is no need whatsoever for the fiction of a permanent object and variable subjects, nor for the converse fiction of different objects and a single constant subject, since when the object is present as it were in person, and not across the narrative of a subject, its transformations are at once and at the same time significant of the double relativity of subjects and objects: among themselves, and of the ones in relation to the others. What the narrative expresses awkwardly by the "then," the "now," the "before," etc., the image produces immediately, because it is capable as much of sudden juxtapositions and mutations as of the slow transformations that generate otherness.

Thus if the cinema confined itself to a narrative and descriptive role, that is, if it could rest content with telling a personal or interpersonal story, as its visual character would seem to demand which, as we have seen, lends itself perfectly to this genre of "narrative," it would present no special problem: It would amount to giving back to the subject matter of the narrative what language had taken away from it while adding to it what properly pertains to language, namely, the expression of subjective meanings; an addition by the way which the image in motion is also capable of making, in part at least: in the imperfect form of mimicry.

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But this is not the aim of the new cinema. Quite to the contrary, by paying back in kind, the cinema seeks to dispossess language, in turn, of what properly belongs to *it*. The image in motion tries in turn to become language and to usurp the place of language proper. Film critics, for once, have appropriated this term once and for all, and there is no longer any question of anything but the "language of the cinema."

One of the peculiarities of the contemporary cinema is that almost nothing happens—nothing, to be exact, which could become the subject of a narrative. This does not mean that the images are given for themselves or for their intrinsic aesthetic value, although this end is present among the ends directors have in view. The images are given for their sense, and as their sense. And this sense, even though it is not conceptual, belongs to the universe of discourse. Like poetry, the cinema does not *state* the sense in images. This is reserved for the talking of the talking pictures or to the subtitles of silent or foreign films. But in a non-narrative film, such talking and such subtitles are not designed to state the sense. Quite to the contrary, and here we find what we were looking for: Language proper, far from being explicative of what the image is in itself, has the function of veiling and disguising the proper sense of the image which it finds impossible to state, of serving it on occasion by enhancing its value by contrast, or only of drowning, tempering or denaturing it. We must not see in this method (for it is one) an uncalled-for and unmotivated ill-will on the part of the director. If he wants the cinema to be a language, he cannot combine it with another, explicative, language which would expose the pretensions of the cinema to be one. The roles must therefore be reversed: The image clarifies, and language muddles the meanings. And the word "clarify" must be taken in its literal sense and not metaphorically. "Clarify" does not here mean "explain" or "explicate," but "cast a certain light (or a certain shadow) which by and in itself has a sense." The whole of this sense is in the image, which does not refer us to any verbal translation whatsoever. Such an image is language proper, which is to say that it does not translate, so as to make accessible, a real thing, whether external or internal, which existed before it did. It produces the sense in producing itself as an indissoluble unit

of sense and sign. Thus the word proper comes to veil the sense of the image, not because its support or opposition is important to the image, but precisely because it is inessential. The qualitative poverty and quantitative paucity of the dialogue in a good many contemporary films is not necessarily to be attributed to the stupidity of the director or the mediocrity of the characters and plots, but to a deliberate effort to downgrade the sense of the word and upgrade the sense of the image, to dispossess the former to enrich the latter, and, by heaping discredit on language proper, to discredit the belief in a language of images. This is thus a two-phased operation: On the one hand, it disparages language by proclaiming its failure to express meaning, and on the other hand, uses language in the capacity of a sign; for in the absence of the meaning from the word proper, the very inessentialness of the word is also designed to send the mind in search of a sense elsewhere—a sense which is not stated, but (because it cannot be stated) suggested by the image, or better, which *is* the image in and by itself.

Now it appears that this enterprise vacillates between two opposite extremes, without being able, by its very nature, to choose the one or the other. As to the one, and as was said elsewhere¹ as far as the contemporary novel was concerned, the cinema wants to be objective. This is to say that it tries to get at what is human by way of things, and at what is internal by way of the external. The things that are to confer a meaning on what is human are objects, landscapes, even "objective" facts and events. The animation of things is counterbalanced by the inertia of man, and the counterpart to the glorification of things is the failure of man. All attention is given to the thing; and since human motives are inscrutable because they are not things and because they have to be inferred or guessed at, human situations and acts appear denuded in their objective purposelessness; and finally, man himself, placed into the world of inert silent things, becomes a thing among things and reflects back onto them their own reflection which is that of an object in a mirror. The image by its very

¹ D. Dreyfus, "Vraies et fausses énigmes," *Mercure*, Oct. 1957, and "L'Ascétisme dans le roman contemporain," *Esprit*, July-Aug. 1958.

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nature lends itself to this transubstantiation. This is why it is preferred to the word; discourse is the last refuge of subjectivity because things are silent. And discourse is then used to darken or to veil the meanings that are properly human, and which could escape, in spite of the words, from the images, or better, which could escape (because he is human) from the director. But if worst came to worst, the subject could shrink to a single look: Just as a word makes sense of the subject, so that look would make the world a sight for the subject. But this is still too much: The universe of things is not given as a spectacle, since the percept presupposes a perceiver. To carry the enterprise to its completion, things must be made to give themselves and to have meaning in and for themselves. Thus the image is given with all the opacity of the thing, and held against the light, does not allow us to see anything. A lonely and deserted island does not mean human solitude and incomprehension; it is that solitude. A small pile of clothes in the middle of a half-dark room does not mean a carnal embrace; it is that very embrace. There is nothing beyond the image: The solitude becomes a thing, and the deserted island is not deserted because man has left it momentarily, but because he is eternally absent.

But this aim of objectivity is no sooner envisaged than rebutted and opposed by another aim. The cinema wants to have meaning: It wants to *say* something and say it in images and not discursively. Thus discourse remains inessential. But the image tries to transcend itself as an image to mean something foreign to it, namely, the internal life which it repudiates when it aims at objectivity. This interior is that of human motives, intentions, thoughts, feelings, impressions and desires; it is clear that the cinema cannot *say* these without negating itself. It must assure at all cost that language proper remains meaningless in both senses of the term, and retains no virtue of its own and no signficatory privileges. But since the task is now to express by the image a subjectivity which is no longer of the order of things, nor of the simple movement of things set in motion, and cannot therefore pass as such into the image, the image is now pressed to transcend itself without changing its nature, towards a linguistic or discursive sense; for if there is a subject, there must be a way of saying it.

From this point on, the cinema will strive for the impossible synthesis of the immanent and the transcendent, of the internal with the external, of the objective with the subjective, and of impression and expression. The image must express without saying, which is to say that it must express by the impression it produces. The sense must be at once immanent and transcendent, both inside and out: Immanent, since it must be the image itself and it alone which has the meaning. Transcendent, because what it means is no part of the opaque and inert universe (even though it be in motion) of images and of objects of visual perception, but beyond these, in the universe of human discourse. Extreme objectivism thus falls back onto extreme subjectivism; and a whole system of correlations and analogies comes to be established, which allows one to read or to decipher in things and in their images, as in a mirror, the traces of human meanings: The empty landscape and the train that disappears on the horizon, become symbols. They lead us back to the romantic "landscape of a state of mind" which complicates, but does not appreciably defer, the task of introducing the products of human intention. Man gives a sense to things and to their images. While the image passes into the inessential, the essential becomes the inner life which the image suggests without being able or willing to say it. A little while ago, the image took up all the space, facing us in all the opacity of its immanence. At this moment, it effaces itself before the sense and makes itself transparent for it so as to make appear through itself the filigrane of discursive meanings. The foreign nature of the sense pushes the image into subjectivism; it becomes a symbol and not a sign, because the image cannot be made to vanish entirely, to become a mere nothing and to be forgotten, before the sense towards which it reaches out: Images are taken both for themselves and for what they mean. The art of the cinema becomes a symbolic art and can recover its objectivity only by inventing symbols that are generally understood, or by borrowing symbols that are already current, from mythology and psychoanalysis.

If expressionism amounts to making an image represent, that is, express, something other than itself, and if impressionism amounts to reducing an image to the impression it produces, then the cinema is faced here with a conflict which is very old, but

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ever-present in all the arts proper. In this case, the conflict is not only intensified but also somewhat changed in sense, insofar as the cinema, more than any other form of art, finds it altogether impossible to restrict itself to a pure and simple imagery, devoid of any discursive elements. Whichever road the cinema may take, it always finds itself pulled irresistibly in the opposite direction. On the one road, it errs by default: The image suggests or evokes, because it cannot say. Hence its equivocal nature and its inferior status in comparison with language proper. On the other road, it errs by excess: Since the image can suggest and evoke, it will seem that it can also say much more, or much more fully or much better, than the word. Hence its alleged superiority in comparison with language proper. But it ceases to be equivocal only to become overcharged: It can say everything.

This seems to be the dilemma in which the contemporary cinema finds itself, and which endangers its immanence or meaning. The sacrifice of one of the horns to the other cannot solve the dilemma, as long as the contemporary cinema, like the novel, refuses to become straightforward entertainment, while it does not allow itself to take its obligations to the serious historical and social situation seriously. For either the cinema recognizes its own deficiencies and transcends itself towards a sense which is foreign to it and transcends it in turn, or else it remains self-sufficient imagery which, incapable of inducing belief in its own fictions, falls inevitably back into fantasy. But neither of these attitudes is preferable to the other, and besides, they come to the same: When the cinema aims at a sense which eludes it, it is no less firmly convinced that such a transcendence is possible, which is to say that the image in its role as a sign is very much superior to the linguistic sign. Since the image is, moreover, unwilling (and unable, by its nature) to become a sign, it adds to its expressive or signifiatory value an impressive or aesthetic value, which is itself signifiatory, but only of itself. When the cinema remains self-sufficient, it appropriates both the sense and the sign. As a sensible thing, the image preserves its aesthetic value, and through it, its proper meaning. But the image also presents itself as an intermediary between the aesthetic meaning, or impression, and the discursive meaning, or expression, since in the image the sensible is completely identified with the sense, and impression

with expression. If it takes the former road, the cinema borrows its meaning from language, but transfigures it in the image. If it takes the latter road, it creates its own meaning, but even though it has it, this meaning can never be made to feel at home in inert things, and thus the cinema, in this latter case, does no more than borrow secretly what, in the former case, it borrowed openly.

ON PRECISION OF EXPRESSION

We can see an ideal of precision, to which we can approximate indefinitely; but we cannot attain that ideal. (B. Russell, *Vagueness*).

Both in the case of colloquial language and in the case of specialized scientific language we always have to face the essential issue: what must we do in order not to be misled by an incorrect use of language? When we refer in general to being misled by some use of language we have two cases in mind: *primo*, when the language in question wrongly performs its communicative function so that the speaker is unable to convey his ideas to the listener, and, *secundo*, when the language by means of which we think imposes on us, through its structure and forms fixed by tradition (in the case of natural languages), incorrect ideas about reality (cf. the issues of hypostases). The causes of such and similar difficulties are varied. These difficulties, among other things, suggest the idea that language is not only an instrument, but also an object of research, an idea which induced twentieth century philosophers to engage in the study of language in its ontological, *gnosiological*, and methodological aspects. The method of se-

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mantic analysis, understood as a method of analysis of meanings of words, is directed precisely against these shortcomings of language. That method is meant to prevent semantic and logical errors that encumber the process of thinking with difficulties and hamper communication both with others and with oneself. Among other causes, these errors are due to the ambiguity and vagueness of words.

I abstain here from the issue of obscurity of statements that formulate some ideas in an incomprehensible way. And it is irrelevant whether the speaker deliberately wants to clothe his ideas in incomprehensible forms (as is done by certain philosophers who manifest their "professional pride" in esoteric thought), or whether he is unable to make correct statements because of his incompetence. In either case we have to do with errors that are subjective in nature and, as such, less interesting.

It is quite different when it comes to statements containing ambiguous and vague words.

Ambiguous words are those which, despite similar sounds or combinations of sounds, have different meanings (homonyms). They are objective linguistic facts that can be explained by the history of the language in question. The danger of confusion of different meanings and the resulting danger of misunderstandings and logical errors in reasonings are reduced by the fact that ambiguous words usually become unequivocal when they appear in the context of a sentence or a group of sentences, since the context determines that meaning which has been actually referred to in the given case. Moreover, the simple operation of pointing out *expressis verbis* how an ambiguous word has been used in a given case, eliminates the danger of misunderstandings. That is why this case, too, may be disregarded in the present analysis.

We shall, on the other hand, engage in the study of vague words. In doing so we shall be interested in the ontological aspect of that issue, i.e., in the problem of the origin of vague words, and in discussing whether their vagueness is subjective or objective by nature. The method of determining the degree of vagueness, and of eliminating vagueness, and of using vague words in a precise manner (in the literature of the subject discussed, respectively, by Max Black in his essay on *Vagueness*, and by T. Ku-

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biński in his paper, *Vague Terms* [in Polish]), is an important issue, but it is secondary to the ontological analysis of the origin and causes of vagueness of words. For as long as that issue is not solved we are unable or hard put to determine how to eliminate or restrict vagueness.

IS VAGUENESS SUBJECTIVE?

In order to answer the question formulated above we must first formulate with precision what is meant in this paper by a "vague word." In my analysis I shall base myself on two papers which I believe to be the most important in the literature of the subject, namely on Bertrand Russell's essay, *Vagueness*, and on an essay by Max Black bearing the same title.

The issue investigated in the literature of the subject (including the two essays mentioned above) is principally, if not exclusively, that of vague *names*. I think that that is an unjustified restriction of the object of study which should cover all words. For if such a name is vague which has a fringe, i.e., divides the universe of discourse into its own extension (the class of its designata) and its complement (the class of objects which are not its designata) in such a way that there are objects which cannot be included in either class, then a similar property is shared by words that are not names. For not only names, i.e., substantives and adjectives, but also verbs, adverbs, and conjunctions are often vague in that sense of the word. Now, if we may face difficulties (as we shall see later, not for subjective reasons) in answering the question: "Is that a river?" when the class of objects that can be designata of the name "river" happens to include such with reference to which it is impossible to say whether they still are rivers or not (for they may be torrents, streams, etc.), then we may likewise encounter difficulties in endeavouring to answer such questions as "Is that object red?," "Does it walk?" (or does it creep, crawl, etc.), "Is that a noble act?," "Has he behaved bravely?," etc. Thus we have to do with vagueness in the sense defined above (i.e., that there are such actions, modes, relations, etc., about which it cannot be said—and that not for subjective reasons—whether given words are adequate to them or not) not only in the case of names having as designata individual objects or classes

of such objects, but also in the case of other words which say something about objects, their action, or mode of action. As shall be seen later, doubts may also be raised (as they are by Russell) as to the sharpness of meaning of such words as *or*, *not*, etc., which appear as logical constants. Consequently, we shall hereafter speak broadly about vague words, and about vague names in such cases only when for some reason we shall be particularly interested in names.

Before proceeding to define more strictly the vagueness of words and to investigate its origin, we must first give an explicit answer to the question: Of what is vagueness an attribute? Is it an attribute of language expressions, or of the reality referred to in those expressions? This is a significant issue for the study of the subjective, or objective, nature of the vagueness of words.

For a clear demarcation line must be drawn between the *origin* of the vagueness of words and *that of which* vagueness is an attribute. Both questions are somehow connected with the issue of the nature of vagueness, an issue we are interested in, but they are so from different aspects and in different ways.

In his essay, already quoted above, Russell wrote that vagueness is a property of that which represents things (language being an example of such a representation), and not of things as such. "Apart from representation, whether cognitive or mechanical, there can be no such thing as vagueness or precision; things are what they are, and there is an end of it" (p. 85). I am in full agreement with that statement which I consider highly significant for the understanding of the problem under discussion. Things are neither vague nor sharply defined, as they are neither true nor false, etc. Things always are just things. What is vague is our knowledge of things and the linguistic statements which express that knowledge, in the same way that that knowledge and the corresponding linguistic statements are true or false. In the case of vagueness, as in the case of truth, we have to do with certain properties of the *relation* between knowledge (which always is a unity of thought-and-language) and reality, and not with any properties of reality as such.

But the answer to the questions: *Why* is knowledge, or the corresponding linguistic statement, vague? Is that fact due to

objective or subjective causes? is a different issue. To answer these questions we must revert to the definition of vagueness.

Let us begin with the problem of names (I follow Kotarbiński in interpreting the term "name" so that to be a name is tantamount to being usable as a predicate complement in all sentences of the type "A is B," with the basic interpretation of the copula *is*). We distinguish between individual and general names, i.e., such as denote a single object only (there is a one-one relation between the name and its designatum) and such as denote many objects (the corresponding relation is one-many). Let us now pose the question: What is a vague name, and what is its relation to the categories of names enumerated above? For that purpose we shall analyse a name which beyond all doubts is classified as vague.

Now, water flows along its bed eroded in the ground. Let us suppose we have to do with the Vistula near Warsaw, with the Thames near London, with the Seine near Paris. We say without hesitation: the Vistula, the Thames, the Seine are rivers. Thus the word "river" is a general name (since the relation involved here is one-many) of such objects as the Vistula, the Thames, the Seine. In very many other cases we also have no difficulty in stating whether or not we have to do with a river, for instance in the case of the Volga, the Danube or the Mississippi. The decisive factor is the length and the width of the channel in which the water flows. But on our globe there are many such objects which are water flowing in a channel, although their number is finite. The lengths, the widths and the depths of their channels vary. Suppose we have arranged all these objects as a sequence according to the indices of the three dimensions of the channels in which the water flows, from the largest to the smallest. Let us now try to provide these objects with names, using such expressions of our language as "river," "stream," "rivulet," "spring," etc. We shall easily see that at both extremes of the sequence we have to do with objects which cause no difficulties in choosing appropriate names for them, but the more closely we approach the midpoint of the sequence the greater our difficulties. We can easily quote cases in which we do not know whether a given object is to be called a river or a stream. And the difficulties are due not to our ignorance but to the blurring, in the limiting cases, of the properties characteristic of the two

names to be distinguished (in the present case these properties are the dimensions of channels). In such cases we usually say: a small river, or: a large stream. Yet all this does not eliminate the problem, but merely shifts it further away: for how shall we distinguish between a river and a small river, between a stream and a large stream? If between the extension of a name and its complement there is a border area (metaphorically called *penumbra* by Russell) which for objective reasons—lack of clearly defined criteria—cannot be classified as one or the other, then it is no way out of the difficulty to devise a new name for that area or else abstain from giving it any name whatever. In such a case the issue remains where to draw the demarcation line between that specific no-man's land between the fronts of rival names and the areas incontestably covered by the name in question and its negation, respectively. (As has been correctly pointed out by Ku-*biński*, the name-forming functor *not* in this case serves to form not a contradictory, but an opposite name, which reveals the following characteristics: the extensions of both names are disjoint and included in the universe *U*, and the sum of their extensions is a proper subset of the universe *U*.) Thus, the issue remains, despite the fact that the *margin* of a vague name may be shifted further and further by the introduction of new distinctions and names. All this has been stressed by Russell. It must be added that the solution most often resorted to in science, i.e., sharpening the definitions of terms by conventions, does *not* settle the issue (although it may be of great importance for practical behaviour), but merely shifts the border of the "fringe." For if we adopt the convention that by a "stream" we mean an object which is a mass of water flowing in a channel that is not wider than five meters, and that analogous objects with wider channels are called "rivers," we merely shift the problem, since it is well known that to determine whether or not something is more than five meters wide involves problems of the "fringe" analogous to the distinction between the river and the stream, although the problems of measurement in this case may prove much subtler.

What has been stated above in the course of an analysis of the name "river" occurs in the analysis of such expressions as "red," "bald," "heap of stones," "noble," "brave," etc., that is, in all cases in which the names concerned serve to determine quali-

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tative differences between objects on the basis of sense data, moral and aesthetic valuation, etc., subject to gradation. The issue reduces itself to the following: when dealing with a series of objects designated by a common name and revealing quantitative differences of certain properties—sequences of colors, attitudes, modes of behavior, etc.,—which are described by common names and which also reveal quantitative differences measurable in some respect on a certain scale, we have to do with a continuum or with distinguishable "quanta" of changes. Only in the latter case could we speak, even theoretically, of a definite point dividing the universe into the extension and the complement of a given name. Unless a method of such quantification is known—and it is not—all endeavours to define precisely the margin of such a name, and thereby to remove its vagueness, are doomed to failure.

This creates a new problem from the point of view of Marxist dialectics which, following the statement by Hegel that quantitative changes at a certain moment bring about a qualitative change, seems to suggest that the Marxists believe in such a "quantification" of all changes. Obviously such an interpretation, which, moreover, is not supported by any empirical proof provided by the specialized disciplines, would be, to say the least, incautious, and besides it is quite unnecessary. Dialectics need not associate its law with any belief in such a "quantification" of changes, or with the conviction that names are perfectly sharply defined. Transition from quantitative into qualitative changes can quite well be interpreted not as an ideal point in an ideal moment of time, but as a segment of a time period of some duration. This applies not only to social revolutions, which have long been interpreted by dialectics as *periods*, but also to other cases of "jumps" in development.

The same can be applied to an object which is changing continuously in some respect and which may alternatively be designated e.g. as "young" and "old." In this case the sequence to which a given general name applies consists not of a class of different objects possessing a common property that can vary in degree, but of different stages of development of one and the same object, stages that differ from one another by degrees of a certain property. The problem is the same as before: Is the sequence continuous, or is it somehow "quantized?" And the answer is the same as before.

We have touched here on the issue of the origin of the vagueness of names. But for the time being we are concerned only with a definition of a vague name and its relation to individual and general names. Such a definition can be formulated on the basis of the examples adduced above. In these examples we always have to do with the relation between a name and the set of objects it denotes, with the proviso that the domain of the name is not well defined (it has a vague "fringe"). Thus the definition in question might be: *a name is vague when it denotes many objects the class of which is not strictly defined*. The same line of reasoning is followed by Black who says: "...vagueness is indicated by the finite area and lack of specification of its boundary" (p. 31). Black criticizes Russell for having confused generality and vagueness of names, which in fact can be found in Russell's paper ("*Per contra*, a representation is *vague* when the relation of the representing system to the represented system is not one-one, but one-many" [p. 89]), but in the same paper Russell correctly distinguishes between vagueness and generality of statements, and Black's definition clearly follows the track of that reasoning ("It follows that every proposition that can be framed in practice has a certain degree of vagueness: that is to say, there is not one definite fact necessary and sufficient for its truth, but a certain region of possible facts, any one of which would make it true. And this region is itself ill-defined: we cannot assign to it a definite boundary. This is the difference between vagueness and generality" [p. 88]).

As far as the applicability of the definition of vagueness to the categories of names distinguished above is concerned, the case is obvious when it comes to general names. General names may, but need not, be vague. It might be said that the generality of a name is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition of its vagueness. Thus, e.g., the name "planet," in the sense of a planet of our solar system, is general, but not vague as far as its extension is concerned: the class of planets consists of nine objects known to us. But if the generality of a name is combined with the indefiniteness of the boundary of the class of objects which it denotes (for example "river"), then the name is vague.

But the fact that a name is vague in some respect does not imply that it must be vague in some other respect. An example

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is offered by those individual names which denote single concrete objects and as such are not vague as to their extensions (we disregard here the trivial case when the same name is an individual name of many objects, e.g., when many persons have the same first name and the same surname, both of them common in a given country), but at the same time are vague if we consider certain processes (e.g., the life of an individual from his birth to his death), and the same name is used to denote the various stages of that process (in particular, birth and death are processes too, and hence the problem, whether or not the given name is *already* applicable in the former case, and *still* applicable in the latter). Thus the issue of the vagueness of individual names emerges when an individual name is crypto-general, and denotes a sequence of consecutive stages of development of a given object.

The study of verbs and adverbs as grammatical categories would not contribute anything new to the principles of determining whether or not a word is vague, all the more so as in both cases we can easily switch over to the category of substantives (e.g., from "to walk" to "the walking," from "nobly" to "nobility"), and although we shall have to do with apparent names (onomatoids), as always in the case of abstract names, the problem we are interested in can be presented in a manner identical with that expounded above.

Such words as "slowly," "quickly," "much," "little," "some," "few," etc., are vague in the very intention of those who use them, since they have to state something (about certain objects) that either cannot be strictly defined or is not precisely known to us. That is why we are not in a position to proceed beyond such a vague statement which, while dividing the universe of discourse by means of disjoint words, does not divide it exhaustively, so that there remains a certain subset belonging to that universe with reference to which it is not possible to decide whether the use of any of the two words is justified.

An interesting problem is presented by the logical constants, such as *or*, *not*, etc. According to Russell, they too are vague, since their meaning in logic is defined in a manner which implies the truth or falsity of sentences, so that the issue of vagueness is indirectly involved. The word *or* is defined by Russell so that "*p or q*" is true when *p* is true, and when *q* is true, and false if and

only if p is not true and q is not true. That is why Russell is justified in his scepticism about the precision and sharpness of meaning of the logical constants, although such properties of logical constants are usually assumed. "All traditional logic habitually assumes that precise symbols are being employed. It is therefore not applicable to this terrestrial life, but only to an imagined celestial existence. Where, however, this celestial existence would differ from ours, so far as logic is concerned, would be not in the nature of what is known, but only in the accuracy of our knowledge. [...] On this point I agree with Plato. But those who dislike logic will, I fear, find my heaven disappointing." (pp. 88-89)

From this there is but one step to the stand, actually taken by Russell, and also by Black who follows him in that respect, that *all* words are vague. I do not see any necessity to draw so radical and so extreme a conclusion. Of course, it can always be demonstrated that a word is vague in some respect. But in some other respects words do happen to be sharply defined, and there is no need to deny that. It suffices to say that cases of vagueness of words do occur and that they are frequent (anyhow more frequent than is usually believed), and that vagueness is objective in nature.

That issue will be dealt with below. But let us first conclude the analysis of the definition of a vague word. By paraphrasing the definition of a vague name we shall say that a word is vague when it has a "fringe." This occurs directly when a given word states something about certain objects (not necessarily *denotes* those objects, since that is a function of names) in such a manner that the sum of the "extension" and the "complement" of that word (i.e., the cases to which the given word—e.g., "walks," "slowly," etc.—applies, and the cases to which it clearly does not apply) do not exhaust the given universe of discourse. It occurs indirectly when the definition of a given word (for instance, a logical constant) is involved in sentences containing vague words.

But what is the origin of that vagueness, and what is its nature, objective or subjective? I wish to draw attention to the practical aspect of that question. One or another answer to that question will determine the possibilities and methods of our struggle with the vagueness of words, a vagueness which not only hinders the communication process, but also gives rise to specific paradoxes which undermine the logical foundations of human

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thinking. Let us bear in mind that the principle of the excluded middle holds only with reference to well-defined words. And where the validity of the principle of the excluded middle is impaired, we have to face the danger of logical contradiction (were it only on the strength of De Morgan's law). This has been convincingly demonstrated by Black (p. 36), who suggested, as a solution, a different interpretation of the word *not* when it refers to vague words (this idea has been taken up by Kubiński with reference to vague names). Were the issue reducible to a subjective imperfection in handling expressions of a language, the situation would, of course, be different from that characterized by objective factors. And what are the facts?

Black firmly declares for the objective nature of the vagueness of words, his criterion by which to distinguish objectiveness from subjectiveness being as follows: are the properties of the vagueness of words facts that pertain to human behaviour (i.e., psychological facts) or facts that pertain to the physical world? The solution is correct, although the criterion is wrong, for vagueness is an attribute of words, and not of things. Yet the vagueness of words is not something purely subjective, due to ignorance or error. At the root of vagueness rests the relation between words and the objective reality referred to by those words. And from the properties of words and of reality it follows that words cannot serve as a precise mapping of the full richness of reality to which they refer. The importance of that issue requires a deeper analysis. The problem was treated by Russell both peripherally and inconsistently, as will be shown later. And Black is interested chiefly in the methodological aspect of the struggle against the vagueness of words, and has only just alluded to the ontological issue involved. And the issue is far from trifling.

Criticism of verbalized cognition, that is, standard scientific cognition or cognition in the current sense of the word, broadly interpreted, had been carried out by the various philosophical schools. The motif can be traced from Plato to Bergson. And if we reject the irrationalistic consequences of that criticism, which usually led its authors to an unjustified belief in some non-verbal direct "true cognition," we obtain its rational element, namely the emphasis laid on the imperfection of linguistic means as an instrument serving to map reality.

Those verbal signs which generalize are a result of the process of abstraction. We are concerned with the meaning of the verbal sign and we always find in it a result of abstraction due to classification, which chooses a certain property as its criterion and rejects all other properties as unimportant from a given point of view. That is why verbal signs, like other products of logic, are static, rigid, and non-flexible. I mean to say that a verbal sign immobilizes in its meaning the picture of reality to which it refers, even if it refers to motion and change; for even to these phenomena it refers in a classifying sense, i.e., brings out their common properties and generalizes them in the form of certain categories. I further mean that a verbal sign maps reality through its meaning by imparting to that mapping a rigid, non-elastic frame which by means of classification separates given things, their properties, behaviour, etc., from the surrounding world as a whole. The more precise a given term, and the more rigorous from the logical point of view, the more sharply outlined and striking are those properties of the verbal signs.

And reality is changing and moving in every fragment and aspect which interests us, connected by an infinite number of links and mutual relationships with other fragments and aspects of the objective world. If we disregard that changeability, those links and interrelationships, we obtain, so to say, a cross-section, an anatomical preparation of reality. And what else can we obtain if we squeeze changing reality into a Procrustes' bed of categories which disregard that changeability, and endeavour to map a fragment of reality, linked with the rest by all-embracing interrelationships, by means of verbal signs with rigid boundaries, the less flexible the more they are "sharp." If we look from that angle, at the relation between verbal signs and reality, a relation that consists in the mapping or "reflection" of that reality by language categories, we see clearly that language is not adjusted to the object it has to map, so that the relation of reflection of reality by language is not one-one. This fact must be kept in mind when we analyse facts of the language. Of course, this is not meant to lead to the metaphysics of "true cognition," supposed to be non-verbal and non-intellectual. No logical bridge spans the gap between empirical linguistic facts and metaphysical speculations.

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But we may learn something here with reference to the vagueness of words, and to the origin of that vagueness.

Verbal signs are vague not because they are imperfect (which might suggest that there exist technical means with which to eliminate that imperfection), but because there is a relation of "maladjustment" between a rigid classification in some respect of real phenomena and those real phenomena themselves, which by their changeability and transitions from one state to another defy all rigid classification. Of course, if reality defies the classification imposed by a given verbal sign, this phenomenon takes place on the fringe of the area covered by classification and can be restricted by making the verbal sign in question "sharper." The limit of "maladjustment" can be shifted (in the sense that by making a verbal sign "sharper" we reduce its fringe), but cannot be eliminated. The reason has been shown above: what is changeable and linked with other fragments of reality cannot be fully mapped by means of categories which grasp as motionless that which is changing, and squeeze into rigid classifications that which overflows all artificial boundaries by the richness of shades, gradations, and transitions to other phenomena with which it is linked.

Is that an essential defect of language, a defect which bars us from acquiring knowledge of reality, as is claimed by the irrationalistic propounders of "true cognition?" Not in the least. All measurement made by means of an instrument is burdened with an error. But it suffices to know the limits of that error to be able to evaluate its consequences in our reasoning. There is a definite, though incomplete, analogy between this and language. It suffices to know the nature of error in the mapping of reality by verbal signs, in order to be able to render that error to a certain extent innocuous by means of other signs of that language. Anyhow, the limits of the error can be shifted, the error can be reduced to the point where idealization, i.e., the consciously false assumption that there is no error at all, is permissible and justified not only in practice but in theory as well.

The "maladjustment" of verbal signs to reality is thus objective in nature. This fact does not prevent us from acquiring knowledge of reality by means of a language consisting precisely of such

"maladjusted" signs. The point is only to know the nature and the scope of that "maladjustment."

Both Russell and Black agree in principle with such a standpoint, although in Russell's case we have an interesting duality of views. On the one hand, he is firm in stating that every verbal sign is vague and that a logic which used signs perfectly free from vagueness would be suitable for the study of some Platonic celestial entities (that is, ideal entities, characterized by changelessness), and not of terrestrial entities (this implies recognition of the fact that verbal signs are "maladjusted" to changeable reality). On the other hand, however (due to the metaphysical assumptions of logical atomism), he does not reject the idea of a perfect, ideal language in which the vagueness of words would disappear. This would happen if that language were built on the basis of one-one relations between verbal signs and (atomic) facts of reality. Apart from all other objections, the prospect of such a language is really disastrous, and will be discussed later. The issue, however, takes us directly to that of an ideal language as a means to end the struggle with the vagueness of language expressions.

THE "PERFECT LANGUAGE" AND THE LIMITS OF VAGUENESS

Thus we come back to the linguistic troubles referred to at the beginning. Complaints of errors in thinking and communication due to language, and the comprehension of the role of language in the process of thinking, are as old as philosophy itself. They can be found in the *Upanishads* and in Chinese philosophy, and develop into a powerful trend in ancient Greek philosophy. And in modern times explicit statements on that subject are to be found in the works of Descartes and Berkeley, Bacon and Leibniz, to mention only a few. Yet the idea of a perfect language, expected to overcome all the shortcomings of language and the errors resulting therefrom, is closely connected with logic. Its peak coincides therefore with the development of contemporary logic in its mathematical form. Here too one could go back to the Stoics and refer to Raymundus Lullus and above all to Leibniz as the forerunners, but the fully developed and theoretically founded idea of an ideal language is a product of the period when logic came to face the task of overcoming the antinomies dis-

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covered at the root of the foundations of mathematics and logic, and when it became clear that the scientific use of language requires a restriction of some of its uses and that language ought to be not only an instrument but also an *object* of cognition and research. What symbolic logic then achieved in its struggle with the obscurity, imprecision, and vagueness of every-day language was so important that it could give rise to euphoria: even if the level of a perfect language has not been reached, we are on its track. The symbolic language of logic is that language, or at least the path leading to a perfect language—such was the conviction common among logicians in the early twentieth century.

It is not to be wondered then that Bertrand Russell, who together with A. N. Whitehead in *Principia Mathematica* created in the beginnings of our century the most developed language of this type, was inclined to consider it perfect, or at least nearing perfection. Russell also wrote in *Principia Mathematica* that it was a language which had syntax, but no vocabulary. It tended to become a language which upon investigation of the vocabulary involved would be a logically perfect language. As has been rightly stated by Warnock, Russell was convinced that the calculus he had invented reproduced, so to say, the skeleton of everyday language, and language consists of that skeleton clad with the flesh of words.

Since Russell's views on that matter reflected opinions and beliefs then very popular among logicians, they deserve a brief study of their evolution.

As is now almost universally recognized in the literature of the subject, Russell's views of the perfect language were closely connected with the metaphysics of logical atomism. The conviction that the universe consists of simple atomic facts was accompanied by the conviction that their logical counterparts are atomic propositions and that, if it were possible to establish a one-one relation between the two, language would be perfect and would eliminate all vagueness, all lack of precision, and the danger of hypostases. That is why it is very interesting to watch how that line of reasoning led Russell to the study of the vagueness of words. When beginning a series of lectures on logical atomism in 1918, Russell at the very outset (cf. *Logic and Knowledge*, pp. 179-180) raised the issue of vagueness. He stated that it was

an interesting thing that the data with which philosophizing begins are vague. In his opinion, sound philosophizing consisted mainly of the transition from obvious, vague, and ambiguous things with reference to which we have a feeling of certainty, to something precise, clear, and definite, which—as is shown by reflection and analysis—is involved in those vague things with which we start; it constitutes, so to say, the real truth of which that vague thing is a sort of shadow. We find here not only the idea of a perfect language hidden somewhere behind the surface of the vagueness of words, but also the metaphysical, clearly Platonic hinterland (which Russell did not deny) of beliefs on which that idea is based.¹ But just a little later, he reverted to the problem of vagueness and wrote that should he have more time and should he know more, he would willingly devote a full lecture to the problem of vagueness. Russell put his intention into effect three years later in his lecture on *Vagueness*, already referred to above. There the picture was different, though by no means unequivocal. On the one hand, Russell came to the conclusion that the vagueness of words is not only a common phenomenon, but also that it cannot be eliminated and that, consequently, a logic that presupposes ideally sharp definitions of its symbols is applicable only to Platonic celestial entities. On the other hand, however, he did not abandon his idea of a language the signs of which would bear a one-one relation to facts, and which would thus avoid the inconvenience due to the vagueness of words.

Wittgenstein's *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, which continued Russell's ideas, made its appearance shortly after. Russell wrote the Introduction to that work, which gave him an opportunity again to formulate his opinion on the ideal language. "In order to understand Mr. Wittgenstein's book," he says, "it is necessary to realize what is the problem with which he is concerned." And that focal problem is: "In the part of his theory which deals with Symbolism he is concerned with the conditions

¹ Russell's Platonism was connected with his concept of mathematics, above all with the concept of such categories of set theory as the class. And his doctrine of logical atomism was based on a clearly metaphysical assumption that the universe consists of some atomic facts which correlate with atomic propositions, to discover which is the purpose of philosophical analysis.

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which would have to be fulfilled by a logically perfect language." (p. 7) The principal condition to be satisfied by that language consists of the already known requirement of a one-one relation between the words of that language and simple facts. "A logically perfect language has rules of syntax which prevent nonsense, and has single symbols which always have a definite and unique meaning." (p. 8) The fact deserves attention that Russell interprets Wittgenstein's ideas of a perfect language in the spirit of a scepticism which we already know from his essay on *Vagueness*: a perfect language is not something that is actually given or accessible, but is only an ideal model for which we strive, without ever being able to attain it fully. "Mr. Wittgenstein is concerned with the conditions for a logically perfect language—not that any language is logically perfect, or that we believe ourselves capable, here and now, of constructing one logically perfect, but that the whole function of language is to have meaning, and it only fulfils this function in proportion as it approaches the ideal language which we postulate." (p. 8)

Russell's ideas were transplanted to continental Europe through Wittgenstein, in the paradoxically exaggerated form which he had given them in his *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. They caused euphoria in the school of nascent logical positivism, and were occasionally transformed into a veritable mythology of symbolic language. Since the language of symbolic logic was believed to be a perfect language, or at least was supposed to lead to perfection, some people initiated a real worship of logical symbols in the conviction that any triviality clad in a symbolic form, became a nearly perfect statement. That characteristic manifestation of shamanism on a sophisticated cultural level passed away in the West rather quickly and now belongs to the past.

It is interesting in this connection to watch the further development of ideas of the two principal protagonists of the idea of a perfect language, namely Russell and Wittgenstein.

The latter soon abandoned the ideas expounded in his *Tractatus* and, as far as the analysis of language and the evaluation of formalized languages is concerned, adopted a quite opposite position, as can be seen from his *Philosophical Investigations* which matured already in the twenties. In one place there (p. 12) he is quite self-critical when saying that it is interesting to compare

the large number of linguistic tools and the ways of using them, as well as the large number of types of words and sentences, with what the logicians (including himself) have said about the structure of language. Later Wittgenstein not only abandoned the worship of the formalized language as the perfect language, but even initiated the shifting of analysis into the sphere of natural languages which he came to consider the proper object of research of linguistic philosophy. That trend, which referred to the common-sense tradition of Moore's philosophy, came to be dominant in the Oxford school. This led to a controversy with Russell, a controversy which recently flared up quite openly in a passionate discussion of E. Gellner's book that was a violent attack upon linguistic philosophy in the Oxford style. Although Russell abandoned the position he occupied at the time of writing *Principia Mathematica*, as far as the issue of a perfect language is concerned, and has many times sharply criticized logical positivists for their conventionalism and for analysing language in separation from extra-linguistic facts, i.e., as a purely "linguistic" issue (cf. *An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth*, and also his essay *Logical Positivism* of 1950), he nevertheless does not follow Wittgenstein and does not renounce a formalized language as a model. His attitude on that issue is inconsistent and vacillating: on some occasions he emphasizes the common vagueness of words and thereby shifts the ideal of a perfect language into "celestial" spheres; but on other occasions, he comes back to the idea of such a language as a model and then comes to think again about eliminating the vagueness of words by defining one-one relations between them and facts.

But it is not essential what the authors whose works are discussed here think about their own ideas. Whatever such people as Russell and Wittgenstein think about their own conceptions, we may and ought to form some opinion on the issues of the vagueness of words and of a perfect language.

First of all, one comment which is peripheral to the concept of a perfect language, but important with reference to the ideas of Russell and Wittgenstein. As has been mentioned above, so-called logical atomism, with which their views of a perfect language were connected, had its metaphysical hinterland. This consisted in the conviction that the universe is formed of some simple

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atomic facts, and that there is a one-one relation between atomic propositions and atomic facts. This specific theory of reflection, in a radical form expressed by Wittgenstein, assumes that the said relation consists in a structure that is common both to linguistic and to extra-linguistic facts. The perfect language was expected to have the property that the comprehension of its structure led to the comprehension of (extra-linguistic) reality. But in order to know whether a given language is really perfect, in the sense that its structure corresponds to that of (extra-linguistic) reality, we have first to know the structure of that reality. Thus, contrary to the assumption made, a perfect language cannot serve as an instrument of a philosophical analysis of (extra-linguistic) reality. The requirement that we should first build a perfect language and then use it as a tool in investigating the ontological structure of (extra-linguistic) reality includes a vicious circle.

This argument (repeated after Irving M. Copi) is, however, incidental to the principal issue, since the belief in the existence of a perfect language need not be associated with a program of metaphysical investigations of the structure of (extra-linguistic) reality. Much more important is the criticism of that idea, to be found in British authors such as Strawson, Urmson, Warnock, and others.

Their criticism goes in two directions: 1) the belief that the language used in *Principia Mathematica* is perfect is refuted by the fact that other rival formalized languages have been built since, which too may pretend to the role of the perfect language dreamt of by Russell; 2) the perfect language was supposed to function better than a natural language, and yet natural languages cannot be translated into a formalized language of the type used in *Principia Mathematica*.

The first argument requires no comment. Let us briefly discuss the second.

If, following Russell and Carnap, we assume that to describe a language we need syntactic rules and a vocabulary, it can easily be demonstrated that the calculus built on that basis will cover only part of what is usually taken to belong to everyday language. The logician is interested only in declarative sentences, and orders, questions, demands, etc., cannot be translated into the language of that calculus. But that is not all. The observance of

syntactic rules, which among other things determine which place in a sentence may be occupied by words belonging to specified semantic categories, does not safeguard us against absurdities of the type: "Monday is rectangular," and yet a perfect language ought by definition to safeguard us against absurdities. Finally, transformation rules pertaining to sentences (such rules being part of syntax) do not guarantee that transformations will be correct if we abstract from the context, i.e., if we do not know from another source that reference is made to the same object in the same time segment.

But these objections might be waived (as is explained, e.g., by Warnock) by assuming that logical calculus discloses the structure not of language in general, but of the language of science, from which everything that is not a declarative sentence may be eliminated; that that calculus is a perfect language in the sense of an ideal construction; and that this is an abstract and simplified way of presenting certain essential aspects of language.

But even by adopting that argument we do not settle the important issue of vague words, with which we are principally concerned in this paper. The perfect language was expected in the first place to remove that defect of language. Can it carry out that task and, if so, to what extent?

As we have seen, all the endeavours to eliminate completely the vagueness of words, including the determination of meaning by convention, are unsuccessful. There remains only one suggestion more, which must be analyzed. It consists in a construction which, by introducing a one-one relation between the word and the fact, would completely remove the issue of vagueness, since it would eliminate the possibility of its development as a relation holding between one word and an indetermined number of facts. That is a radical recommendation, which unfortunately amounts to throwing the baby out with the bath water. The vagueness of words in fact disappears, but at the cost of cancelling the possibility of abstract thinking. Such a prospect justifies our previous description of Russell's idea as disastrous. We know that every word generalizes, that the process of abstraction is a process of generalization. If every word by definition is to become individual, and if we thereby renounce the possibility of generalizing, we have to work two miracles at the same time: the miracle of

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forgetting the system of abstract thinking, as shaped by the history of the human race, and the miracle of remembering an infinite number of words (not to speak of producing them) that would correspond to an infinite number of things and phenomena. *Nota bene*, that extravagant idea has nothing to do with the idea of a formalized language as a skeleton of a perfect language, for a formalized language is based on the opposite principle of rising to the highest levels of abstraction.

Thus it may be said that if the solution indicated by Russell is the only way of eliminating the vagueness of words, then that vagueness cannot be eliminated. Personally, I would go even further and claim that an ideal delineation of meanings of words is not only impossible to attain and thus resembles the notorious squaring of the circle, but also that it would be undesirable.

To explain this standpoint let us resort to an analogy. The philosophers who in some form or another realize the role of the subjective factor in cognition have for centuries been troubled by the problem of absolutely objective cognition. That was why Kant, a realist for all his recognition of an objective existence of the world, developed a subjective and idealistic conception of phenomenalism, a conception which reduces the picture of the world to a subjective construction of the cognizing subject, and transforms the world of the *noumena* into a postulate based on unjustified faith. In our time Karl Mannheim, guided by similar considerations, passed from the recognition of a social conditioning of human cognition to an extreme relativism which denies any possibility of objective knowledge in the sphere of social phenomena, and transforms the objective existence of those phenomena into the specific Kantian *Ding an sich*. In both cases the role of the subjective factor in cognition was rightly taken into account; but in both, too, false and extremely sceptical conclusions concerning the possibility of objective cognition were drawn from that observation. We are unable to eliminate the influence of the subjective factor upon cognition where that factor is connected with the objective conditions of cognition: the apparatus of perception will, of course, remain our human apparatus, and our consciousness will not, in any miraculous way, free itself from its own social conditions in which it has been shaped. The limitations of the apparatus of perception result in specific limitations

of human cognition: certain things we are unable to perceive at all, although we could perceive them with a different apparatus; and other things are always perceived in a specific way, although with a different apparatus we could perceive them in a different way. And yet, do we not overcome these limitations, do we not learn to perceive things that under normal conditions are inaccessible to our senses, do we not correct the errors committed by our senses and eliminate some of the limitations that are imposed on them? It is the same with the social conditioning of our consciousness and with other forms of influence of the subjective factor upon our cognition. Practice shows that our cognition is objective, although its objectivity is certainly not absolute and manifests itself in an infinite progress of our knowledge. That indubitable progress of human knowledge of the world proves that we can achieve objective cognition without trying to solve the problem of the squaring of the circle, i.e., without endeavouring to achieve ideal objectivity of cognition, realizable in a single act of cognition, and to eliminate all the limitations of our cognition, limitations which because of their nature do not succumb to our will and cannot be eliminated. The ideal of an absolutely objective and absolutely complete cognition, that is, cognition that would satisfy the criterion of absolute truth, presupposes extra-human or superhuman cognition. At one time Joseph Dietzgen, a German worker who came to formulate the basic ideas of Marx's philosophy on his own, independently from Marx, referred the advocates of such angelic cognition (it was a discussion with neo-Kantians) to the world of angels, and requested them not to interfere with us in this vale of tears. And he was right.

Mutatis mutandis, the same can be said with reference to language as a means of thought and of human communication. It is handicapped with a number of imperfections, including the vagueness of words, due to causes discussed above. Shall we then try to solve the squaring of the circle, i.e., endeavour to eliminate absolutely that shortcoming which cannot be eliminated in an absolute way and try to build a "perfect" language, which cannot be built? Experience teaches us that that is not necessary, that by improving the language, as much as is necessary under given conditions, we attain our cognitive objectives without undertaking

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tasks which cannot be carried out. The history of the problem shows us that the idea of a perfect language, born in the atmosphere of euphoria due to the vertiginous successes of symbolic logic and the construction of formalized languages, miscarried. We are unable to build a language consisting of words absolutely sharply defined, but on the other hand we need not do that. We are in a position to add as much precision to the meanings of words as we need in a given case, and to handle vague words with precision. Consequently, we have at our disposal all that is necessary for improving our language and our cognition, and so we may leave the "perfect" language to the angels, following the pertinent advice of Joseph Dietzgen.

First of all we must see clearly that the squaring of the circle, which preoccupies so many people to this day, is just a hindrance, in addition to being unnecessary. The limits of precision of our statements depend above all on the task set before cognition. Measurements made by means of an electronic microscope for the needs of everyday life would not only be unnecessary, but would hamper us in our usual activities. Consequently, no one has ever come up with such a crazy idea. The same holds for language expressions. Since the idea of establishing a one-one correspondence between words and facts has proved a failure, words must be vague. Often, too, they are ambiguous in the sense of being homonymous. But there are also other factors which lead them away from ideal unequivocality. Language not only serves the purpose of conveying information, but also has an emotional function which manifests itself in the way a word is spoken out, etc. Thus the ambiguity and the vagueness of a word are multiplied in the actual use of that word. In a sense this is advantageous, for the more elastic a word the greater its possibilities of expression. On this issue there is a radical divergence of views between the logician and the linguist.

But what about the precision of statements, what about the struggle against the vagueness of words, which after all in certain cases may give rise to serious errors? Language has a number of means with which to counteract that. They vary from the simplest and the most often used, such as situation and context which in most cases help to avoid misunderstandings that might arise as a result of ambiguity; to definitions which practically enable us to

shift the "fringe" of vagueness in the direction of the limit which is the ideal precision of a word; or, if this is necessary in science, to idealizations which consciously introduce the fiction of ideal precision in the same way as in geometry we use fictions of an ideal straight line, an ideal point, and ideal geometrical figures.

Practically, the precision of words knows no boundary, although we never attain the limit of ideal precision. And that is the most important point, provided that we fully realize that the limits of precision needed are a function of the practical or theoretical task which we set ourselves. It is only in such a context that we can solve the problem of the formalized languages, used in mathematics, and in some cases in logic, and in particular the problem of their claim to the status of a perfect language.

After all that has been said above we may without much ado abandon the term "perfect language," since it is just a myth. On the other hand, it is true that there are more and less precise languages, consisting of more and less vague words, and languages which in that sense are more or less perfect. As far as the formalized languages met in the sphere of logic are concerned, I am most inclined to share the opinion that they are constructions which, owing to abstraction and generalization, reflect in a simplified way (thanks to which they are in a position to acquire exceptional precision in that respect) certain important relations occurring in languages. Thus they reflect a certain reality, but as a reflection they are simplified on account of their abstractedness. This creates the possibility of imparting exceptional precision to words belonging to those languages and, thereby, a convenient position for the study of relations between those words, relations presented in a simplified way. This procedure is necessary for certain research purposes; and for this reason, the development of formalized languages and studies in this field, must be considered great scientific achievements. But that is necessary, and consequently useful, only for *certain* research purposes. If we go outside these limits we may encounter serious dangers. First of all, the danger of blurring the fact (which Russell many times criticized in logical positivists) that the study of language is not autonomous and may not be treated in abstraction from extralinguistic facts (which was suggested by the restriction of studies to investigations of the syntax of formalized languages), Further,

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the danger of impoverishment of the functions of language, if they be confined to those simplified relations which occur in the formalized languages.

Practical conclusions from the above are as follows:

We ought not to exaggerate in the search for appearances of precision interpreted as a symbolic form of statements, when such a precision is not necessary for the purpose of research. This is so because no outward form of a statement will eliminate the vagueness of words where such a vagueness is their objective property, and also because a triviality clad in the form of symbolic notation (which still occasionally occurs, although the peak period of that ridiculous mannerism belongs to the past) does not cease to be a triviality. At the most, it may impress the uninitiated, on the principle of the superstition that incomprehensible things must hide some inscrutable wisdom. In saying this I do not mean to deny that in certain cases symbolic notation is necessary and useful. For some selected groups of people it may have a communicative value, since it makes certain analyses more comprehensible to them. Symbolic notation may also have heuristic importance, since sometimes the very form of a statement written down in symbols stimulates the mind of the researcher, which does not happen in the case of the usual script or improperly chosen notation. Finally, symbolic notation may also facilitate solution of certain problems. Hence the conclusion that, without attaching any undue, absolute importance to symbolic notation, we ought to learn to choose the suitable language to the needs of a given research problem.

We may strive for precision of statements and of terms used, insofar as that is dictated by our needs in a given case. But we should bear in mind that sharpening the tools is never a task in itself. Exaggeration in toying with "adding precision" to the terms we use may prove no less deplorable than a carefree use of vague terms and obscure statements. For the habit of adding precision to statements just for the fun of it threatens a complete sterility of thought. There is no end to such "adding precision" to terms, and he who does not know when to stop, is doomed to Sisyphus' labour. And that is why we must warn against a wrong use of the otherwise extremely useful and respectable method of semantic analysis. For the Utopian requirement of an *absolute* precision

of statements and terms, and the feasible and justified requirement of their *optimum* precision, adjusted to the needs of the various disciplines and research problems, are two quite different things.

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THE MACHIAVELLIAN REVOLUTION

It is impossible to understand the significance of Machiavelli's work if one does not understand, to begin with, the concept of man and of the world which dominates it.

Too frequently the image of Machiavelli is limited only to a study of the procedures, tricks, string-pulling, ropes (and even ropes around the neck) which he prescribes for the attainment and maintenance of power, all of this well embellished with a psychology which is either praised or deprecated.

This aspect of Machiavelli's work is not false. It is undoubtedly true that Machiavelli is the father of all the Machiavellian recipes. But it is no less true that Machiavellism does not exhaust all the thought of Machiavelli. No work of genius exhausts the genius who has created it. Plato is greater than Platonism, because he bears within himself an entire world of which his work is only a fragment. Balzac is greater than the *Comédie Humaine*. The property of genius is to be inexhaustible. In contrast to the chatterer, it tirelessly continues to say the same thing. And so does Machiavelli. Even at the very heart of the political mechanisms which the Florentine patiently takes apart, there is a certain vision of the human being placed in the world, organizing

its relations and coordinating its joints. The advice which Machiavelli gives to those who love power has no meaning aside from the central philosophical and anthropological intuition which strategically orients it. To give this advice, and to be sure that it would be well received, Machiavelli had to know what the man of his time was, what concept this man had of himself and of his place in the universe. The Florentine was not a man to preach to the deaf.

If one does not discern this initial concept, from which all of Machiavelli's thoughts spring as from a subterranean source, nothing is left of his work but a formless, inchoate, disconnected mass of behavior, manners, attitudes and artifices. Most critics of Machiavelli, and the men of action who wanted to shape their conduct according to the suggestions of the author of *The Prince*, have fallen into this trap. They constructed for themselves a conventional Machiavelli. They made him a sort of *virtuoso* of Machiavellism. They imagined him as a simple technician of politics. If Machiavelli is a fox constantly on the lookout for prey, he is, however, a thinking fox, whose ruses and slynesses depend on the type of man whom he observes in his time, and whose effigy he carries within himself. He is much too intelligent not to surpass by a thousand ells the vulgar Machiavellism to which his thought is too often reduced. He knows the new man whom the Renaissance has brought forth. He has formed, in his most secret thoughts, a just, firm and lucid idea of him. His art of governing is not left to chance, to improvisation, nor even to a mere knowledge of the psychological motivations of the human heart. He knows all that, and well, but above all he knows human nature as it was conceived by the Renaissance.

But in order to grasp the concept of man which Machiavelli ceaselessly assumes in his ruthless analyses (and which doesn't openly appear in any of his work), it is necessary to contrast it with the concept of the Middle Ages.

The Middle Ages were dominated by the Aristotelian concept of man that the genius of St. Thomas integrated with Christianity. Of medieval man, one might say in general that he was all of a piece, without a break or crack between the components of his being, like a peasant innocent, in his simplicity, of the psychological conflicts of city-dwellers, whose cerebral vision of the world

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is so often pushed to an extreme by the spell of urban civilization. Confronting reality, the attitude of medieval man is synthetic and not analytic. He apprehends himself as a whole, just like the creatures and things of nature which he observes and with which his life is involved. A tree, for him, is not roots, plus trunk, plus branches; the parts are all alive with a single principle. An animal isn't a sum of organs and members put together like the parts of a machine, but a living being which takes its life from a mysterious entity diffused equally in all its members and which the scholars call the soul. The universe appears to him to be a vast net of correspondences agreeing among themselves in an organic fashion. His concept of man and of the world is essentially vitalistic.

It is, therefore, not astonishing that the man of the Middle Ages, formed by contact with nature, adopted in his behavior the Aristotelian doctrine—the scholars consciously, the ignorant unconsciously. This doctrine adapts itself like a glove to his being. For Aristotle, indeed, the soul is not separated from the body, the spirit is not cut off from the flesh. They are two incomplete entities which only exist together. The soul penetrates the body down to the least fiber, and the body impregnates the farthest recesses of the soul. Christian Aristotelianism orchestrated this *unitary* concept of man. For it, the spiritual is carnal, to use the formula of Péguy, a medieval man lost in the nineteenth century. Grace is, undoubtedly, distinct from nature; but far from abolishing it, it fulfills itself by becoming incarnate in it.¹ It is not at all a layer of paint or a poster slapped onto man, but intimately involved in his life, as food is in blood; it is the principle of all his supernatural actions and the origin of his theological virtues. The Christian Aristotelianism is governed by the radical law of the incarnation of Grace and of the soul in the body, with which they form *one* substance.

For the medieval man, then, there is not the soul on one hand and the body on the other, like a pilot in a boat, but one being only, all of a piece. There is not on the one hand the super-

¹ *Perficit*, says St. Thomas; one could translate: it carries nature to the point of supreme perfection and maturity, while remaining at the same time, as the source of this transformation, superior to nature.

natural and on the other the natural, but a complete human being, baptized man, completely natural and completely supernatural to the degree that he realizes within himself the demands of nature and of Grace.

The human being is, therefore, for medieval man, an individual in the strongest meaning of the word, that is, an *undivided* being. Only death can break this fundamental unity. But even death, in the Christian perspective, is only the open door to resurrection, where the soul and the body are rejoined, where the concrete unity of the human being is reconstituted. The scenes of resurrection on the doors of Romanesque or Gothic cathedrals of the Middle Ages are not only the pictured translation of the Last Judgment, but also the symbol of the reconstitution of the integral human being, gifted with a soul, supplied with flesh and bones, promised an eternity of joy or an eternity of suffering according to the life led on earth, and who arises anew, with a permanently fixed destiny. The dogma of the resurrection of the body is tightly linked with the unitary concept of man which passed from Aristotelianism to Christianity.

The universal macrocosm is only the gigantic enlargement of the human microcosm. It too is subject to the golden rule of the unity of its component parts. Every terrestrial phenomenon has its celestial counterpart, and vice versa. The dogma of the mystical body that is the Church in its triple aspect—militant, suffering, and triumphant—directly underlines the tight solidarity which exists between the hierarchical and unitary concept of the Aristotelian *cosmos* and Christian theology.

Man, therefore, finds himself in fundamental accord with the universe in which he is placed by the accident of birth. Doubtless, original sin has distended this relationship. It has not completely broken it. Man has been excluded from the benefice of Grace, but the nature within him, while wounded, has not been corrupted to the point of no longer being nature. Christ, also, came to restore the unity of creation, and to offer it anew, sublimated by His redeeming sacrifice, to the Father who created all things, visible and invisible. The Christian who imitates Christ in this way is a man who, supernaturally elevated by Grace, offers himself and the entire universe of which he is a part to the divine Father.

The Aristotelian and Christian perspective in which the Mid-

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dle Ages places itself is then determinedly and at the same time *vitalistic, consonant and optimistic*. The bustling life of nature comes from God and returns to God through Christ, *per ipsum et cum ipso et in ipso est tibi Patri omnipotenti, in unitate Spiritus Sancti, omnis honor et gloria*. This grandiose theological vision of a world whose multiplicity is gathered in unity would not have been possible without the vast work of systematization undertaken by Aristotle, who carried the Greek idea of a universe ordered like a chorus to the ultimate point of perfection: the cosmos suspended through love from a supreme Good who is God. The medieval spirit will strive, then, like the Greek spirit, to make manifest the convergence of all beings, of all goods towards the one Good, of all material, spiritual and intellectual interests towards total harmony. The Christianity of the Middle Ages is in this sense the direct heir of the Greek *cosmos* and its transposition to the superior level of the supernatural.

This universe is all the more ordered since all its members depend on a creative God all the way to the ultimate roots. Each one has there his destined place. Each is what he is in that place because of the divine will. No one can add an ell to his stature. No one can become something other than he is. No one can escape from his own being. To surpass oneself, to go beyond the power which God assigns to each of his creatures is the sin *par excellence*: pride, which makes its victim fall into disorder, out of the divine creation, and lets him fall into the hands of the Devil. Here too the Christian concept of sin as a breaking of divine law is parallel to the Greek concept of lack of measure, of *hybris*, according to which any man who exaggerates the power at his disposal and surpasses his limits is immediately punished for his temerity by the explosion of his own power. To want to be more than he is excludes man from the universe and from order. Every abuse of power is immediately punished. Whoever crosses the limits of the human condition to set himself up as a superman and as a god cuts himself off from the universal harmony.

This concept was demolished in the Renaissance. Difficult as it is to sum up in a few words that prodigious movement that was the Renaissance, the least one can say is that there was a lessening of the Aristotelian and Christian influences which had made themselves so forcefully felt in the Middle Ages. In some

cases, these influences even disappeared. Doubtless, the school of Padua remained faithful to Aristotle, but the Aristotelianism which it diffused had nothing more in common with the Greek and Thomist Aristotelianism. It is an Aristotelianism so strongly influenced by Averroism that it is hardly recognizable. In all minds Plato, or rather his neo-Platonic transposition, takes the place of Aristotle, and Paduan Aristotelianism is hardly more than a camouflaged neo-Platonism, just as is the Averroism whose influence it underwent. There is no longer, from the Renaissance on, a single philosopher of peripatetic breadth.

In the same way, the solidly peasant structure of the Christian faith is altered, and invaded by elements which disjoin within it the firm relations which it had established between supernature and nature. While nature, in the medieval sense of the word, is the ensemble of created beings assembled in creation and concretely submissive to the Creator, nature, in the new sense of the word, becomes abstract and degenerates into naturalism, that is to say, a doctrine which removes the universe and human conduct from the imperatives of the transcendent divine law which governs them.

Deprived of its natural substratum, Christian faith transforms itself in turn: it casts off its carnal character and makes itself immanent. It is much more thought than lived; it moves on the basis of pure faith. Certainly, the Renaissance man remains a believer, but his belief is cut off from all the speculations which he elaborates concerning the universe; it is enclosed within itself, breaking all the relations which the Middle Ages had so firmly established between philosophy, the realm of proof, and theology, the realm of revelation. As Poggio wrote on the subject of his friend Lorenzo Valla, the latter "discredits Aristotle's physics, destroys religion, professes heretical ideas, despises the Bible. And has he not claimed that the Christian faith rests not on proofs, but on belief, which would be beyond all proofs!" From this typical quotation one may see that the Renaissance breaks with Aristotle and with traditional Christian theology.

The two breaks are parallel and are to be found, in different degrees, in all minds of the time. The Renaissance man does not consider the world as a *cosmos* created and redeemed by God.

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He places himself henceforth outside of this world with which he now no longer deals except in a strictly worldly sense.

Let us not be deceived here by the metaphors which are so often used when speaking of the Renaissance. The historians and philosophers tell us that the Renaissance substituted anthropocentricity for medieval theocentricity. The image of the center is rather misleading. In fact, that of the circle is much more proper: for the medieval man, the cycle of the real passes from God as principle to God as end, through finite beings both natural and supernatural. This circular harmony is now broken. Man finds himself *outside* the cycle of reality. He is no longer a being in the world, but a being outside of the world, facing a world that has been despoiled of its natural profundity explored by Aristotelianism and of its supernatural profundity communicated to it by Christianity. The world of the Renaissance is a *denaturalized* and *desacralized* world. This world no longer has a vital principle as Aristotle had assumed. This world no longer has the ferment of Grace as St. Paul had assumed. It is now a bare, disenchanted world. One will no longer seek in it for traces of the divine intelligence which created it or the passage of divine love which redeemed it. The world is now no more than an object of conquest for man, who faces it as a master faces a slave or as an artist faces the model from which he is working.

Such a change of concept has the immediate result of substituting the practical men, the artists, the artisans, the warriors, the conquerors, in short, the technicians, for the philosophers and theologians and contemplative spirits of the Middle Ages. And just as it is necessary, in order to seize the world and give it shape, to know its resistance and malleability, so it will be necessary to determine its lines of strength, just as if the world were a machine to be constructed. Henceforth the world is no longer an organism, as Aristotle thought, but a mechanism in which all idea of cause is excluded, where there are now only phenomena which succeed each other, revealing only the invariability of their antecedents and consequences to the observer. As Emile Bréhier has emphasized, the new concept of the world "is a concept which one realizes rather than thinks." The Renaissance man whose behavior Machiavelli analyzes is the first Faustian man: *im Anfang war die Tat!* One could even say that he is the first man of a Marxist

type, even if it be true that, according to the prophet of communism, it is no longer a question of knowing the world but rather of changing it.

With prodigious acuteness, Machiavelli discerned this new aspect of man arising under his very eyes on the stage of history. Machiavelli resolutely turns his back on the philosophers of the Renaissance who remain prisoners of the old scheme of the universe, such as Nicholas of Cues and Campanella. He adopts the new vision of nature. He does not want to pour new wine, whose fermentation he sees, into the old skin of the past. He adopts, rather, the path of the great captains, the great political leaders, the great artists.

For him, as for his contemporaries who sense the coming of the new man, there is no longer a harmonious universe, articulated in all its parts by a creating and redeeming God. There is now only, on the one hand, mankind and, on the other, a world which men can freely violate, if they are intelligent and astute enough. By the word *liberty*, Machiavelli no longer understands, as did the people of the Middle Ages, the possibility of doing good or evil, as he explains in subtle terms in the *Discorsi*, but rather the power to dominate a world henceforth as plastic and malleable as one could wish, since this world is now merely a banal and profane world, where reason can discover only matter perceptible to the senses. Outside of this material world, there is only a distant supernatural, floating like a balloon without anchors, without communication between the two.

Machiavelli is not an atheist in the modern sense of the word. He remains attached to the traditional faith, but it is no longer possible for the traditional faith to become incarnate in the new world which Machiavelli has discovered. He is just as likely to write an exhortation to penitence or a moral discourse—the title of one of his prose works—as a set of rules for a society of pleasure—the title of another. He will die in the lap of the Church. His son Pietro Machiavelli wrote these dry lines to Francesco Nello, a Florentine lawyer in Pisa, on June 22, 1524: "He let Fra Matteo hear his confession, who kept him company until his death." That is all. Machiavelli dies, faithful to an institution. Nothing more. He is not a miscreant, not a negator or an enemy of Christianity. He does not even mimic the faith,

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as Abel Lefranc thinks Rabelais does. He lives in two different worlds, separated by high walls. Human knowledge of the world is for him no longer integrated with Christian faith, and Christian faith no longer vitally applies itself to human knowledge of the world. He practices, as do the Averroists of his time, the doctrine of the double truth: religious truth and profane truth, each independent of the other. His attitude is that of reliance on faith: *credo quia absurdum*, and not *credo ut intelligam*. Reason and experience no longer lead him to the threshold of the supernatural mystery. The latter no longer extends the research of reason and of experience. They are two compartmentalized methods of knowing. The real terrestrial world is that of action. The real celestial world is that of irrational, sentimental, affective faith, enclosed by the institutions and rites of the Church. Machiavelli accepts both, without discovering any tie between them, as does the majority of his contemporaries. The two worlds are dissonant, and Machiavelli adjusts himself to this, as do, by the way, Montaigne, Hobbes and so many others.

But it is not enough to determine this, as do most historians, or to declare this ambivalent attitude untenable and purely hypocritical, as does Abel Lefranc. One must understand it. And one will not understand it if one plunges Machiavelli into the specifically neo-Platonic atmosphere in which all the Renaissance minds under the influence of Proclus immerse themselves. For the neo-Platonists, as for Plato, there are two worlds which coexist without interpenetrating: the intelligible, harmonious world and the material, discordant world. But while Plato poetically conceived of the sensible world as a degradation or shadow of the world of ideas, the neo-Platonists considered the material world to be an assemblage of exterior parts with no principal of organization. Matter is for them completely indeterminate. It is evil, and if it isn't evil in the way that Proclus thinks, it is the absence of all consonance, all accord and all harmony.

Man is therefore in a universe radically marked with the seal of duality: here below, a dissonant world, and above, a consonant world. By his spirit man belongs to the latter, by his body to the former. Faced with this dual world, there are only two possible attitudes, and they are exactly the ones which the men of the Renaissance adopt, according to their respective temperaments:

either they flee the world below as much as possible and escape into the world of cerebral speculation, and this is the attitude of numerous philosophers, from Marsilio Ficino to Nicholas of Cues and Campanella; or they deny, or, at the very least, enclose the world above in silent solitude, and adapt themselves to the world below with the firm intention of making a place for themselves in the midst of its divergencies.

Most minds vacillated between the two, for that matter. Leonardo da Vinci throws himself at the same time into esotericism and into technique. Certain philosophers reconstruct with their thoughts an ideal world, but are, at the same time, doctors, astrologers and occultists. The humanists build a religion out of beauty, and are exact philologists. As for Machiavelli, he throws himself eagerly into the world here below, except to reserve for himself—with characteristically extreme prudence and sense of calculation—an emergency exit to the world above.

The entire genius of Machiavelli resides in his having understood the significance of this passage from a unified world to a disjointed one, and in having drawn the consequences.

Machiavelli admirably grasped the cause of this immense transformation. His experienced eye saw at once: if the world is dissonant, *it is because man himself is cracking* and the components of his nature, only recently assembled into an organic whole by Aristotelianism and by a Christianity that is diffuse and *passé* in the customs of the time—these components are separating. Not only is faith self-isolated in Renaissance man, under the aspect of a deincarnate fideism, divorced from human nature, reduced to naturalism; it is man himself who is isolated, everyday man, the man in the street, so to speak. The medieval man—all of a piece—gives way to a man whose spiritual and vital extremities are separating from each other. The angel within us, under the guise of spirit, now contemplates *from outside* the beast within us, under the guise of passions and instincts. A triple fissure splits man from top to bottom. There is no longer organic communication between the believer, the reasonable being and the animal being. The Renaissance man, for Machiavelli who observes him with the sagacity of the entomologist, is a prey to the tensions and oppositions of the disjointed elements of his being. This man had just barely overcome the contradictions in

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his nature by sublimating them in an art of living inspired by Aristotelianism and Christianity. The invasion of neo-Platonism submerged this possibility.

Pico della Mirandola best translated this attitude in his famous *Oratio de hominis dignitate*. The creator says to Adam: "I placed you in the center of the world so that you could more easily look about you and see what it encloses. In making you a being that is neither celestial nor terrestrial, I wanted to give you the power to form yourself; you may descend all the way to the level of the beast and you can elevate yourself until you become a divine being."

All the philosophies of the period reject the unitary concept of man. Man's reason is autonomous and has no point of contact with the body, which is only vile matter. Reason is divine, or participates in the divine. It introduces itself into the secrets of the superior realities to which its nature is related. There is hardly a thinker, an artist or even a man of action at this time, who does not dabble in hermetic or exotic sciences, close to cabala and magic. It follows that the passions of the body, no longer regulated by a spirit present in the flesh, are given free rein. The famous adage of Pascal stresses this: he who behaves like an angel behaves like a beast. It would be difficult to find in history another period in which the culture of the spirit in all directions, normal or aberrant, coincided with the worst license in moral habits. The pontifical court is an example.

Machiavelli adapted himself to his epoch. He made this concept of *homo duplex* his own. "He is happy," he writes, "that is to say, arrives at the perfection of his being, who knows well how to govern himself according to the quality and condition of the times." But his peculiar genius lay in *having reversed the terms*, and in having realized that all the esoteric dust which his contemporaries sniffed with such delight in the manuscripts of decadent antiquity were not worth anything. For him, too, man is double: there is reason, and there is the animal in man, but it is the animal in him which brings him into contact with reality. The proper function of reason is not to escape into the kingdom of illusions, permitting the animal's passions and instincts to fulfill themselves haphazardly, but, on the contrary, to follow them in order to allow them to attain their end, as a

pilot guides a ship towards the port, and to give them the maximum power, by means of wise techniques which reason invents for this purpose.

We are here at the very core of Machiavelli's thinking.

The Aristotelian and Christian type of intelligence that finds the ultimate aim of human life in the Sovereign Good that is God, assigning to the will the task of approaching Him as closely as possible, bit by bit harmonizing the material world with the spiritual world for Machiavelli all this is finished. For him reason, too, is finished, in the ancient and medieval sense that unveils to man his nature as a reasonable animal with organically hierarchified functions, a reason that enlightens the will charged with realizing this ordered architecture. Reason finds itself in the presence of the animal that demonstrates its desires, its ardors, its loves and hates, and aspires only to satisfy them. But how can one satisfy a being that no longer has a proper aim and that is moved by limitless aspiration? Deprived of his supernatural and of his natural good, man is so animal as to be only a gaping appetite. The animal knows its limits: when it is full, it stops. Its hunger satisfied, its thirst quenched, its other desires fulfilled, it rests.

But man retains in himself, deep down, however far he may have fallen, the specific aspect of his nature. He will still desire to realize his nature and to arrive at the Supreme Good.² Since this path is closed to him, he will go in the direction of his animality, at a single word of command: *always more*. Machiavelli saw this without emotion: the man he observed has no outlet other than *power*. The definition of power is *always more*. Power is like a gas, wrote Simone Weil, paraphrasing Thucydides: it expands indefinitely until it encounters an exterior obstacle. Thus the whole problem, *the only problem* which Machiavelli poses is this: *how can man, who is only power, extend this power without losing it?* The answer which he perpetually gives is the following: by elaborating a *rational technique* of power which prevents it from dissipating itself.

² Pico della Mirandola, again, has clearly seen this. In his *Oratio*, God says to man: "On coming into the world, the animals were given everything they needed... But you, you can grow and develop as you like."

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Machiavelli then sees the double man acting exactly like an engineer. The engineer finds himself faced with material forces. It is a matter of first conquering them, and then of utilizing them, in such a way that the forces remain captive and do not escape. Machiavelli's problem is the same. The engineer is a Machiavellian without being aware of it. Machiavelli is an engineer of men who is not called such.

To arrive at this point, Machiavelli pushes his analysis of power to the extreme limit.

In the first place, he frees it of its impurities. Power has no end other than power. According to him, one is not powerful in order to enjoy comfort, women, pleasures, etc. One is powerful in order to use one's power. Therefore Machiavelli seeks all the historical examples of power. He plumbs the depths of Titus Livy. Ancient Rome, the archetype of power, furnishes him with innumerable materials that permit him to determine how power is achieved, maintained or lost.

Like the engineer who applies his intelligence to material forces from the outside, he will later see in power only the single quantitative slope which will give the correct measure. One is struck, in reading Machiavelli's advice, by the place occupied by "the more and the less." For him it is always a question moving toward a certain point determined by calculation. Sometimes it is necessary to assassinate, but never too much, except in the unusual case when "the grandeur of the crime covers its infamy." All human acts must be judged, counted, weighed, calculated and numbered, like things. Man is a thing. And the Prince is himself a thing which his technical reason must calculate, if he wishes to remain a Prince. Napoleon is on the straight line drawn by Machiavelli when he says: "For me, there are no persons, there are only things, their weights and their consequences," and when he specifies, "I am the most enslaved of men, because my master is necessity, and this master has no entrails." In other words, the animal-man is a *mechanism* for the reason-man.

Machiavelli said the same in his famous letter from San Casciano: "I adjust my watchmaker's lens, I manipulate my tiny, fine needles with a delicate finger, I unceasingly take apart and put back together the little toothed wheels, I examine the minuscule pivots, I sound the nervous organs and all the springs of the

human soul and I make it function before my eyes, *as it functions in all men*." Undoubtedly, he would not deny the possible presence of chance and accidents in events, but for the Prince, if he would remain the Prince, it is a matter of foreseeing these and parrying the thrusts ahead of time by setting up substitute mechanisms that will make good the failings of the mechanisms already in place. For the first time in the history of humanity, human acts are considered to be a system of mechanical reflexes which almost always make infallible predictions possible.

And finally, man's reason, applying itself to purely mechanical objects and situations, is itself a mechanism. For Machiavelli there is no form of intelligence other than the calculating intelligence. Before Descartes, who said that his physique was only geometry, Machiavelli could have claimed that his politics were only mathematics, with its fundamental signs: *more, less, equal*. For that matter, to see in man and in the world only their quantitative aspects is evidence that the reason which sees them must itself be completely mathematized, mechanized. One could almost say, without falling into caricature, that Machiavelli sees in *homo duplex* the mechanism of reason acting on the mechanism of the passions and instincts, and their juxtaposition acting on the machine of the world.

In this way, and only in this way, is it possible to maintain acquired power. All the risks of losing it are present in the equation of power together with all the stratagems for maintaining it. Each is weighed. Each is in its place, provided with its negative or positive sign. It is now only necessary to carry out the operation. The solution will be free of error. Machiavelli never wearies of repeating this. Moreover, he adds with his habitual ardent coldness, "one owes the people only results."

Machiavelli is therefore not, absolutely not, the pure technocrat of politics that some people like to think he is. His processes are rooted in a strongly determined dissonant and dualistic conception of man and of the world. Anyone who reads Machiavelli attentively cannot help but notice this. When one writes that interest or power have no need for basis or foundation according to Machiavelli; that they are taken for granted; that they are simply facts which the Florentine determines, one underestimates the intelligence of the author of *The Prince*. Machiavelli

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has before him a new type of man, avid for power over men and things, whose structure is presupposed in all the techniques which he prescribes. He has applied to the neo-Platonic type of man the same reversal which Marx will later effect in the dialectics of Hegel, with the same intention: that of dominating other men and the world.

It is clear that so resolutely mathematical a way of thinking ignores the notions of good and evil. In mathematics, there is neither good nor evil, there is not even truth and error in the real sense of the terms, there is only exactitude or inexactitude. In this sense, Machiavelli is the supreme contemporary thinker in a world given over to techniques. Doubtless, his thinking still causes scandal, and it is in memory of Niccolò Machiavelli that the English call the devil *Old Nick*.³

It is indubitable that this rigorous mechanization of man and of the world under the rule of a quantitative intelligence appears *satanic* to the Christian. But the satanic quality of Machiavelli is not there. It resides rather in his inharmonious concept of man and of the world, which his methodical calculations try to reduce to, and disguise as the relations of forces. Satan is in effect the cleft character *par excellence*, because he derives his being from God and has turned away from God. He has no more interior unity. He is torn through and through. Vigny saw this admirably when he made him say:

Entre moi-même et moi si grande est la distance
Que je ne comprends plus ce que dit l'innocence.

[The distance between me and myself is so great that I no longer understand what innocence says.]

Satan no longer understands that sin is, at the same time, separation from oneself and separation from God, on whom all being depends. To select arbitrarily one part of one's being to the detriment of the others, and to remove it from the divine rule, is according to the Church Fathers the very definition of original sin: "by the first sin," one of them writes, "Adam separated himself from himself and from the others," Adam broke the tie

³ Macaulay seems to have been the first to apply the fantastic epithet of *Old Nick* to the devil, around 1880. (E.N.).

that united him as a creature to all the other creatures, and to the rest of creation in the love of the Creator.

This is exactly the position of Machiavelli, whose concept of man and of the world is as pessimistic as possible. "For one can say that men in general are ungrateful, inconstant, dissimulating, cowardly, prejudiced...and the Prince who has relied on their word, without taking other precautions, falls.... As all those who have written about public life may demonstrate, and as may be observed in the numerous examples offered by history, anyone who organizes a Republic and orders its laws must assume that all men are bad, and give free rein to the malignity of their souls every time that they may freely do so... Men never do anything good except by necessity." One could find armfuls of analogous quotations in the Florentine's writings.

The immoralism of Machiavelli, crystalline and glacial, has at least the consequence, Asiatic as that might be, of putting the political man on guard against the smoke of moralism. The devil carries stones. If there is indeed a domain where the end frequently justifies the means, it is certainly politics. The common good which the statesman protects always includes a heavy dose of "impure" elements, and the health of a nation is not the result of a microbial sterilization. The statesman, in his function as watchman over the common good, is often forced to be "cruel" or "perfidious." If he has the perpetrators of grave disorders put to death, he is not more "immoral" than a surgeon who amputates a gangrened leg. If he hides his true intentions from his adversaries, he does not "lie" any more than the doctor who hides from a stubborn patient the true purpose of his therapy. Having excluded themselves from the common good which would require them to participate in the life of the city, malefactors are only things, to be treated as such. Placed outside of this same common good, enemies are in their turn things. They are no longer, neither the former nor the latter, "persons." They have broken, as the poet says:

L'attachement qui nous rend libres

A l'ombilic dont nous vivons.

[The attachment, which makes us free, to the umbilical cord, from which we live.]

In addition, the position in which the statesman finds himself includes a number of factors which escape his free choice, and

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therefore his moral or immoral will: the geographical situation of his land, its demographic development or recession, natural riches, commerce with neighboring peoples, etc. Therefore his action will resemble the techniques applied to material realities, when it comes up against the impersonal forces subject to his care. He cannot strictly apply to these forces, principles which govern the relations between conscious and free beings.

Finally, the anti-Machiavellians who rise up against the "Machiavellism" of the political man are always pharisees of Machiavellism when they do not recognize the enormous dose of natural philosophy which ballasts the art of ruling. Their moralism proceeds from a secret or admitted adhesion to a cult of the "gross animal" which sets up nations and peoples as gigantic individuals, gifted with liberty and responsibility. It is no longer the individuals whom they sacrifice to the idol of their pseudo-morality, it is entire groups, classes, lands, races. In imbuing with "morality" the physical means which they are forced to use, they shamelessly justify these means. The Machiavellism which they deny in words has been inherited in their marrow like an old and shameful malady which ravages them, and whose sepulcher they must whiten. "To be taken by idealism," Lenin said of these types. The real world disgorges these "moralists" who, like termites, gnaw at the vital tissue of nations and dress in glory the ruins which they have provoked. The great solitary wild animal that is Machiavelli is supremely innocent, compared with these insects who consider themselves athletes of morality.

Machiavelli is equally the exact antithesis of Rousseau. For him, man is radically bad, as if he had never been created or redeemed by God. For the Genevan, man is radically good as if he had never sinned, as if he were God Himself.

Our time has combined the two concepts. Under a Rousseauism of law which betrays the great words *liberty*, *equality* and *fraternity*, a Machiavellism of fact is hidden, that uses the hypnotic influence of these words in favor of the will for power of these who love power—individuals, groups and nations. Rousseau gives Machiavelli the good conscience and good faith that the Florentine laughs at. He covers his enterprises with a plastic coating of respectability. Divisions, conflicts and crimes are no longer perpetrated in the name of power, but in the name of

Justice with a capital "J." The man whom Rousseau idolized hides a demon in his bosom. The Rousseauian angel is combined with a Machiavellian beast. That produces an excellent explosive mixture. For two centuries now, all revolutions have used it shamelessly. Nuclear fission, presented at the same time as the key that will open the new terrestrial paradise and as the instrument of the absolute catastrophe unloosed by the will for power, is the symbol of this.

We will not escape from this inhuman dilemma without returning to the human. This conversion is simple and difficult. Man is neither good nor bad. The proper function of the statesman is to establish by all means a social climate such that the powers of evil themselves promote the development of good. A healthy policy is one in which strictly personal interest, which, if left to itself, removes man from the community, is made to coincide with the duty which absorbs man into the community if it is allowed to dominate. This tension is perpetual. Political work has constantly to be redone, like Penelope's cloth.

To go beyond Machiavelli and Rousseau, only recourse to some transcendent and atemporal power, mythological or not, can turn evil towards good. That is why the ancients said that politics is a *divine science*. Without the keystone of religion, the social edifice crumbles.

THE INCA EMPIRE:

DESPOTISM OR SOCIALISM

The true character of the Inca Empire is poorly set forth in works dealing with its economic and social structure. Too many historians or sociologists have attempted, in their enthusiasm, to make of it a state corresponding to a modern formula: a socialist, a totalitarian or a welfare state.¹ From the sixteenth century on, how many arbitrary pictures have been drawn, propped up by quotations! In fact, among the chronicles and reports and documents which Spain, that rummager of old papers, has handed down to us, and in the accounts of the Indians them-

Translated by S. Alexander.

¹ For fear of overburdening the pages of this article with notes, I have preferred to omit the bibliography entirely. However, I wish to make clear my particular debt to my colleague and friend, Professor John Murra, whose work on the economic and social structure of the Inca Empire will inevitably renew our interpretation of the facts.

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selves, one finds enough mixed-up assertions and facts to bolster or justify the most diverse interpretations. Reality has frequently been confused with a schematic, abstract order which was the fruit of frequently gratuitous speculations.

Undoubtedly, the Indians who described their system of government to the Spaniards gave them a somewhat idealized image, exaggerating the geometrical order and rigorous discipline which it implied. The perfection attributed to this administrative machine, in its functioning as much as in its intentions, cannot but fail to arouse suspicion in our minds. The Inca Empire as it is usually evoked, escapes history. It is a Utopian republic and not a kingdom of this world which collapsed in a few months under the aggression of a band of adventurers. The terms used to define its institutions, constantly creating false associations, only add to the disease. Even contemporary authors often speak of the Empire of the Sun as did their colleagues of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries who attributed the customs of its inhabitants to legislators as beneficent as they were wise and ingenious.

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Professor Baudin, in a celebrated work, *The Socialist Empire of the Incas*, while admitting the traditional character of the rural communities, considers all the other institutions as a form of organization bearing the true trade-mark of socialism, for, as he explains, "it is an attempt at the rationalization of society." For this eminent economist, this organization would seem to respond to a preconceived plan tending "to realize a veritable absorption of the individual into the State, the well-being of the first being assured only in order to redound to the grandeur of the second." He adds: "If we have chosen this title of State Socialism, it is in order to clearly characterize the entire organization as conforming to a certain ideal, put into operation by authoritative means." One of the aims of this article is to confront this concept of the Inca Empire with a new interpretation of the facts.

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More recently a Finnish ethnologist, R. Karsten, published a popular work on the Incas, entitled *A Totalitarian State of the Past*, likening the Inca sovereigns to fascist dictators.

The conception of an ideal empire, of a "Welfare State," the result of a rational plan, has found its most extreme formu-

The Inca Empire: Despotism or Socialism

lation in the pages of a Peruvian historian and ethnologist, Dr. Luis Valcarcel. According to the latter, the genius of the Incas manifests itself especially in economic arrangements. "All of our sources," he says, "permit us to maintain that few civilizations—if any at all—have possessed an organization more likely to prepare man for the maintenance, development and expansion of his existence. The reciprocal relations between the individual and the group, and between the groups and the State, were regulated according to ethic norms, automatically observed, without hesitation, and without shocks. Economics and ethics were inseparable and did not conflict with each other, as in civilizations based upon private property and mercantilism."

"The State, the great single entrepreneur, with its administrative and statistical services, its laws, its precepts, its discipline, its creative dynamism was capable of mobilizing the entire population, eliminating unproductive unemployment and parasitism, and abolishing the distinction among economic, political and technical activities. An analysis of this phenomenon of association reveals to us the socialist character of *Tawantinsuyu*. It is the Peruvian species of the socialist genus."

Does the Inca Empire really belong to "the socialist genus" and are its organizers—the "Sons of the Sun"—really the forgotten precursors of modern socialism? That is what we shall seek to determine in these pages.

To Cunow must go the credit of having been the first to understand that the economic and social structure of the Inca Empire could be explained only in terms of the structure itself, of the innumerable cells which composed it; these cells were the little country communities or *ayllu*, many of which have survived down to our own times. Although there is very often a discussion of these in the old chronicles, their true nature has eluded us. Most authors consider them as patrilinear clans. However, for reasons which we shall develop below, we are rather inclined to define them as strictly localized endogamous lineages, or of related or unrelated family groups, possessing a common territory.

The myth of the great socialist state of the Incas is based upon a rather summary notion of its institutions. The property system, especially, as well as the duties of the subjects toward

the emperor, have been interpreted according to a terminology and spirit only vaguely corresponding to a civilization which was still archaic despite its complexity and subtlety.

Based on Garcilaso, a picture has been drawn of an Inca economic and social system, thus briefly summed up: the monarchs of ancient Peru, seeking to establish a reign of justice and prosperity among their peoples, once a province was conquered, "divided it into three parts, the first for the Sun, the second for the king and the third for the natives of the country."

The fields of the Sun were cultivated for the needs of the cult and their products served to support a numerous clergy. The domain of the Inca,² exploited for the government's profit, were drawn upon as from a safety vault, when disaster struck some province. Finally, the third group of arable lands were annually divided into equal lots, then re-divided among the families of each community according to their members. Each individual's private property was reduced to possession of a hut, an enclosure, some domestic animals, and household goods such as clothes and utensils. All the rest belong to the State. The inhabitants of the Empire worked for the emperor, who, in exchange left the free disposition of the communal lands to them and equitably redistributed a part of the fruits of their labor. If the economic structure of the Inca Empire was carried on in this manner, one would more accurately entitle it State Socialism grafted upon agrarian collectivism. Did the reality correspond to the ideal image here evoked?

As a matter of fact, the Incas combined the most absolute kind of despotism with the greatest tolerance toward the social and political order of its subject peoples. The emperor's will was primary, but this will reached the common man via the intermediary of local chiefs whose authority and privileges were maintained and reinforced. The centralizing tendencies of power harmonized with the practice of indirect government, a good and bad harmony—if such an anachronism may be permitted us.

The most original aspects of Inca civilization—the tripartite

² Let us recall that the term, *Inca*, properly refers to the sovereign of the *quichua* Empire of Peru, and his cast—and only by extension to the people subject to him.

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division of the land, the convents of the Virgins of the Sun, the state granaries, the system of statistics transcribed by means of knotted cords, the network of roads—reflect, in great detail, the conception of the subject's obligations toward his sovereign, and a most ingenious exploitation of resource—both in manpower and products—which a brutally imperialist political system had set up for itself in less than a century.

Inca society did not practice slavery in the usual sense of the term. Only much later do we see the emperor and his governors settle upon their domains peasants uprooted from their original communities. Tribute could not consist of money inasmuch as its usage was unknown, even in the rudimentary form in which it was developed in Mexico and Columbia. Gold and silver were valued only as raw materials for ornaments and ritual objects. The Incas certainly would have been able to appropriate a part of the harvest from each village, but they preferred to control the most precious riches: the manpower and energy of the people.

The forced labor system which the Incas imposed within their Empire derives directly from the work-payments out of which they formerly profited when they were only chiefs of rural communities. The peasants for whom they had been, in bygone times, the *koraka* ("elders") followed them to war, cultivated their fields, and, in turns, took it upon themselves to serve them. Having become masters of a great empire the Incas organized it in such a way as to derive the same advantages from it, but on an incomparably vaster scale.

"The tributes (that is to say the taxes)" writes the *licenciado Falcón* "were all personal and no Indian was taxed on his goods." The Inca's subjects were so used to work for the State that for a long time after the conquest they preferred, to the Spaniard's surprise, to be subjected to forced labor "though it might last fifteen days, rather than yield up to the authorities a single bushel of potatoes."

Once a province was conquered, the first task of the officials installed by the Inca was to estimate the resources in manpower and produce. On the basis of the information obtained and transcribed by means of knotted cords, the functionaries went on to the parcelling-out of the lands which would pass to the domain

of the State, and those whose yield were reserved to the cult of the Sun and the principle official divinities.

In appropriating part of the soil of the vanquished, the Incas modified, but did not transform, the existing land system. They twisted it to their advantage and to that of their tutelary gods. In effect, they did not introduce any structural changes: the *ayllu* did not lose their communal property (even if a part of them were confiscated) any more than the *koraka* and the *waka* (idols) lost theirs. The new arrangements which the royal officers inaugurated resulted in incorporating the Inca within each conquered community, since the Incas were satisfied to claim for themselves and for their divinities the rights which had been held from time immemorial by the lineage of chiefs and idols of the region. In this sense, it is less the community which adapted itself to a new organization than the Inca dynasty which, identifying itself in some way with the old order, rooted itself in the community. All the weight of the new land distribution and forced labor levy fell back, then, on the peasant who, over and above his obligations to his chiefs and traditional gods, now had to cultivate the fields of the Inca and those of his imperial divinities.

What was the extent of the Inca's lands and those of the Sun in comparison with those left to the communities? On this question our sources are still vague and even contradictory. Some, like Polo de Ondegardo, give the impression that the Inca reserved for himself the lion's share, while taking care to see that the communities had sufficient for themselves. A precious sixteenth century document reveals to us that in the Chíncha valley on the coast of Peru, each group of a thousand households were forced to cede to the sovereign at Cuzco a piece of land producing around ten *fanègues* (20 bushels) of grain. The exact acreage varied according to the nature of the soil. In truth, the Incas did not always expropriate cultivated lands; they often contented themselves with waste or fallow lands which they rendered productive, thanks to irrigation works and terracing. Corn cultivation seems to have been favored, and most of the admirable terracing laid out along the flanks of the valleys were intended for this grain.

The lands consecrated to the cult, whether belonging to a

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single tenant or divided, were relatively large, even if their area did not equal those of the fields belonging to the Inca. That is what caused Polo de Ondegardo to write that "no nation in the world has spent so much for sacrifices, and never have any villages contributed so much land to such a purpose." All these "Gods' Acres," it is true, did not exclusively belong to the Sun, since the sanctuaries and local gods kept the fields which they possessed before the Inca conquest.

But it was in vain that the land was fertile: the subject peoples were no less grievously affected by these confiscations. They did not forget the lands of which they had been despoiled, and in many cases did not fail to reclaim them from the Spaniards after the fall of the Incas.

It is less probable that the Incas intervened in community affairs and that they had sought to regulate the quantity of land returned to each family. Local usages were certainly respected. Whether lands were annually divided or not, the community certainly took account "of the needs of each family." However, "it assigned to it only enough to subsist, even if available land existed" (Polo de Ondegardo). Without day laborers and without slaves, families could only cultivate areas proportional to their actual members. In certain *ayllu*, the parcels were cultivated in turn by the entire community, in others only kinsmen assisted each other.

If a great deal of evidence exists with regard to the obligatory character of the periodic redistribution of the parcels, we also possess examples of lands exploited for generations by the same family. These contradictions are mitigated if one considers them in terms of present day situations. In certain Indian *comunidades* of modern Peru, notably at Chincheros, each year a purely symbolic ceremony of redivision of the lands is carried out, which changes nothing of the actual property relationships. The chiefs of the families affirm their right to their fields by walking around them and by stamping on the soil in the presence of the authorities to whom they offer gifts.

Today the only restrictions imposed upon property rights by indigenous custom to the members of a *comunidad* consists in forbidding the transfer of landed property to strangers in the village. Aside from that, everyone may dispose as he wishes

of the fields which he has inherited from his ancestors or received as a gift from his kinsmen. The villages often possess lands on which parcels are set aside for the young people who wish to settle, or lands which are consigned to dignitaries in compensation for moneys dispensed by them during Patron Saint festivals.

The land system in the Inca Empire, therefore, is characterized by the contrast between communal lands and lands of the Inca and of the Sun; private use of the soil was not ruled out. This had its origin in the land gifts which the Inca made to nobles enjoying his friendship, or to those who had won his favor by military valour or by carrying out great works in the public weal. These generositys were extended to priests and royal concubines when the latter were sent back to their native towns. Lands granted by the Inca were inalienable and non-taxable. They passed on to the heirs of the beneficiary who were obliged to exploit them in common and equally divide the yield. The parts going back to each household were equal. But those who had not participated in the planting lost their rights to the harvest.

Did these gifts operate to the detriment of the community or were they drawn from the royal domain? No text makes this clear. Undoubtedly, there did not exist any rule on this subject and decisions were made according to the circumstances and the region in which the land grant was situated.

The nobleman or functionary who had received a grant of land did not on that account, lose his rights to the communal lands of his *ayllu*. The Inca's favor was, therefore, at the base of a new type of property grafted on the traditional system.

Around Cuzco, especially in the beautiful Yucay valley, the Incas owned great private domains which remained to them even after death, since their products served for the care of their mummies and the servants in charge of them. We don't know how the Incas succeeded in appropriating the most fertile lands of the Cuzco region. Undoubtedly, they had not drawn back in the face of arbitrary confiscations as Pachacutec had done when the Inca dislodged all the Indians settled around the capital within a radius of five leagues and distributed their fields to members of the imperial family.

It is not always easy to distinguish between domains relating

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to royal favor, and hereditary lands of regional chiefs, whose possession had been confirmed by the Inca. Judged in this light, they might seem like deeds of gift. Various privileges were connected with these lordships, such as the right to toll-payments and priority in the seasonable work cycles undertaken under the guise of public forced labor. The lands granted by the Inca did not confer similar advantages upon their proprietors.

The Incas infringed upon the territorial integrity of the communities not only by deducting, for their own profit and that of their gods, a part of the arable lands but also by entirely confiscating lands belonging to rebel groups. These spoliations were, it would seem, numerous under the reign of the last great Inca Emperor, Huayna-capac, at the beginning of the sixteenth century. The lands taken from their legitimate proprietors passed under the direct control of the Inca or were distributed to his favorites.

Did the Inca possess eminent domain on all the lands of the Empire or only on fallow land, pastorage, or forests? This question, so often debated, might appear idle when one is dealing with an absolute sovereign who may dispose, at his pleasure, of the lives and goods of his subjects. The communities drew part of the natural resources of their territory to the degree that they did not harm the interests of the ruling class. The gold and silver mines as well as the auriferous streams reverted to the Inca, although certain *koraka* or even entire communities seemed to continue the exploitation of them, sending to Cuzco as tribute part of the metal which they had extracted. The coca plantations in the warm valleys belonged to the Inca. He had these cultivated by individuals often guilty of some crime, for work in sub-tropical regions, so laborious and dangerous for mountain folk, was considered a severe punishment.

The Indians had no right to hunt game in their territories, this pleasure being reserved to the Inca and his nobles. From time to time, the latter organized, with the participation of veritable armies, tremendous hunts called *chacu*, in the course of which thousands of animals were captured and slaughtered.

The Incas had reserved ownership to themselves of a great part of the llama or alpaca which constituted the wealth of the inhabitants of the high plateau. Only those animals consecrated

to the cult equalled the number of those belonging to the emperor. The communities of shepherds kept only pitiful herds for themselves. As for the heads of families, they had a right, in general, only to a dozen beasts. According to services rendered, or the favor which they enjoyed with the Inca, the *koraka* were entitled to receive gifts of a more or less great number of animals.

"The communal herd was sheared at a given time and the wool distributed to the villagers, to each according to his needs and his condition, and those of his wife and children. Inspections were made to verify if they had woven clothing out of the wool, and those who proved negligent in this regard were punished." (Ondegardo). All members of the *ayllu* received equal shares. This was true even for those who possessed llama or alpaca herds; and therefore, would have been able to do without such shares, strongly proving that family rights were imprescriptible, even if the result of inequalities.

The wool of the state herds was spun and woven under community supervision; garments and textiles made for the State and for sacrificial purposes. "For great quantities of *kumbi* quality (that is to say, the finest) were burnt."

In fact, the economic unit which the State took into consideration was the family or household and not the individual. If young people, the aged and women were not counted in the distribution of tasks, nevertheless they participated in agricultural work to the degree of their capability. A sector of the field of the Inca or of the Sun was assigned to each one liable to forced labor.

"He who was able, because of the assistance of a large family, to finish more quickly than the others was called a rich man." Work on the fields of the Inca and of the Sun, therefore, represented a periodic obligation whose duration varied from region to region. The order in which agricultural labor was carried out, according to the categories of the lands, has given place to contradictory assertions. Garcilaso de la Vega, in a frequently quoted passage, affirms that the peasants began at the fields of the Sun, and those of the widows, orphans, and soldiers of the army, and ended at the fields of the *koraka* and of the Inca. Texts of a less apologetic character assure us that State forced labor was carried out first.

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The products of the Inca fields and those of the Sun were stored in granaries situated along the roads or in easily accessible places. Part of these on the way to Cuzco served the needs of the Inca and the noble families. The rest were calculated to provide for the functionaries, the army, or work crews. Finally, these granaries were drawn from in order to make available new provisions for the population in the event of a poor harvest.

The tributary peasants were constricted to set up crews, not only to cultivate the fields of the poor and invalids, but those of families whose head was in the army or employed on Inca works. Finally, the rural community watched over the maintenance of the roads and the proper functioning of the irrigation system.

In an agricultural and handicraft State in which the authorities limited the circulation of persons and goods, and in which production was subject to governmental control, allotting the surplus toward public warehouses, commerce would not have been able to develop, in most cases beyond the barter level. Such are the conclusions which would seem to result from an analysis of the entire social and economic set-up of the Inca Empire. Once again, however, the reality is less simple than that. Certainly the Inca or his governors intervened, whenever it suited their purposes, in the trade between one region and another: when a harvest was insufficient within a province, whatever was lacking was supplemented, by official order, from a more favored region. Certain alimentary provisions, not existing in one zone because of climatic reasons, were regularly imported on a reciprocal basis; finally, luxury items manufactured by artisans in the Inca's service were redistributed in the form of gifts. However, to deduce from all this that the State exercised a monopoly on all kinds of commercial activities is an abuse of language and an anachronism. Evidently there had not been any desire among the Incas to restrict the trade which had existed before them. In a country as varied as Peru, where often short distances separate entirely different geographical conditions, a certain amount of barter was in the nature of things. Even before the Incaique epoch, the communities of the colder regions sought to swarm down into the warm valleys in order to maintain a minimum of alimentary variety by means of areas of enclosed land. Besides, one may find very clear allusions in the accounts of

the conquistadores to trade going far beyond local exchanges. Otherwise, how can one explain the duties at the entrances of towns and the toll houses at bridgeheads? Doesn't the capture by Pizarro's captain, Bartholomeu Dias, of an enormous raft loaded with merchandise prove that, despite their subjugation by the Incas, the coastal peoples had not abandoned all maritime traffic? For the same reason, there is the question of the markets, especially at Cuzco, capital of the Empire. Undoubtedly, they did not serve only for barter, nor were they important only in the economy of a restricted region. And finally, even if one were to ignore these facts, the abundance of objects of pure Incaique style gathered from the equator to Chile would seem to suggest the survival of strong ancient commercial resources which the Incas had not tried to suppress in order to assure their monopoly.

ORGANIZATION OF WORK

Collective ownership of the land, aid to the aged and sick, lands of the gods, lands of the chiefs—such institutions existed long before the reign of the Incas; their origins are lost in the night of time. Since Cunow, no sociologist who has examined the question has doubted it. If property relationships do not make the Inca Empire a socialist state, which of its institutions deserve such a characterization? To put it otherwise, which institutions introduced by the Incas might pass as original creations?

Without adopting the thesis of Garcilaso de la Vega, in whose eyes the Incas are heroic civilizers, making wars only to spread the benefits of a generous and equitable administration, it would be worth while to find out what there was in the servitude imposed on the vanquished that would be of profit to the ruling class and justify its thirst for conquest?

Conquered populations were subjected to tribute essentially consisting of personal services. Insofar as the Incas owned a portion of the soil, they were inevitably led to require that the conquered lands be worked collectively by the members of the community. Without peasant hands, the lands incorporated into the domain would have been of no value.

Tributes also allowed for all the forced labor (*mita*) which the Inca or his governors imposed when there was great need

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for manpower. In this regard, war is similar to state forced labor. Guarding and maintaining the caravansaries (*tambo*), situated along the imperial roads, fell upon the communities as well as the responsibility to provide each postal relay with two couriers always ready to bear messages transmitted to them. In breeding zones, the *ayllu* had to take care of the Inca herds and those of the Sun. Undoubtedly, shepherds were assigned to carry out their functions in turn.

In principle, women did not count among the persons obliged to these tributary duties, although in practice they escaped nothing since part of the burden of forced labor in cultivation fell on them and they wove the materials which the State needed for its depots. They often accompanied their husbands to war in order to bring food and provisions to them. Villages furnished servants for the chiefs or for the Inca court and were required to present to an Inca official all little girls from eight to ten years old. The prettiest of them were sent to a "convent" where under the direction of an elderly woman, they busied themselves in various tasks, particularly in the weaving of fine materials in vicuna wool. When they achieved the age of puberty they had to undergo a new inspection. The most beautiful were incorporated into the Inca's harem, or given as concubines to the nobles and high functionaries. The others assigned to a sanctuary became servants and priestesses. Finally, some of them were destined as human sacrifices.

In addition to the obligations toward the Inca or his governors were added personal services which, as we have noted, were due local chiefs whose peasants continued to cultivate the fields and guard the herds. At least in the Chinchá valley, each group of one hundred households delegated a man to serve the Lord as a domestic. How long this service lasted is unknown to us; we may assume it was brief, if the present *hacienda* system, which has maintained this kind of work-payment reflects an ancient practice.

Peasants cultivating Inca lands or those of the Sun, as well as those employed in public works, were fed from state granaries during the period of their compulsory labor. Similarly, with regard to the soldiers "who marched to war furnished with provisions, arms, shoes and clothes issued by the Inca depots."

This has been interpreted as an instance of Inca paternalism; however, it is only the application on a governmental planned level of a rural tradition as strict today as it was four centuries ago: an individual benefitting from his neighbors' help must provide for their needs as long as they work for him. According to custom, he must show himself generous and make a veritable festival out of the work from which he profits. The compulsory labor accomplished for the Inca became identified in some way with peasant mutual aid. It was always carried out with the accompaniment of dances and singing, in short, in an atmosphere of thanksgiving in which the Spaniards saw the result of wise measures calculated to maintain the people in good humor.

Among the community obligations toward the Inca, manufacturing services also figured. Each household delivered to the tax collector a predetermined number of manufactured products: fabrics, clothing, shoes, ropes, etc. The raw materials came from the regional warehouses. The only contributions of the workers were their time and effort.

The richness and luxury of the Incas, a subject about which reports of the conquest never stop talking, as well as the technical or artistic quality of the objects abounding in our museums, maintained a large class of artisans—goldsmiths, weavers, potters and sculptors. If a great many of the objects of daily use were made at home by the peasants, the same does not hold true for luxury items—jewels, fine cloth, ceramics—all highly skilled work. We are poorly informed regarding the conditions of these artisans. Some of them worked directly for the court, while others were earmarked for workshops of the provincial governors or local princes. According to custom, imperial functionaries presenting themselves before the Inca paid him homage with a valuable gift. They could not have fulfilled this obligation if the work of artisans had not been at their disposal. These workers and artists separated from the land were fed and maintained at the Inca's expense or at the expense of the dignitaries employing them; furthermore they were excused from forced labor. The Virgins of the Sun who wove richly decorated vicuma cloth might also be considered among the artisans gathered into workshops. The situation of these individuals who during their lives worked for the court or a functionary is comparable to

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that of the artisans of ancient Egypt who, at the will of the Pharaoh, were attached to his person, to a monarch or to an important official. The condition of the artisans was not essentially different from that of the *yana*, a category of persons whose status is hardly clear and frequently contradictory. These *yana* at times seem like actual slaves and at times like privileged officials. In fact, torn away from their communities, they depended entirely upon those whom they served. Some were prisoners of war, others criminals or relatives of criminals who had been reduced to this state because of collective responsibility. Most of the *yana* were young people whom the rural communities sent to the Inca or to his representatives as servants. Many of them became valets, personal guards and palanquin bearers. Others fulfilled similar functions with the governors or assisted them in their administration. Their intimacy with these powers offered some of them the chance to carve out careers and achieve important posts. As a reward for their zeal, some of them received women and even *yana* to serve them. What we know of these *yana* recalls the condition of ministers in the Middle Ages who, like them, often managed to exercise considerable power despite being serfs.

However, the privileged *yana* were the exception. Most of them established on the private property of the Inca or nobles were attached to the soil like the *colonos* in the *haciendas* of modern Peru. The always important role which the *yana* played in the Empire may be explained only if their labor output be adjudged more satisfactory than that attained by the traditional forced labor system. In withdrawing some of their members from the communities, the Inca weakened them and made the first draft of a revolution which, if it had been continued, would have changed the structure of the Empire. Of an assemblage of rural communities enjoying considerable autonomy he would have created a kind of pre-feudal empire wherein nobles and officials would have possessed large domains exploited by serfs and slaves. But at the moment of the Spanish conquest such an evolution whose effects would probably have been felt only much later was scarcely sketched out.

The rents in kind accumulating in the granaries and Inca depots were used for numerous purposes. Part of the products

were sent to Cuzco although the largest part remained on the spot for the maintenance of officials, of the army and of work crews. Undoubtedly, provisions were drawn from these granaries, and distributed to the population when they were menaced by famine as a result of a poor harvest.

By virtue of a system here described, the communities of the Empire were self-sufficient and produced a surplus, thanks to which the caste of nobles and body of civil servants lived in ease and luxury. This surplus was so considerable that it made it possible to raise veritable armies of workers for the enormous contructions undertaken by the Inca, to carry out war against numberless peoples and to indemnify the artisans. Part of the rents received by the Inca were regularly re-distributed in the form of presents to the nobles surrounding him, to the officials serving him with zeal, and to chiefs and local princes whose fidelity and devotion it was important to purchase. Such acts of generosity repeated on a large scale and sanctioned by custom have led us to believe in the existence of an Incaique *Welfare State*. But, in fact, here again the Inca was only conforming to a mode of behavior which was perfectly normal on the part of chiefs of many archaic societies, especially in Indian America. He who commands must be generous under pain of losing the support of his subordinates. The Indian cacique as a good father of the family watches over these, to see that no one is hungry or unclothed even if his solicitude results in great personal sacrifices.

The impressive mass of the buildings erected by the Incas, the enormous blocks of their cyclopien structures, the audacious laying out of mountain roads—if all this arouses admiration in us for the sovereigns who ordered such works they evoke in us no less an awareness of the hard labor of the workers employed in their construction. Most of the chroniclers agree, however, about the spirit of justice with which the division of work was carried out. It seems, in fact, that the number of peasants drawn for the forced labor crews was very small in comparison with the rest of the population. It has been calculated that if the Sacsahuaman fortress, the most colossal edifice realized by the Incas had really been built by 30,000 men, these only represented 1.9% of the total number of subjects, that is to say, adult

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men between twenty and fifty years of age, if one assumes that the entire Empire had a total population of eight millions, and of 3.8% if one accepts only half of this figure.³

The Inca administrative system seems to have been principally conceived in order to assure the efficacious functioning of different types of forced labor, whether these had as their aim the providing for the maintenance of the ruling caste or whether they were assigned to great public works or war. The Inca's authority was exercised over the whole hierarchy of civil servants, from those who were veritable viziers chosen among his intimates, down to the humble foreman overseeing the labor of a five man crew.

The utilization of these enormous resources in manpower and products was scarcely possible without a census and regularly taken inventories. To satisfy this need, the Incas had created a core of special officials, the *quipu-camayoc* who transcribed by means of knotted cords the results of their counting. This care for exact information cannot help but bring to mind the role played by statistics in states with more or less planned economies. However, one must not allow oneself to be deluded by words. The census of the population, divided according to age groups, and the estimate of wealth produced by forced labor responded to very simple needs. The Incas could not have undertaken their conquests nor constructed so many palaces and fortresses without being informed about the available manpower and the necessary resources for the undertaking. Thanks to the *quipu* which, if they do not lend themselves to calculations, represented nonetheless very precise numbers, a rudimentary type of planning was possible. The projects conceived by the sovereign could be carried out with a certain order and a certain economy.

To make things easier for the census takers, the decimal system to which the *quipu* conformed was applied to state administrative sections. The entire masculine population between the ages around twenty-five and fifty were distributed in groups of 10, 100, 500, 1000, and 10,000, each of which was placed under the authority of an official of corresponding rank. At the

³ These very hypothetical estimates have been made by Mrs. Sally Falk Moore in her book *Power and Property in Inca Peru*, Columbia University Press, 1958, p. 64.

head of this hierarchy was the provincial governor who, in theory, was supposed to control, according to the census, 40,000 tributary groups, or about 200,000 persons. These administrative units were supposed to correspond to the lineages (*ayllu*), to the tribes, and to the former provinces—the *pachaca* (hundred), for example, was synonymous with *ayllu*. Until now, no one has managed to explain how this rigid numeration could have been adapted to traditional social structures.

It is difficult to believe that here we have to do with anything else but bureaucratic fictions, to gross approximations whose only usefulness was to facilitate the census in a given region and the raising of troops and work crews. However, one cannot overlook Santillan's account, which insists on the methods employed by Inca officials in order to assign to new ten-year periods individuals who were supernumeraries in the old census. This tendency to count by masses rather than by units is not limited to the Incas but is also found in other civilizations of the same type.

The evidence of our sources is unanimous: the Incas avoided crushing their subjects under the weight of too-heavy tributes, and, as a rule, distributed personal services equitably. Despite its implacable discipline their government appears to us paternalistic by comparison with the truly ferocious régime which the Spaniards introduced into Peru. Perhaps we are baptising with the name of wisdom and political sense that which was only respect for norms of behavior and archaic traditions to which the Incas adapted themselves like the smallest community chief. Was not the structure of the imperial *ayllu* identical with that of other Andean *ayllu*, and did not their conceptions of the chief, as well as that of community rights, fit into the general ethic held by peoples of the same stock? What was at the beginning a simple confederation of agrarian communities in a Sierra valley was transformed into a hegemony over immense territories without fundamentally altering the primordial relationships between the ruling and ruled groups. In the mountainous region the relatively fertile earth derived its main value from the manpower available for its exploitation. Masters of an empire, the Incas imposed the obligations of work with much severity and made it a moral duty. Undoubtedly, the only condemnable idleness was that which harmed the state and which

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constituted for this reason an undisciplined act, almost a rebellion.

To read the numerous works treating of the Incas one would gather the impression that at the time of the Spanish conquest, their civilization had reached a dead point and that their empire had become inert in its rigidity and perfection. If one objectively examines the sources, devoting oneself to the exegesis of Spanish documentation without neglecting the teaching of modern ethnography, one would perceive that the Empire's institutions were in full evolution, and that in this apparently so-harmonious system, the Incas had introduced innovations which would sooner or later have modified the structure of their state.

These, as yet, scarcely-indicated tendencies, however, are sufficient to permit us to imagine an epoch in which, after repeated gifts, the nobles and high officials would have ended by carving out vast lordships for themselves. The Inca then would have been able to satisfy the ambition of his aides only by dispossessing a growing number of communities whose members would have changed status from freedom to servitude. Among those people uprooted from their *ayllu* were the specialized artisans, servants or tenants, Virgins of the Sun and the *mitima*, farmers transferred to conquered territories. They formed a new category of men whose status was not determined by blood ties, weakening, in proportion, the traditional communities.

Civic officials to whom land had been granted would have also been able to form a new class whose mentality and mode of life would no longer conform to the ideas of old Andean society. If the Empire's evolution had not been brutally interrupted by the Spanish conquest, would it have transformed itself into a kingdom with a structure similar in many ways with that of the late Roman Empire or the decadent Carolingians? With the multiplication of large domains, would not the ruling class have constituted a powerful aristocracy and would it not have been opposed to the central power? The number of *yana*, domestic servants of the great and tenant farmers on their properties, would certainly have augmented at the expense of free peasants. These, of course, are only conjectures based on limited clues but these do reveal the possibilities of transformations which would have operated in a directly-opposed sense to the idea of a "Socialist State of the Sun."

Let us consider the political and economic system described here in terms of the famous definition of Socialism by Bertrand Russell. For him, socialism essentially means common ownership of land and capital under a democratic form of government. It implies production for use and not for profit and distributed, if not equally to all, at any rate according to inequalities justified only in the public interest.

The Inca Empire hardly corresponds to these qualifications. Subjected to the despotism of a caste, its aristocratic tendencies were emphasized as a result of the consecration which the authority of the petty kings and local chiefs had received from the conquerors. Besides, in addition to the traditional privileges enjoyed by the *koraka*, were added those deriving from their status as Inca officials. An increasing distance separated them from their former subjects. Agrarian collectivism existed only on the level of the rural communities (*ayllu*) and represented an ancient system whose equivalent may be found in the Old as well as the New World. Therefore, it is certainly a peculiar anachronism to apply a term applicable only to industrial societies to the collective property of archaic societies.

Production was only partially influenced according to the needs of the subjects, the entire surplus reverting to a ruling caste and to its administration. Certainly a part of the excess was re-distributed under the form of provisions and material allocated to work crews and soldiers or as presents made to noblemen, clergy, and officials. Assistance to the aged and to the sick which one would be tempted to compare with our social security was an obligation of the village and not of the state. This responsibility simply expressed the old group solidarity still present today among primitive farmers of the Amazon and the peasants of modern Peru.

Socialism, as its theoreticians have emphasized, is not limited to state ownership but implies that the latter be put to the service of the collectivity. In the Inca Empire the tribute paid in personal services and wrought objects profited a caste whose riches and power were growing.

The classical tradition, extolled by the Spanish chroniclers, was imposed on modern historians and sociologists, who, vying with each other, compared the Inca Empire to ancient Rome, to

The Inca Empire: Despotism or Socialism

modern states, and to Utopian Republics, but hardly ever dreamed of comparing it with States which existed or still exist among people characterized, for good or evil, as "primitive."

There exists more than one analogy between the Inca Empire and the ancient kingdom of Dahomey. The latter was founded after successive conquests made by the sovereigns of Abomey. It was endowed with an internal organization which has often been offered as an example of the administrative genius which a people in a state of archaic civilization are capable of. Like the Incas the kings of Dahomey respected the autonomy of the agrarian communities and permitted the traditional leaders to remain in power. Just like the Indian caciques, these were integrated into a hierarchy of civic officials who, on the highest echelons, were recruited into the royal family. The ruler of Dahomey also took care to be informed concerning the resources of his state and undertook census-taking of the population, divided into age groups. Taxation and the raising of troops were managed with the greatest rigor. The State was feared and obeyed. The king's envoys, the *recadères* exercised the same authority as the *tokoyrikoq*, the inspectors of the Inca. The women which the villagers furnished the king were enrolled in a woman's brigade instead of being enclosed in "convents" to serve the nobles and the gods according to Peruvian usage. These analogies are pointed out only as examples. They serve to demonstrate that a bureaucratic type of administration might very well develop among a people without a system of writing, whether they be American or African.

The conquistadores accustomed to fight "naked and savage" Indians were dazzled by the manifestations of high civilization among peoples whom they were naturally inclined to treat as irrational barbarians. Nothing astonished them so much as the discipline ruling the Empire. Later, the old order seemed even more just and humane to the degree that the rule introduced by the Spaniards was marked by wretchedness and cruelty. By contrast with the horrors of the conquest and colonization, the Inca despotism was melded in memory into an age of gold. And so it was, to the degree that the Cuzco emperors, respecting millenary customs, managed their subjects, and under the *pax Incaica*, guaranteed their well-being and their happiness.

NOTES AND DISCUSSION

Alexander Anikst

SHAKESPEAREAN STUDIES IN THE USSR

1. SCHOLARSHIP

There is no need to explain the difficulties connected with the scholarly study of Shakespeare in a foreign country. In this respect Soviet scholars are in much the same position as other scholars outside England and the USA, which possess the most source material, books and manuscripts. However, thanks to the rich collections in the public libraries in Moscow—the Lenin Library—and Leningrad—the Saltykov-Schedrin Library—and in the Arts faculties of the universities as well, practically all of world *Shakespeareana* is available to Soviet students. They also profit by communication with such important centers of scholarship as the Shakespeare Institute at Stratford-on-Avon and the Folger Shakespeare Library at Washington.

During the early Soviet years rather much attention was given to the problem of authorship. A stir was made in 1924 by F. Shipulinsky when he published *Shakespeare-Rutbland*, an exposition of the theory proposed by the Belgian Demblon, who

held that the Works were written by the Earl of Ruthland. Our outstanding literary scholars at the time, Anatoly Lunacharsky and Vladimir Fritche, immediately subscribed to that theory, and the latter based his book on Shakespeare (1926) upon the assumption of the playwright's aristocratic origin. The Ruthland vogue, however, was short-lived, and Fritche himself intended to rewrite his book, this time with an impersonal Shakespeare in view, but death stopped his work in its first stages. Lunacharsky also returned to the orthodox view, and Professor Alexander Smirnov in his *Shakespeare's Art* (1934) in a brief chapter gave a scholarly refutation of all the anti-Shakespearean theories. That settled the matter. Some of the more recent anti-Shakespearean conceptions were dealt with by the present writer in the magazine *New Times* (1957. N° 20).

The biography of Shakespeare for Russian readers was written by the late Professor Mikhail Morozov. Published in the series "Lives of Eminent Men" (1947) it appeared in a second edition of 50 thousand copies in 1956. This also comprises a critical review of Shakespeare's works. Shorter sketches accompany the several editions of Shakespeare's works published during the last three decades. Professor Alexander Smirnov of Leningrad, who edited most of these editions, wrote the accompanying brief biographical sketches of the poet. Shakespeare's biography for the first edition of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia was written by Ivan Aksenov, and for the second edition by I. Wertsman and myself.

Problems of Shakespearean textology have been briefly reviewed at different periods by M. Morozov, A. Smirnov and myself. Professor A. Smirnov's suggestion concerning a more active study of the original texts has so far found no response.

From the very beginning Soviet scholars have been greatly interested in problems of the theatre during Shakespeare's lifetime. The start was made by B. Silverswan in his essay "The Theatre and the Stage in Shakespeare's Time" (published in *Sbornik Istoriko-Teatralnoi Sektsii* [*A Miscellany of the Section on Theatre History*] in 1918). His lead was followed by W. Müller in his monograph *The Drama and the Theatre in the Age of Shakespeare* (1925). Another study was published a few years later by A. Bulgakov as *The London Theatres and their Social*

Environment during the Epoch of Merchant Capital (1929). Needless to say, these authors profited greatly from the monumental *Elizabethan Stage* by E. K. Chambers. However, they put forward some original ideas about theatrical practices in Shakespeare's time. Bulgakov's work, as its title suggests, was a sociological study of the Renaissance theatre in England. Professors Smirnov and Morozov paid due attention, in their general studies of Shakespeare, to the theatrical conditions. The latest study in this field is my chapter in *The History of the Western European Theatre*, edited by Prof. S. Mokulsky (Vol. 1, 1956).

The most important studies of Shakespeare's language were done by Prof. Morozov (see, for instance, his essay on "The Individualization of Shakespeare's Characters through Imagery," in *Shakespeare Survey*, 2, 1949. Linguistic studies of Shakespeare are pursued at some of our philological Institutes and appear in the form of Candidate's theses.

2. CRITICISM

By far the largest is that branch of our Shakespearean studies which deals with criticism of the plays and the dramatist's art and philosophy. Although all aspects have come under discussion, one stands out, namely the problem of Shakespeare's social outlook.

I have had opportunities to discuss this with my foreign colleagues, and have heard opinions which in the main tended to disapproval. It is still thought by some that this emphasis on the social significance of Shakespeare's work is a kind of Marxian much ado about nothing. But, to our satisfaction, we Soviet scholars find that some Shakespearean studies produced both in England and America no longer avoid social issues connected with Shakespeare's plays (T. Spencer, *Shakespeare and the Nature of Man*; P. Siegel, *Shakespearean Tragedy and the Elizabethan Compromise*; G. Salinger's introduction to *The Age of Shakespeare*, ed. by B. Ford in *The Pelican Guides to English Literature*, to cite the first that come to mind). But since this preoccupation with the social and political problems of Shakespeare's works is still misunderstood in some scholarly circles, an explanation of this might perhaps be in place here.

One had to live here, in the USSR, during the last four decades in order to feel that the interest of Soviet scholars in Shakespearean sociology was born out of the tumultuous social and political history of the country. There are some who still think that the social emphasis was only due to a desire to apply Marxian principles of class struggle to Shakespeare. But this is only a part of the truth. In fact, the life of the country during the first years of Soviet power was characterized by such acute social and political conflicts that it was only natural they were reflected in literary criticism, as they were in literature in general. Young as I was at that time I still remember the atmosphere of those years of struggle to abolish the last remnants of the former exploiting classes. Thinking in terms of the class struggle was natural in that period, and this, more than anything else, explains the turn of mind which led our critics to regard Shakespeare in relation to the class struggle of his time. The Marxian theory of class struggle had its influence upon the first critical works but its application was rather primitive, owing to the neglect, or lack of knowledge, of Marxian esthetics.

The positivist school of Taine was the first to show the links between Shakespeare and the social and cultural environment of his time. Long before Soviet criticism, the German G. Rümelin claimed that Shakespeare's work for the theatre expressed the mood of the aristocratic youth who frequented the Globe. The Dane G. Brandes based his explanation of Shakespeare's tragic period largely on the assumption of the influence which the unhappy Essex revolt produced upon the mind of the dramatist.

I cite these examples to show that Soviet scholars were not the first to point out the influence of social and political conditions on Shakespeare. Even before the October Revolution, Peter Kogan and Vladimir Fritche suggested, in their histories of Western European literature, certain social and cultural factors that had influenced the plays of Shakespeare. The first study of Shakespeare from the point of view of class struggle was written by Vladimir Fritche in 1926 (its title was simply *Shakespeare*). According to his view, Shakespeare's plays presented the world outlook of the decaying nobility of Elizabethan and Stuart England. Socially and culturally it had certain links with the rising bourgeoisie, which in Fritche's opinion explains,

for example, the juxtaposition of Antonio and Shylock in *The Merchant of Venice*, the former representing a noble bourgeois patrician, the latter the capitalist. The tragic mood of Shakespeare, according to Fritche, is an expression of the ideology of the aristocratic class doomed to destruction by the progress of capitalism. It is not difficult to see why Fritche so badly needed a Ruthland to support his conception from the biographical point of view as well. Peter Kogan in his *William Shakespeare* (1931) also explained the aristocratic meaning of Shakespeare's work.

The aristocratic conception was opposed by Alexander Smirnov in his *Shakespeare's Art* (1934, translated into English in 1937 as *Shakespeare, A Marxist Interpretation*), who pointed out the undoubtedly Renaissance nature of Shakespeare's work and explained its meaning as an artistic expression of the humanist ideology. In his opinion at that time, Shakespeare was a writer whose standpoint was that of the humanist bourgeoisie of the Renaissance.

Later, due to the new conditions which arose in the country after fulfillment of the First Five-Year Plan, a closer view was taken of the works of the classics of Marxism; many writings were re-discovered. Examples of such critical analyses were studied together with Lenin's articles on literature, with the result that the former approach was condemned as being a vulgarization rather than truly Marxist.

A new criterion of literature and art has been brought to the forefront. It can be summed up by the Russian word *narodnost'*. This word has no exact equivalent either in English or in French. Literally it means "popularness," but still that does not convey the meaning. Perhaps, "folk quality" comes nearest of all. The German *Volkstümlichkeit* would be almost exact, and yet I suggest that you adopt *narodnost'* as we have subscribed to almost all your literary terms, merely transliterating them.

The term was coined by Russian critics in the first half of the 19th century and suggested a return to original national folk poetry, as the most suitable basis for literary writing.

The first aspect of *narodnost'*, then, is that literature and art must have roots in the history, culture, traditions and customs of the given nation. Secondly, it is based on the presumption

that what we for brevity's sake shall call the spirit of the nation finds its clearest expression in the cultural mode of the folk, the mass of the people, and their view of life. This brings us to the third aspect, which considers *narodnost'* to be an expression of the real social interests of the people, that is, knowledge of the needs of the people and affirmation of the people's human and social right. Finally, the conception is topped by the conviction that all great literature and art, with some qualifications, fall within *narodnost'*.

It was suggested that the greatness of Shakespeare, alongside with other writers whom the nation considered as their classics, was due to the fact that he expressed the aspirations, as well as the view of life, characteristic of the English people at the critical period of the Renaissance. Vladimir Kemenov was the first to attack the vulgar sociologists in Shakespearean criticism and to postulate Shakespeare's *narodnost'* (essays "Shakespeare in the Embrace of a Sociologist" in the magazine *Literaturny Kritik*, 1936, No. 1 and "Class Characteristics and Narodnost' in the Work of Shakespeare" in the newspaper *Sovetskoye Iskustvo*, 1936, August 5, both reprinted in amended form in the author's *Essays on Art*, 1958).

With this begins the new era of Soviet Shakespearean criticism, which includes its present-day activities. To sum up, all the Soviet critics of the last quarter of a century regard Shakespeare as a writer of the English people, who in his works gave artistic utterance to the people's view of life in the period of the change from feudalism to capitalism. He combined the views and tastes and aspirations of the people with the fruits of Renaissance humanistic culture. The latest view, suggested by I. Wertsman and myself, is that Shakespeare is to be regarded as a synthesis of all the progressive forces of the nation at his time. Soviet critics subscribe to Jonson's dictum that Shakespeare, while being the soul of his age, was essentially not of an age but for all time. To us Shakespeare's art is one of the greatest peaks in world literature. It gave expression to the humanist view of life. As a Soviet critic put it, using the expression of Romain Rolland, to us Shakespeare is "a great brotherly soul."

These ideas inspire numerous works of Soviet Shakespearean criticism, leaving complete freedom for subjective interpretation

of his plays and poems. Among the most important publications I give pride of place to the writings of Alexander Smirnov, who willingly accepted the criticism of his book, and in his later essays proved how fertile was the application of the principle of *narodnost'* to Shakespeare. His introductions to the 1938-40, 1939, 1950 and 1957 editions of the works of Shakespeare form a body of progressively deepening critical pronouncements and analyses. Morozov's *Shakespeare* stands equally as high in popular estimate. After them comes the work of the others, including the well-known Soviet critics N. Berkovsky, A. Djivelegov, S. Krzhizhanovsky, I. Wertsman, A. Shtein, L. Pinsky, G. Kosintzev (film and stage director), etc.

One finds in their essays all the usual topics of Shakespearean criticism: the sources and influences, psychological and philosophical problems, dramatic method and poetic style—I need not enumerate them all. I should only like to add that it would be a mistake to infer from the above that present-day Shakespearean criticism in this country concentrates upon social problems only. After the main issue was settled, Soviet critics went on to explore all the aspects of Shakespeare's work. It is too early to say they have covered all of them, or have come to decisive findings in the various fields, but the work continues.

Soviet Shakespearean scholars and critics wanted to have their own periodical long ago. M. Morozov laid the foundation by editing, in collaboration with G. Boyadjiev and M. Zagorsky, a *Shakespeare Miscellany* (1947), which was supposed to become an annual publication. Various obstacles, chief among them being the death of Morozov in 1952, prevented the continuation of this plan until recently when, with the help of A. Shtein, I edited a new issue dated 1958. The next *Shakespearean Miscellany*, as it is called in Russian, will soon go to press, and essays for another one are being collected.

Another publication that should be mentioned is the new edition of the works of Shakespeare supervised by A. Smirnov and myself. Of its eight volumes six have already come out, while the remaining two are in preparation. A subscription edition, it drew 225 thousand subscribers. This edition includes a general introduction by A. Smirnov, long enough to be counted as a small book, and separate essays on all the plays, written alter-

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nately by the two editors. When this edition is completed, it will practically contain within itself a monograph on Shakespeare, which in size, at least, will be bigger than any previous book on the dramatist published by Soviet critics.

3. THEATRICAL CRITICISM

There are some 600 theatres in the USSR based on the repertory principle. Shakespeare is one of the dramatists standing at the head of our repertory lists. Between 1945 and 1957 there were 265 productions of his plays, and the pace has not slowed down.

I think we can boast of something which Shakespearean scholars all over the world would appreciate. We have succeeded in bridging the gap between Shakespearean scholarship and the stage. The credit for this is due to the late Professor Morozov, who combined a profound knowledge of the texts with a real sense of things theatrical. He prepared stage versions of *The Merry Wives of Windsor*, *All's Well that Ends Well* and several other comedies. Even more important was his practical work in advising the theatres on various matters connected with Shakespeare productions. He was the head of the Shakespeare Cabinet of the All-Russian Theatrical Society, which offered all kinds of help to theatres engaged in Shakespeare productions. The Cabinet continues its work as an advisory body extending its activity to all foreign playwriting, while problems pertaining to Shakespeare only are dealt with by the Shakespeare Commission of the Society. Its members will travel to any distant city to offer consultation on problems connected with the staging of a Shakespeare play, such trips being financed by the All-Russian Theatrical Society. Theatres often ask for a public discussion of their Shakespeare productions and theatre critics willingly participate in them, giving a detailed analysis of all aspects of the stage-manager's, actors', artists' and composer's part of the production.

Day-to-day press reviewing of Shakespearean productions sometimes gives rise to heated controversies, of which the most notable were those connected with the production of *Hamlet* at the Vakhtangov Theatre (1934), *Othello* at the Maly Theatre (1935), and with the staging of *Hamlet* at the Moscow Maya-

kovsky Drama Theatre (1955). While the first two were concerned mainly with the problem of character interpretation (is Hamlet weak or strong? Is Othello a warrior or a humanist?), the latter aroused mainly a dispute over the methods of stage production by N. Okhlopkov (theatrical conventions *vs.* stage realism). The fullest, if somewhat subjective, account of the latest developments in the theatrical field may be found in an essay by B. Emelyanov in the *Shakespeare Miscellany* (1958). If I were asked to name an example of Soviet criticism of Shakespeare in the theatre I would suggest Y. Youzovsky's book *The Image and the Epoch* (1948), which practically covers the golden era of Shakespeare stage productions, giving an interpretation of the major achievements of Soviet actors and stage directors in the thirties and early forties, together with a discussion of the vital problems of the Soviet theatre of that period. Essays by G. Boyadjiev, B. Alpers, B. Singerman and other notable theatre critics offer the reader thoughtful reviews of Shakespeare performances deserving of remembrance.

I should like, in conclusion, to say a few words about the work of Soviet translators. We have inherited from the 19th century a treasury of translations of the plays of Shakespeare. Their language, style and method were that of the time, and with all their merits they could not satisfy modern demands for a closer rendering of the text. The 1930's witnessed the rise of a new school, which aimed to give a more exact text. Equilinear translations were brought forth with a literal rendering of the imagery and metaphors that had not been even approximated by the 19th century translators. At first some of the results were rather clumsy, and Kornei Chukovsky had every right to criticize them, Anna Radlova's translations in particular, in his book *The High Art* (of translation—A.A.). But when the translators learnt the true measure of exactitude the results were really marvelous, as in the work of Mikhail Lozinsky, Tatyana Schepkina-Kupernik and others. Professor Smirnov, who acted as editor, helped greatly both with his knowledge of the original texts and his stylistic taste. The major achievement was that of M. Lozinsky, who had every right to publish his rendering of *Hamlet* parallel with the original text.

In the forties two outstanding Soviet poets entered the field.

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Samuil Marshak made a translation of the *Sonnets* which, despite the existence of some half dozen pre-revolutionary renderings, for the first time revealed to the Russian reader the beauty and poetical magic of Shakespeare's lyrical poetry. Boris Pasternak took up the great tragedies and produced a *Hamlet*, a *Romeo and Juliet*, a *Lear*, a *Macbeth*, an *Othello*, an *Anthony and Cleopatra*, and the masterpiece of histories, *Henry IV*. As he put it himself, when publishing his *Hamlet* he asked that his translations be regarded as original Russian dramatic works. He deliberately avoided transmitting into Russian some of the more clustered metaphors of Shakespeare, modernized the vocabulary, Russified the language, and made cuts in the text, omitting classical allusions. This resulted in a very readable Shakespeare, and particularly in a Shakespeare easily delivered by actors on the stage—an opportunity immediately seized by the theatres. But, all in all, it is not Shakespeare but rather Shakespeare-Pasternak. The great paradox of his translations is that Pasternak, complicated and intricate in his original poetry, becomes simple when he takes the part of Shakespeare's mouthpiece.

In the latest edition of Shakespeare's works all the trends of modern Shakespeare translation are represented—A. Radlova, T. Schepkina-Kupernik, S. Marshak, B. Pasternak, M. Morozov, W. Levik—and they are supported by some new talent discovered and fostered in Leningrad by the indefatigable A. Smirnov, who is well over 75. To name a few, there are M. Donskoi, C. Korneyev and T. Gnedich.

With all our achievements we are always conscious of what is not yet done. And, eager to learn, Soviet Shakespeareans regard the present as a foundation for the immense work ahead.

THE NOTION OF CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE ACCORDING TO LOCKE

The notion of resistance to the state has come to be bandied about a great deal, and a great many political movements place themselves under its sign. This intrusion of violence into the realm of the law seems to be spreading since the advocates of insurrection, who accuse the state of betraying its mission, are not those who consider revolt to be the necessary first step towards any kind of affranchisement. Where the partisans of revolution believe that violence is, in Marx's words, "the midwife of every old society that carries a new one within it" and that it is "the instrument by which the social movement sweeps it away and breaks to pieces the political forms that are fixed and dead,"¹ the partisans of the right to resist the state do not share these

Translated by H. Kaal.

¹ F. Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, part II, ch. IV, p. 157. Cf. also *Das Kapital*, vol. I, ch. XXIV, sect. 7., p. 728.

hopes for political and social upheavals.² Marxist theory, which praises revolutionary insurrection, stands opposed to a kind of philosophy that admits of armed opposition to the state, but can nevertheless be called liberal in two respects: formally, from its present perspective, where it appears opposed to Marxist thought, and also historically, in the evolution of political ideas, where it is opposed to absolutist conceptions of the state. For, as R. Derathé remarked, the question of the right to resist "cast light on the chasm that separated the theologians from the legal experts."³ The doctrines of divine right left no room for envisaging a limitation on the duty of obedience, without turning such a limitation into the equivalent of a revolt against God. Bossuet, in his *Politique tirée des propres paroles de l'Ecriture sainte*, asserts that "God has made the kings and the princes his lieutenants on earth so as to render their authority sacred and inviolable."⁴ The result is unconditional obedience to the kings and to all those who hold a parcel of authority: "Declared impiety and even persecution do not exempt the subjects from the obedience they owe to their princes."⁵ The only possible attitude in the face of "the violence of the princes" is to submit "respectful remonstrances, without mutiny and without a murmur, and with prayers

² The authors of the Declaration of Rights and of the Constitution of the year I do nevertheless constitute an exception. Their articles expressed a certain idea of the state, "that of a social democracy which intervenes in order to establish, to the profit of the poor, the equilibrium that was destroyed by money" (G. Lefebvre, *Les Thermidoriens*, p. 165). The Constitution of the year I is the only French constitution that proclaims the right of resistance, in its Article 35: "When the government violates the rights of the people, insurrection is for the people and for each portion of the people, the most sacred of rights and the most binding of duties." Similarly, in the projected declaration presented by Maximilien Robespierre to the society of the Jacobins on April 21, 1793, and adopted by this society, Article 25 stipulates that "the resistance to oppression is the consequence of other rights of man and of the citizen."

³ R. Derathé, *J.-J. Rousseau et la science politique de son temps*, p. 36.

⁴ *De l'obéissance due au Prince*, bk. VI, art. II, prop. I.

⁵ *Ibid.*, bk. VI, art. II, title of prop. 3.

for their conversion."⁶ It is also necessary to ban "remonstrances full of bitterness and grumbling" since these "are the beginnings of sedition, which must not be tolerated."⁷

On the other hand, the school of natural law, in formulating its theory of the social contract in order to "combat and replace the doctrine of the divine right,"⁸ could be led to conceive of the possibility of forcible opposition to the established authority. Among the theorists of the school of natural law, Locke was one of those who, in the seventeenth century, saw most clearly how harsh and negative laws could under certain conditions engender opposition and thus turn into something foreign to their nature. It is true that a few years before the publication of Locke's *Treatises of Civil Government*, Algernon Sidney, the youngest son of an illustrious family and one of the leaders of the Whig party, who was executed in December, 1683, for having been involved in Rye-House's plot, had written a manuscript, which was published in 1698,⁹ where he allowed for the right to resist. The courageous death of one of their rank must have convinced the English aristocracy that resistance to the state was no vulgar insubordination, but had some affinity with legitimate war.¹⁰ More than a hundred years before, Calvin had seen in war God's way of achieving the restoration of legitimate power.¹¹ With

⁶ *Ibid.*, title of prop. 6.

⁷ *Ibid.*, prop. 6.

⁸ R. Derathé, *op. cit.*, p. 33.

⁹ A. Sidney, *Discourses Concerning Government*.

¹⁰ G. N. Clark, *The Later Stuarts*, vol. I, p. 101.

¹¹ Calvin admits that God "evidently calls up some of his servants and arms them with his mandate to mete out punishment for unjust oppression and to deliver the people who suffer iniquities from their calamity" (*Institution de la religion chrétienne*, text of 1541, reprinted under the direction of Abel Lefranc, p. 781). This was the case with Moses, when he delivered the people of Israel, and with Othniel, when he delivered them from the Syrians. In this case, God inspires just men, "called by God and by legitimate vocation, to undertake such matters: in rebelling against the kings, not to violate by any means the royal

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Locke, the notion of resistance became definitely independent and distinct from the notion of war.

This metamorphosis of violence into a right has often been considered a means to "justify to the world the people of England."¹² The date of publication of the *Treatises of Civil Government* (1690), the allusions to contemporary events, the attention to constitutional questions that were specifically English, the fact that Locke's thought became the inspiration of the Whig party, all this has militated in favor of a partisan interpretation of Locke's work: that it was a work dictated by the circumstances, destined to justify a revolution and to render it legitimate, and that Locke had the mien of a realistic thinker, who analyzed contemporary political facts and was too much at one with his time not to elevate the facts into a right.

But the ideas compressed into the *Treatises of Civil Government* are much more the outcome of long political reflection than of the desire to legitimize a historical fact—even though this was for the author the only way to return and to enter again into the possession of his estate. There were indeed other ways of looking at the events of 1688. In the same period, Jurieu, for example, in his 9^e *Lettre pastorale*,¹³ and Abbadie¹⁴ were both defending the English revolution by taking the point of view, not of political philosophy, but of the law. It was by showing that the actions of the king were illegal that these French protestants proved the revolution to be well founded: "This is why the English nation

majesty which was given them by God, but to punish an inferior power by a greater one, in the very same way that a king has the right to chastise his lieutenants and officers" (p. 781). The inspired man becomes an intermediary between God and his lieutenant on earth; or if you prefer, the presence of the inspired man, called by "legitimate vocation," reverses the positions in the hierarchy so as to place the tyrant in relation to him in the position of lieutenants in relation to their princes. Rebellion is no more than the legitimate right of punishment.

¹² *Locke's Works*, vol. V, p. 209, preface to the *Treatises of Civil Government*.

¹³ "Examination of the question whether it be permitted to defend one's religion by the use of arms."

¹⁴ *Défense de la nation britannique*.

will not be blamed for the conduct it shows nowadays towards its king, except by people who are full of their prejudices, or slaves of the great under whom they live, or very ignorant of the laws of England."¹⁵ And Jurieu defends the events of 1688 by listing eight fundamental laws and the corresponding violations of which James II was guilty. Similarly Abbadie, in writing that "popism is opposed to the law of society in England,"¹⁶ in referring to the various efforts of the king to replace the bearers of high office at court and in the universities by popists, and in stressing that the Jesuits were opening colleges,¹⁷ seems much more anxious to keep the problem on the plane of legality than to raise it to the plane of legitimacy. It is much more as jurists, and as fairly simple jurists, than as philosophers that these authors seek to justify the events of 1688.

Locke's attempt thus rises above all contemporary justifications to put on the mantle of philosophical reflection. His political writings were no occasional pieces, prompted by William of Orange's crossing, but expressed a certain number of permanent preoccupations in Locke's life. Although the first of the two treatises was written between 1680 and 1685, and the second during the last year of his exile in Holland,¹⁸ we must not forget that Shaftesbury's friendship initiated him into political problems, that he undoubtedly took part in the drafting of the constitution of Carolina in the years preceding 1670, and that in his writings on tolerance and religion, published from 1660 on, he himself placed these problems on the political plane, much more so than on the metaphysical one.¹⁹ It appears thus that there is in this English philosopher a continual interaction between practical preoccupations and purely abstract speculations which make his

¹⁵ 9^e *Lettre pastorale*, p. 208.

¹⁶ *Op. cit.*, p. 336.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 372-4.

¹⁸ Fox Bourne, *Life of Locke*, vol. II, pp. 165-7.

¹⁹ Gough, *John Locke's Political Philosophy*, ch. VIII, pp. 172-96.

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writings at once the work of the circumstances and the blueprint of a political system.

This system is generally taken to be the doctrine of political liberalism, a doctrine anxious to defend the liberty of the individual against any encroachments by the state.²⁰ In the eyes of the nineteenth century, it could even contain the germs of democracy. In 1840, a Jesuit, Father Boone, in a little volume entitled *Les mauvais livres, les mauvais journaux et les romans*, mentioned Locke as one of those "famous French or English writers who with their writings prepared the way for the terrible French Revolution and through it, for the alleged reign of enlightenment and liberalism."²¹ In particular, the right to insurrection may have appeared to be charged with formidable revolutionary possibilities.

In studying the notion of resistance to oppression in Locke's work, we will do well to ask whether we should attribute to the recourse to violence that virtue of liberation which the theorists of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries claim to see in it, or whether, on the contrary, the right to resist does not take on a very specific meaning, between the tyrannicide praised in antiquity and the revolutionary form of insurrection, a meaning that is symptomatic of liberal thought.²²

²⁰ C. E. Vaughan, *Studies in the History of Political Philosophy before and after Rousseau*. Cf. also R. Polin, *La Politique morale de John Locke*, Paris 1960, in particular the appendix: "Locke et le libéralisme," pp. 237-50.

²¹ H. J. Reesink, *L'Angleterre et la littérature anglaise dans les plus anciens périodiques français de Hollande de 1684 à 1709*, p. 60.

²² In view of the actuality of the problem, it is necessary to distinguish sharply between insubordination and resistance. Insubordination is the fact of evading one's military obligations; resistance is the armed challenge to the whole of a government's actions. Whatever the motives of insubordination may be, this attitude implies such a distance from violence that it even constitutes the negation of armed resistance. In Locke, the two concepts remain side by side. It may even be that the extent to which resistance is recognized is proportional to the extent to which insubordination is proscribed. As Léo Strauss has noted (*Droit naturel et histoire*, Plon, 1954, p. 243), the people "still retain a right to revolution. But this power (which lies dormant in normal times) does not attenuate the individual's subjection to the community or to society. On the contrary, it is only just to say that Hobbes insisted more strongly than Locke on the individual's right to resist society or the government when his self-preservation was endangered." And in a

In his second *Treatise of Civil Government*, Locke speaks of an "appeal to Heaven."²³ This is the right to have recourse to violence when the conflict between rulers and ruled has become irreconcilable. The right of civil disobedience is unequivocally affirmed, and Locke criticizes Barclay in ironical terms, who recommends that one "resist with respect." Such an attitude, where one tries "to resist force without striking again," amounts to an imaginary and ineffective resistance. "He, therefore, who may resist must be allowed to strike."²⁴

Individuals who have been wronged "have a right to defend themselves, and to recover by force what by unlawful force is taken from them."²⁵ In the chapter entitled "Of Tyranny," Locke takes great pains to show that the right of individual resistance does not in any way endanger the stability of the government: The state runs no risk of being upset all of a sudden, for the right is rendered ineffective by the weakness of the individual and the strength of the state. Nor does the state risk being upset all of the time, for the individual will hesitate to make use of his right if he feels himself isolated. Similarly, in the following chapters, Locke reassures those who fear that if popular resistance were recognized as a right, "no government will be able long to subsist."²⁶ Both individual and popular resistance are thus recognized, and whether the individual be alone or in a group, it is he who holds the unchallenged title to the right to resist.

In reality, Locke's doctrine seems more subtle on this point.

note (note 56, p. 362), Léo Strauss adds: "This is why Locke affirms more clearly than Hobbes the individual's duty to do military service."

²³ John Locke, *An Essay Concerning the True Original Extent and End of Civil Government*, sects. 168 and 176; referred to hereafter under the title: *Essay*.

²⁴ *Essay*, sect. 235.

²⁵ *Essay*, sect. 208.

²⁶ *Essay*, sect. 223.

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An analysis of cases of resistance will show that it may not always be the individual who holds the title to this right.

Locke asserts as an absolute principle that "force is to be opposed to nothing but to unjust and unlawful force."²⁷ This unjust and unlawful force is what he calls "the dissolution of government." Now there exist two modes of dissolution, in addition to "overturning from without." These modes of dissolution are tied, respectively, to the notion of the form of government and to the notion of trust. On the one hand, there is abuse of power every time the laws by which a political society has organized its government, cease to be respected: Failure to observe the constitution, whether by the prince or by the legislative assembly, leads automatically to the destruction of the government. On the other hand, there is "another way whereby governments are dissolved, and that is, when the legislative, or the prince, either of them act contrary to their trust."²⁸ Power is entrusted to the rulers for the realization of certain ends. These ends are nothing other than the motives that drive men to "enter into society." Men desire "that there may be laws made, and rules set, as guards and fences to the properties of all the society, to limit the power and moderate the dominion of every part and member of the society."²⁹ Men enter into society so "that they may have the united strength of the whole society to secure and defend their properties, and may have standing rules to bound it." Thus "the community put the legislative power into such hands as they think fit, with this trust, that they shall be governed by declared laws."³⁰

The dissolution of government takes place when the established laws or the entrusted mission fails to be observed. But "law" and "trust" are two notions that belong to different planes. It is easy to determine when the laws fail to be observed, and Locke could draw up an exhaustive list of all the acts that mark

²⁷ *Essay*, sect. 204.

²⁸ *Essay*, sect. 221.

²⁹ *Essay*, sect. 222.

³⁰ *Essay*, sect. 136. •

an alteration or transgression of the rules and laws: To substitute the will of the prince for that of the legislature, to prevent reunions of the assembly, to modify in an arbitrary fashion "the electors or ways of election," to deliver the people into "the subjection of a foreign power," and to neglect and abandon the application of "laws already made;" these are well-defined violations of the constitution which justify the resistance of the people. At this level, it is possible to determine objectively unlawful uses of power or its abuses, by confronting the act of the government with the rule or right. This would be a kind of judgment of constitutionality.

The problem is much more complex at the level of "trust." It is no longer enough to evaluate the concurrence or discrepancy between an act of government and a written law or precedents. In effect, the ruler fails in his mission "when he employs the force, treasure, and offices of the society to corrupt the representatives and gain them to his purposes, when he openly pre-engages the electors, and prescribes, to their choice, such whom he has, by solicitation, threats, promises, or otherwise, won to his designs, and employs them to bring in such who have promised beforehand what to vote and what to enact."³¹ This is no longer failure to observe the letter of the law, but failure to observe its very spirit. The apparent conformity of certain acts to the rules of the constitution may cover up a real breach of the law. The decision can no longer be made by comparing the objective elements of political reality, the constitution or the laws on the one hand and a certain particular act on the other. A comparison needs now to be made between an act and the general end of government, this being the protection of the lives, liberties and possessions of the people.

Locke distinguishes thus between the "fundamental positive law of all commonwealths" and the "declared laws." The legality and the legitimacy of the acts of the ruling power result from their agreement with these two kinds of law: The "declared laws" conform naturally to the "fundamental law," but it does not follow from this that every act of the executive or the legisla-

³¹ *Essay*, sect. 222.

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ture conforms to the "standing rules," even if these are in the spirit of the fundamental law. Through corruption and other means, the prince could observe the legal forms while at the same time breaking the law of nature. The right to resist bears witness to this possible deviation of acts from the letter of the rules and the spirit of the law of nature. The first of these deviations presents a legal problem which is relatively easy. As to the second of these deviations, the problem becomes a moral one. Gough³² has shown that the legal notions of contract and trust departed from their original meanings as soon as they became political categories: In particular, if in the course of its development, the notion of trust was used as much in a legal as in a general sense, it is no less true that in the end the moral meaning won out over the legal meaning.

By introducing the notion of "trust" Locke managed to distinguish abuse of confidence³³ from abuse of power. The latter belongs on the plane of legality, but the former on that of morals. Locke's criterion is an internal one, as opposed to the external criterion of abuse of power. It is this internal criterion which comes into play in the dissolution of government, "when the legislative, or the prince...act contrary to their trust." To conclude in this case that there was a neglect of duties or a violation of the entrusted mission, one must put intentions on trial. It is necessary to go beyond the acts committed by the civil authority, to try to grasp the intention embodied in them. To the extent that this intention goes against the ends that have motivated the political association, it sanctions the right to resist. The subjective nature of such a decision is confirmed by the vocabulary used to describe it. Locke speaks of the "general course and tendency of things" which confirms the suspicions about the "evil intention,"³⁴ or else of a "long train of abuses" which "make the design visible to the people," and in all these cases the people "cannot but feel what

³² Gough, *John Locke's Political Philosophy*, pp. 136-71.

³³ *Essay*, sect. 238.

³⁴ *Essay*, sect. 230.

they lie under, and see whither they are going."³⁵ It is less by judgment that the people decide whether the prince or the legislature fail in their mission, than by sentiment.

What guarantees the value of this sentiment? The sentiment comes indeed less from a comparison of objective elements than from a revelation of hidden designs. One could not lay it down as the foundation of the right to resist if it were only arbitrary, or only expressed an individual attitude. It gains in value to the extent that it is shared by the people "universally."³⁶ The universality of the sentiment guarantees its truth. To be more precise, in a given political society, it is less the universality than the generality of the sentiment that bears witness to a breach of trust. The participation of "the greater part" of the people establishes the objective reality of an evaluation which is in appearance subjective and arbitrary.

The concept of "public opinion" furnished Locke with the means of disengaging the sentiment of injustice from everything that might be subjective about it. An individual opinion becomes valuable by being extended to the majority. This was the only means of bestowing a certain objectivity on judgments of political intentions. To generalize such a judgment is to make it independent of all psychological forces foreign to the sentiment of justice. "I grant that the pride, ambition and turbulency of private men have sometimes caused great disorders in commonwealths, and factions have been fatal to states and kingdoms."³⁷ If the government is charged with failing in its mission merely by a private person or by a group of them, the charge is open to doubt and attributable to every motive other than the sentiment of justice. But if the charge is made by the majority of the people, it can be taken to be objective and just.

It is then the "opinion...of the people" or the people "who shall be judge,"³⁸ which is to say that the citizens as a whole can

³⁵ *Essay*, sect. 225.

³⁶ *Essay*, sect. 230.

³⁷ *Essay*, sect. 230.

³⁸ *Essay*, sects. 223 and 240.

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pronounce on the legitimacy of the present government and decide on resistance in case of iniquity. The same notion is to be found in Jurieu under the name of "public notoriety."³⁹ Both thinkers consider that there is a connection between government and the judgments of men. If the government is dependent on the judgments of individuals, it must be safeguarded against movements due to humor, caprice and the inconstancy of men. If the Calvinist theory of "the providential man" is abandoned, or that of natural protectors instituted by God,⁴⁰ and if every political or divine function is attributed to the private individual, and he is given back the power to judge the acts of government and the right to resist them, the value of human protestations must be placed on a solid footing. It is not the quality of the subject that guarantees the judgment to be well founded, but the number of the subjects who formulate or share it. In *John Locke and the Doctrine of Majority Rule*, Willmoore Kendall remarks that Locke abandons all terms referring to individuals and introduces collective terms ("the people," "society") as soon as he comes to the question of deciding whether the government has betrayed its mission. The use of these collective terms proves that resistance "operates not till the inconvenience is so great that the majority feel it, and are weary of it, and find a necessity to have it amended."⁴¹ Just as it is necessary to justify the legitimacy of the government and of settled rules, so the principle of the majority is necessary to assure the legitimacy of resistance.

Thus the distinction between abuse of power and abuse of confidence enables us to determine who precisely enjoys the right to resist: Insofar as there has been an abuse of power, it is the individual who has the right; but his exercise of this right is limited in fact by certain conditions. If the injustice extends only to isolated individuals, these have, no doubt, the right "to defend themselves, and to recover by force what by unlawful force is

³⁹ G. H. Dodge, *The Political Theory of the Huguenots of the Dispersion*, p. 112.

⁴⁰ See above, our note on Calvin.

⁴¹ *Essay*, sect. 168.

taken from them."⁴² When there has been an abuse of confidence, it is the majority who has the right to resist.

The use of the right to resist by the individual or by the people is translated into fact as a test of strength which calls in question the actual government and may establish a new power. In granting the subjects the initiative for insurrectionary action, is Locke not threatening every society with anarchy in the name of respect for the liberty of the individual? In fact, the limitations imposed on the right to resist give to insurrection the sense of a restoration of the state much more than of a liberation of the individual.

The individuals who have been wronged have theoretically the right to resist, "yet the right to do so will not easily engage them in a contest wherein they are sure to perish."⁴³ The conditions of fact limit in consequence not only the right to resist, but the use of this right. These conditions of fact are characterized by a disproportion between the strength of the isolated individual and that of the government. This irreducible disproportion which would assure him to "perish" is at the bottom of the hesitation which suspends the exercise of his right to resist. His regard for his own interest comes to supplement his awareness of an injured right and, when his case is dismissed, to annul any decision to resist. Psychology limits the exercise of the right to resist and its social consequences.

But if this psychological factor does not intervene, the objective situation, characterized by the disproportion of strength, plays the same role: "It being as impossible for one or a few oppressed men to disturb the government...as for a raving madman or heady malcontent to overturn a well-settled state."⁴⁴ Objectively, the injured individual finds that he resembles a malcontent or a madman, who is absolutely inoffensive to the government. Thus the exercise of the individual's right to resist is limited either by the objective situation or by psychology. In a similar manner, a certain number of factors come to limit the exercise

⁴² *Essay*, sect. 208.

⁴³ *Essay*, sect. 208.

⁴⁴ *Essay*, sect. 208.

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of the people's right to resist. We have seen that in the case of abuse of confidence, the individual no longer held the title to the right to resist; only the majority of the people were qualified to decide whether insurrection was justified. This denial of the individual's right to resist in favor of a popular right of resistance is, as Kendall has pointed out, a certain limitation of that right. But to this formal limitation come to be added factual restrictions which diminish still further its extent and efficacy. In the chapter in which he tries to reply to the most important objection of the enemies of insurrection who fear the governmental instability it would necessarily entail, Locke maintains that the people are at bottom conservative. They are, according to him, attached to their ancient institutions and will abandon them only with "slowness" and "aversion." Just as a certain psychological make-up came to limit the individual's right to resist by restraining its use, a sociological make-up limits the people's right to resist. In the individual, the instinct of self-preservation is the decisive reason for his hesitation to revolt. Between his subjective evaluation of the injustice and his revolt always comes the taking into consideration of an essential factor, which is his own interest. The people are not held back by the same motive. In fact, assurance or at least probability of success is not a factor that encourages them to revolt, and the dread of failure and the fear of risking one's life play no part. In place of the instinct of self-preservation we find an inertia characteristic of the masses which makes it difficult to incite the people "to amend the acknowledged faults in the frame which they have been accustomed to."⁴⁵ There is then, beside this attachment to ancient forms, or this conservatism, a perhaps more important attitude: that of becoming accustomed to injustice. The people are "more disposed to suffer than right themselves by resistance."⁴⁶ Sensibility is more acute in the individual than it

⁴⁵ *Essay*, sect. 223. Cf. the Declaration of Independence, voted for by the representatives of the United States of America, assembled in congress at Philadelphia, on July 4, 1776: "All experience has shown, that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed."

⁴⁶ *Essay*, sect. 230.

is in the people. The latter, on the one hand, have less perspicacity and fail to discern the injustice till "the ill designs of the rulers become visible."⁴⁷ It takes a "long train of abuses, prevarications, and artifices" to "make the design visible to the people."⁴⁸ On the other hand, "the examples of particular injustice or oppression of here and there an unfortunate man move them not."⁴⁹ And this inability to comprehend injustice renders every isolated act of injustice impotent. The popular conscience is not easily roused, but demands a considerable sum of infringements of the laws, neatly labelled. It is not a single governmental act, but a sum of facts which bears witness to the ill designs of the rulers. It follows that a revolt will not be the result of a momentary impulse, but the fruit of a long growth corresponding to the spread in time of the unlawful acts.

The conservative attitude and the more callous conscience of the people limit the use of the popular right to resist. Moreover, by the very fact that this right is explicitly recognized, it becomes the best security for political stability. Its recognition "is the best fence against rebellion and the probablest means to hinder it."⁵⁰ If the retainers of power know that every unlawful use of force can provoke an insurrection, they will hesitate to transgress the laws to avoid the dangers of a state of war. The recognition of the people's right to resist induces the rulers to use their power with more prudence. This recognition appears as an element of reason which may counterbalance those elements that tend to incite those who wield the power to abuse it: "The pretence they have to authority, the temptation of force they have in their hands, and the flattery of those about them," may lead "them who are in power" to set up force "in opposition to laws." The dread of insurrection is the most effective psychological instrument for removing the temptations of the prince.

⁴⁷ *Essay*, sect. 230.

⁴⁸ *Essay*, sect. 225.

⁴⁹ *Essay*, sect. 230.

⁵⁰ *Essay*, sect. 226.

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One might object that it is not necessary to grant the people a right to resist. For "the people generally ill treated, and contrary to right, will be ready upon any occasion to ease themselves of a burden that sits heavy upon them."⁵¹ The experience of life and history confirms this fact. To enshrine it in the law would be futile. Regard for this simple fact should play the same psychological role as its recognition as a right to resist.

Not so according to Locke, and this shows the real meaning of the right to resist. This right adds nothing to the field of possible action open to the people. The theory that recognizes the right to insurrection lays no more "ferment for frequent rebellion" than "any other hypothesis."⁵² The tendency to revolt against the government is a fact of nature, and it is similarly a fact of experience that "the change, weakness, and accidents of human affairs"⁵³ are not slow to offer opportunities for revolt. Popular psychology on the one hand and historical reality on the other make of revolt an inescapable fact in cases of repeated violations of the law. There is thus a kind of natural law that binds the revolt by the ruled to certain acts of the rulers; insurrection is the necessary consequence of unlawfulness. To act on the effect, we must act on its causes. Now, paradoxically, the best way of acting is to transform the fact into law, and thus to recognize the right to rebel. This right can then become an element in the psychological situation that is the source of the transgression of laws by the rulers. A new factor is introduced beside the three other factors mentioned (flattery, temptation of force, pretence to authority), and comes to modify the situation in such a way as to suppress the political cause of the revolt. The right to resist appears as a substitute for a natural law, destined to weigh on the decision of the rulers so that their acts can no longer provide an occasion for revolt. By transforming the fact of resistance into a right of resistance, Locke hopes to destroy the fact itself. The right of insurrection appears as the surest means of preventing insurrec-

⁵¹ *Essay*, sect. 224.

⁵² *Essay*, sect. 224.

⁵³ *Essay*, sect. 224.

tion. It becomes through its psychological role an element of the social mechanism whose final end is to protect the stability of the political system.

It is curious to note that the right of insurrection plays its role, not inasmuch as it is a right of the people, but inasmuch as it can become a psychological factor in the deliberations of the prince. Its true meaning is not to serve the interests of the people, but to preserve the ruling powers from any gross political errors. It can even be said that the recognition of this right is a typically conservative move. Insurrection has as its goal the maintenance of legal statutes; it never has a revolutionary goal, that of replacing one legal structure by a new one. The distinction between rebellion and resistance is but an attempt to eliminate the revolutionary import of insurrection and to render it impossible. By granting to the people the right to resist, one limits the power of the rulers without ever yielding more power to the people. This right is a piece of political machinery put in its place to assure the respect of legal norms by those who wield the power.

A final consideration will finally exhaust any revolutionary possibilities that the notion of resistance might still retain. The notion of trust invited the individual to compare the general aim of all government with the real meaning of its acts and laws. It was a matter of discerning the intentions of the rulers. The political judgment ceased to be an estimate of the legal type to become an evaluation of the moral kind. One might fear that by placing the debate on the moral plane, and by calling for a pronouncement on intentions and not on acts, the possible cases of resistance would be singularly multiplied. Now, by making intention the object of political judgments, Locke curtailed in fact the right to resist.

Governments are established with a view to realizing the public good. The institutions, laws, rules and acts of those who are in power concur to realize this end. Theoretically, the institutions and the embodiments of political power are means subordinate to the ends of those who lead, and their ends are identical with the ends of those who are governed. In practice, the results attained by the objective embodiments of power may go counter to the goals which called them forth. Political and legal systems bring forth results which no longer coincide with the goals men

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strive for. The philosophers of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, who have examined the notion of "alienation," invite us to recognize that human intentions are no longer found in the processes that embody them. We are thus led to distinguish two sorts of end: an objective end, where "end" refers to the result to which the application of laws and the acts of government lead, and a subjective end, where "end" refers to the goal consciously pursued by men.

Three notions thus emerge: the objective end, the subjective end of the rulers, and the subjective end of the ruled. One could imagine a political community which precipitated a revolution every time a discrepancy or a sequence of discrepancies was noted, be it between the objective end and the subjective end of the ruled, or between this and the subjective end of the rulers.

For the author of the *Essay*, there is no doubt that only the subjective end comes into play in deciding whether an insurrection would be opportune and legitimate. "Great mistakes in the ruling part, many wrong and inconvenient laws, and all the slips of human frailty will be borne by the people without mutiny or murmur."⁵⁴ The unforeseen consequences of certain measures may be "inconvenient" or even contrary to the principles of justice; but if the people have the feeling that they are the consequence of an error in judgment and not the deliberate result of an evil intention, they will "bear" them. A distinction is thus made between a political fault and a political error, a distinction which corresponds to the one we made between objective and subjective ends. "Error" is the name given to the possibilities of alienation contained in every human action. It marks the distance that separates the factual end from the strived-for goal. It has its source in "human frailty" and thus shows itself to be an ineluctable consequence of the human condition. On the other hand, a political fault expresses the distance between the intentions of the governors and those of the governed; the will of "them who are in power" is no longer at one with the will of those who have entrusted this power to them. Only in this case do the people have the right to revolt.

Locke imposes thus a singular limitation on political respon-

⁵⁴ *Essay*, sect. 225.

sibility, and this limitation is born of the conviction that it is not the objective functioning of the institutions that tells a bad government from a good one, but the intention that presides at the drafting of the laws. Twentieth-century political theories, especially in "popular democracies" where the distinction between error and fault is abolished and where a mistake is treason and an accident becomes sabotage, all agree that any governmental team whatsoever can be eliminated in the name of the public good. The confusion between subjective and objective ends leads one to forget that intention is an element in political responsibility, and to multiply, as a result, the occasions and pretexts for political upheavals. In Locke's system on the other hand, the need to grasp the evil intention behind the actions of the government, far from enlarging the possibilities of popular action, narrows down the cases where insurrection would be legitimate.

An article of the constitution of Carolina enables us to see in this distinction between two sorts of end a deliberate attempt to restrict the people's right to insurrection. Even if this constitution was not entirely the work of Locke, who was then confident of Shaftesbury's future it reflects his ideas. One article of this constitution stipulates that all the laws be repealed every hundred years. This stipulation is evidently to be understood as a means of easing the burden of the laws.⁵⁵ It shows that the authors of the constitution were aware of a possible conflict between the aims of a society and the laws it gave to itself. But this conflict would not have to be resolved by insurrection, since a special mechanism was provided for this purpose. To conclude, the right to resist in Locke's political system comes in only when there is no longer an identity of intention between rulers and ruled to realize the public good. By demanding that intention be always taken into account, Locke decreases the responsibility of the authorities and restrains the area of application of the right to revolution.

The conservative accent of such a theory or of such a fiction is brought out again by the connection between opposition and resistance. Opposition, like resistance, constitutes a legitimate suspension of the duty of obedience. Such legal disobedience is

⁵⁵ Edouard Laboulaye, *Locke, législateur de la Caroline*, p. 18.

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not connected with the notion of consent, for even if "the beginning of a politic society depends upon the consent of the individuals to join into and make one society,"⁵⁶ it is nonetheless true that "the majority have a right to act and conclude the rest."⁵⁷ It follows that a member of a minority group cannot legitimately oppose a law under the pretext that he did not consent to it. Legitimate opposition makes its appearance when there has been an abuse of power. In the chapter "Of Tyranny," Locke sanctions disobedience when the conduct of subordinate magistrates conflicts with the prescriptions of the law. "He that has authority to seize my person in the street may be opposed as a thief and a robber if he endeavors to break into my house to execute a writ, notwithstanding that I know he has such a warrant and such a legal authority as will empower him to arrest me abroad."⁵⁸ The infraction of the law momentarily denudes the guilty official of his position of authority in relation to the wronged individual, and the relation that takes the place of that relation, between the functionary and the victim, is no longer that of subordination of citizen to magistrate, but of equality between one individual and another. The function has thus come to be dissociated from the person, and opposition to a magistrate does not mean that his attributes are challenged. Not even the principle of authority is therefore called in question.

Locke makes a similar distinction between orders and authority: One may oppose the orders of the prince without meaning to call his authority in question. Besides, to make it easier to oppose the orders of the prince without prejudice to his authority, "in some countries the person of the prince by the law is sacred, and so whatever he commands or does, his person is still free from all question or violence, nor liable to force, or any judicial censure or condemnation...unless he will...actually put...himself into a state of war with his subjects:"⁵⁹ The inviolability of the

⁵⁶ *Essay*, sect. 106.

⁵⁷ *Essay*, sect. 95.

⁵⁸ *Essay*, sect. 202.

⁵⁹ *Essay*, sect. 205.

prince or the sacredness of "the person of the chief magistrate" is thus a way of assuring the existence of opposition without endangering the government. The result is on the one hand that opposition to orders does not call in question the principle of authority, and on the other, that opposition transforms the relation of subordination of subject to magistrate into a relation of equality between individuals. At this point, in virtue of the principle that no man has the right to "invade" by force "the right of another,"⁶⁰ it is enough to have recourse to justice to obtain satisfaction. The possibility of such recourse marks the line between resistance and opposition. "For where the injured party may be relieved and his damages repaired by appeal to the law, there can be no pretence for force, which is only to be used where a man is intercepted from appealing to the law." And Locke adds: "For nothing is to be accounted hostile force but where it leaves not the remedy of such an appeal."⁶¹ The move from opposition to resistance takes place at the precise moment when the authorities refuse to give satisfaction. Opposition and resistance appear then as two stages in the defence of the rights of the individual, opposition being the sign of future resistance.

But it could serve at the same time as a means of preventing insurrection. In speaking of opposition, Locke says that "notwithstanding such resistance, the king's person and authority are still both secured, and so no danger to governor or government."⁶² Opposition can therefore be regarded as an institutionalized mechanism whose function is to exhaust all possible means short of recourse to resistance. Opposition is thus a safety-valve: It warns the government that one of their orders is unlawful or badly carried out; it signifies unlawfulness and at the same time poses the problem of resistance; and it provides the government with the means of avoiding resistance or else of provoking it. In Locke's theory, all the wheels are set in motion to prevent entrusting to the people the task of deciding whether a political change

⁶⁰ *Essay*, sect. 202.

⁶¹ *Essay*, sect. 207.

⁶² *Essay*, sect. 206.

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is called for. Paradoxically, if the right to resist is granted to the people, the initiative to exercise this right is taken away from them. The right is used not with a view to realizing their deepest aspirations, but to defending the established order or restoring it. Such a political philosophy will find in this theory of the right to resist the surest means of safeguarding the state against those who wield the power: The power of the people is kept in abeyance, as a standing warning to the rulers: If these do not heed the warning and betray their mission, this power serves to put the state back on the right road. The recognition of the right to resist is designed to make use of the power of the people by divesting them of the choice of the ends for which it is to be used.

The interest of the state may, no doubt, coincide with the interest of the people, at least theoretically. Now it is obvious that Locke is not concerned to put forward a theory which would make the people sovereign: He "fears as much the sovereignty of the people as that of a despot."⁶³ And even if he acknowledges that "*Salus populi suprema lex* is certainly so just and fundamental a rule, that he who sincerely follows it cannot dangerously err,"⁶⁴ it might be noted that the limits he imposes on the authorities come much more from his recognition of rights of Nature than from his adoption of the Latin maxim.⁶⁵ But if the end of the state is to defend the natural rights of the individual, the choice of these rights and the manner in which the relations between them are envisaged may well lead to a discrepancy between the end of the state and the interest of the people.

The state ought to protect the "property" of the individual; for as Locke writes, men form a society for the sake of the "mutual preservation of their lives, liberties and estates, which I call by the general name—property."⁶⁶ Now these three elements turn out not to have exactly the same value, and it is property

⁶³ R. Derathé, *op. cit.*, p. 291.

⁶⁴ *Essay*, sect. 158.

⁶⁵ *Essay*, sect. 18.

⁶⁶ *Essay*, sect. 123; cf. also sects. 87 and 173.

in the restricted sense of the term which is the most important element in the *Treatises of Civil Government*.⁶⁷

The end of the state is to protect this kind of property and, by extension, the owners of this kind of property. As Mary Coate has written, "property" and "political power" become once again synonymous terms.⁶⁸ It is true that Locke did not explicitly hold what Harrington had, a few years earlier: that political power was a function of economic power.⁶⁹ But everything proceeds in Locke's writings as if there was a rule by which power was bestowed in proportion to property. The constitution of Carolina allows a subject to participate in government in a more or less direct manner according to the amount of land he owns; and this might illustrate Locke's desire to defend property. Similarly, whether or not Locke can be shown to have been influenced by the morals of his time, and in particular, by the Calvinist contempt for the poor, the lazy and the vagrant,⁷⁰ it is nonetheless true that he seems persuaded that the degree of a man's worth varies more or less with the amount of his possessions: Beggars are corrupt, and laborers have neither the time nor the desire to think of other things besides their own subsistence.⁷¹ Manual labor is even incompatible with reflection, and only reflection allows one to

⁶⁷ L. Arénilla, "Propriété et liberté chez Locke," *Cahiers de l'I.S.E.A.* (Recherches et dialogues philosophiques et économiques), No. 99, March 1960, Series M, No. 7.

⁶⁸ Mary Coate, *Social Life in Stuart England*: "Finally with the revolution, which a territorial aristocracy, backed by national approval, had effected, the landed interest became still more powerful; once again land and political power were synonymous terms, and, in the writings of Locke, men found a reasoned defence of their most cherished idol, the individual ownership of the land, for property now found itself elevated into a natural right." (p. 12).

⁶⁹ Gough, *John Locke's Political Philosophy*, p. 84.

⁷⁰ R. H. Tawney, *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism*.

⁷¹ John Locke, *Some Considerations on the Consequences of the Lowering of Interest and the Raising of the Value of Money*.

Notes and Discussion

become the master of one's liberty and reason.⁷² To conclude, even though the word "class" never appears in Locke,⁷³ there is a very neat distinction between the propertied and the propertyless.⁷⁴

It is in this that Locke's work mirrors his times. The political events of the seventeenth century in England did not just constitute a "Puritan revolution," to use Gardiner's phrase; contemporary historians underplay the religious aspect⁷⁵ of these events to bring out their economic and social causes. The first revolution under Cromwell favored the birth or the manifestation of democratic tendencies, or even communist ones: The Levellers proclaimed the sovereignty of the people, and the Diggers turned communism into a political program. After the return of Charles II, a republican opposition remained, drawing its support from the laboring classes in London and other big cities, and was responsible for several local uprisings. It was the threat of its continued existence that forced the ruling classes to depose James II and to call William of Orange.⁷⁶

The right to resist in Locke's treatise expressed to perfection the needs and desires of a rising class for a stable state which would protect the property-owners against the despotism of the people. The individual or the people, as the case may be, have the right to judge the conduct of the rulers and, if need be, to resist them. But the conditions of the use of this right are such that it becomes a merely formal and theoretical right, at most a psychological menace hanging over the heads of the authorities

⁷² John Locke, *The Reasonableness of Christianity, as delivered in the Scriptures* (*Works*, vol. VI, p. 157): "Where the hand is used to the plough and the spade, the head is seldom elevated to sublime notions."

⁷³ R. Polin, *La Politique morale de J. Locke*, p. 40, note 5, and p. 272, note 2.

⁷⁴ M. Macpherson, "The Social Bearing of Locke's Political Theory," *Western Political Quarterly*, 1954 (vol. VII).

⁷⁵ To the extent of incurring the blame of ignoring the religious meaning of 1688. Cf. E. Weil, "La Restauration des Stuarts et les historiens anglais," *Critique*, July 1951 (No. 50), pp. 628-34.

⁷⁶ M. Dobb, *Studies in the Development of Capitalism*, p. 174.

and guiding their decisions. Its role is not to destroy the government, but to assure its continuity. This is the difference between rebellion and insurrection: The former seeks to replace one government by another, and to destroy the state to set up a new political structure. The latter is opposed to any replacement and any change; it seeks to preserve a historical structure with its legal scaffolding. It is, besides, for this reason that this right is a consequence and not the cause of the dissolution of government. For as soon as the prince betrays the mission that has been entrusted to him and becomes guilty of the "alienation of his kingdom,"⁷⁷ there is a power vacuum that provides an incentive to resistance. This was incidentally the situation that confronted the Chamber of Commons when it took note on February 23, 1689, of the fall of the king: "that King James having endeavored to subvert the constitution of the kingdom by breaking the original contract between King and people...having violated the Fundamental laws and having withdrawn himself has abdicated, and that the throne is vacant."⁷⁸ Alone and to the exclusion of any popular will, the power vacuum becomes the cause of insurrection whose only object is to restore the legal order. Just as the right of resistance was designed to keep the prince within the bounds of lawfulness, resistance itself is designed to rebuild a power for whose destruction the prince himself bore the blame, and to have his mission carried out again after it was momentarily interrupted or forgotten.

This connection of the notion of resistance with the notion of trust brings out the fundamentally anti-popular character of Locke's theory of insurrection. The moral or even religious element that remains within the notion of trust, as in the contemporary use of the word for certain colonial statutes, reveals a distrustful and at the same time protective attitude towards the governed. Besides, there is in Locke no provision for a constitutional recognition of the right to resist. The people do not appear to enjoy explicitly this liberty by which they participate actively in the

⁷⁷ *Essay*, sect. 238.

⁷⁸ H. D. Foster, "International Calvinism through Locke and the Revolution of 1688," *The American Historical Review*, 1926-7 (vol. XXXII), p. 492.

march of events in their country.⁷⁹ Locke's refusal to institutionalize the right to resist emphasizes its theoretical and ideal nature.⁸⁰ To sum up, even though it be the violent reaction of the individual who challenges and disowns his state, insurrection, as Locke conceived of it, offers no revolutionary possibilities.

It should be noted, by the way, that "insurrection" did not appear to have this sense, either to Locke's contemporaries or in the nineteenth or the twentieth century. The *Bibliothèque universelle et historique* of 1690 praises the author of the *Treatises of Civil Government* for having treated "with as much freedom as moderation...the whole of a delicate subject."⁸¹ In 1691, it acknowledges once again that "the author of the book has followed a just course midway between two such dangerous opinions whose consequences appear equally terrifying."⁸² In the seventeenth century, Mably in his *Traité de l'étude de la politique* advises his readers to read the *Treatises of Civil Government* with the most careful attention, and to reread them several times to notice the errors which escaped Locke himself as a result of that "respect which every Englishman has for his government." On the occasion of the reprint of its fifth edition, the *Gazette nationale* dedicated

⁷⁹ Groerhuysen, "Le libéralisme de Montesquieu et la liberté telle que l'entendent les républicains," *Europe*, Jan. 1949.

⁸⁰ In this connection it is interesting to note that, at the time of the French Revolution, the thermidorian republicans and the constitutional monarchists, anxious to block the road to democracy and to forestall the coming of a dictatorship, refused to write the right to resist into the constitution. The Commission of the Eleven, nominated on Germinal 29 of the year III (April 18, 1795) to draft bills in accordance with the constitution of 1793, assigned itself the different task of drafting a new constitution, and Boissy d'Anglas's declaration in the name of this commission is worth noting: "You will agree that it is impossible to describe with precision the cases in which insurrection is legitimate and becomes a right, and on the other hand, that if there is an occasion on which vague provisions can be disastrous, it is this. But there is a general truth, which is that when insurrection is general, there is no need for apologies, and when it is particular, it is always blameworthy. We have therefore suppressed Article 35 which was the work of Robespierre and which, on more than one occasion, has been the rallying cry of armed brigands against you."

⁸¹ December 1690.

⁸² May 1691.

an article⁸³ to Locke's treatises, and in a period when the democratic spirit was suffering a setback, the reviewer presented the treatises as a "valuable work to which the present circumstances lend new interest." In the nineteenth century, Edouard Laboulaye saw in Shaftesbury and Locke "enemies of democracy who regarded it as dangerous for the state and incapable of creating anything permanent."⁸⁴ Finally, in the twentieth century, Locke's theory has never served as backing for political parties who sought to found new political institutions or to abolish private property by an act of government.⁸⁵

The right of civil disobedience, as it appears in Locke's political philosophy, has as its goal the maintenance of a state of law and order, faithful to the original definitions which gave birth to it. The insurrection it sanctions is at the opposite extreme from the revolutionary form of insurrection which claims to express, through the dynamics of classes, the meaning of history. In this sense, it is characteristic of liberal thought, conceived as an axiomatic system that organizes a universe of right in which private property on the one hand and the right to insurrection on the other, are the primitive propositions. Philosophers and especially Locke will undoubtedly deny the arbitrary and contingent nature of the fundamental principles of the community of men, and instead of presenting them as such, will derive them as the expression of a right that is eminently natural and eternal. Revolutionary insurrection looks towards the future; the right of resisting the state, by proclaiming that certain insurrections are legitimate, has no other purpose than to outlaw them all: on the one hand, by denying their "forward-looking" character, and by posing as infallible respect for intangible forms; and on the other, by reducing its existence and its function to a simple ever-present normative idea in the hope that, one day, it will not have to become real.

⁸³ *Gazette nationale*, March 26, 1796 (No. 186).

⁸⁴ E. Laboulaye, *Locke, législateur de la Caroline*, p. 10.

⁸⁵ To our knowledge, the republic of El Salvador is at present the only country whose constitution mentions insurrection as the most sacred of duties against a dictatorship that suppresses the fundamental liberties of man. The republic of El Salvador is not an especially revolutionary republic.

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